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ABSTRACT
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IN HOBBES'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
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A careful reading of Hobbes's philosophical writings

reveals that this author forwards no fewer than three

distinct conceptions of the pre-political situation which he
labels "the natural condition of humankind," or "the state
of nature." By examining the relevant passages from The

Elements of Law

,

De Give and Leviathan

.

Hobbes's three

principal works of political philosophy,

I

demonstrate that

Hobbes's state of nature should not be interpreted as

a

single invariant concept but rather as a series of three

distinct heuristic or expository models. Further,

I

claim

that distinctions between Hobbes's various conceptions of
the state of nature reflect differing background assumptions

concerning such factors as the prevailing degree of group

stability and the level of abstractness with which

representative human beings are characterized
After establishing this framework,

I

examine why Hobbes

chose to include three distinct conceptions of the state of

nature within his writings, and explore the relationship
VI

which appears to obtain among these three conceptions.

I

next examine the manner by which each of Hobbes's three
types of commonwealth, namely commonwealth by institution,

commonwealth by preservation and commonwealth by
acquisition, can be understood to arise from each of

Hobbes's three conceptions of the state of nature. In this
section,

I

focus my analysis upon the transitions which

occur when the unencumbered and isolated individuals who

inhabit the state of nature (in its various forms) enter
into the social contract by "transferring" their respective

rights of nature to the sovereign of their incipient

commonwealth. Moreover,

I

examine Hobbes's explanation of

why each subject incurs an obligation to obey his

sovereign's decrees and

I

address the apparent difficulty of

maintaining the subjects' allegiance to their sovereign in
light of Hobbes's portrayal of human beings as passionate

and predominantly self-serving creatures.

I

conclude by

arguing that given Hobbes's characterization of humans as

passionate and predominantly self-serving creatures, one can
probably not expect commonwealths to arise in the manner
that Hobbes describes, and one can certainly not expect such

commonwealths, if established, to endure for any substantial
period of time.

Vll
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CHAPTER

I

HOBBES’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
A.

Introduction

Hobbes’s theory of human sensation
plays

a significant
role in his theory of motivation,
and within Hobbes’s
system, human motivation significantly
affects the behavior
which human beings can be expected to
exhibit when they
confront one another in the state of
nature. ^ Thus, by

understanding Hobbes’s beliefs concerning
the nature of the
individual human organism, we might better
understand the
character of Hobbes’s pre-social or
pre-political
interactive state.
A discussion of Hobbes’s conception of
the human

organism is also appropriate since the state of
nature,
political commonwealths, and all other types of human
groups
are composed of human beings, whom Hobbes alleged
to possess
a

specific and inflexible nature. Indeed, in his

introduction to De Cive

.

Hobbes contends that ’’everything is

best understood by its constituent causes,
a

.

.

.

so to make

more curious search into the rights of states and the

duties of subjects, it is necessary that we rightly

understand what the quality of human nature is, [and] in
what matters it is, in what not fit to make up civil

government
Accordingly,

I

will devote the first chapter of this

dissertation to an exploration of Hobbes’s analysis of human

beings in abstracto

so that

in the following chapters,

might describe and consider,

I

the "social” or interactive

condition which Hobbes thought likely to result when two or
more human beings are forced to confront each other without
the benefit of some coercive power that is sufficiently

powerful to constrain or control the actions of these
bsings. Since Hobbes began the body of his masterwork
a than

with

a

discussion of human sensory activity, and

since this topic of human sensation plays

a

significant role

in Hobbes's theory of human motivation and behavior,
a

this is

fitting topic with which to begin.
B.

Hobbes on Sensation

Before beginning my actual discussion of Hobbes's
doctrine of sense, it should be mentioned that Hobbes uses
the term 'sense'

to refer to two related,

though clearly

different bodily processes. Specifically, Hobbes employs the
term 'sense' to refer to (A) the process by which ideas,
thoughts or phantasms come to be generated within, and come
to be experienced by,

the percipient subject; and' (less

familiarly) to (B) the process by which the sensations of

pleasure and pain come to be generated within, and come to
be experienced by, the percipient subject.

Further, it should be noted that Hobbes forwards

a

"dua 1 -aspect " model of both of the abovementioned varieties
of sense,

according to which each instance of sensory
2

activity can be identified as both (C)

purely mechanical

a

act occuring within the relevant sensory
subject's body, and
as

(D)

an appearance, "seeming" or feeling which is

experienced, as an object of immediate conscious awareness,
by the relevant sensory subject.

Indeed, Hobbes identifies

the first variety of sense (A) as both (C) "the reaction
and

endeavour outwards in the organ of sense caused by an

endeavour inwards from the [perceptual] object,"^ and as
(D)

etc.

such phenomenal images or ideas as colors, shapes,

Moreover, Hobbes identifies the second variety of

sense (B) as both (C) "the quickening or slackening, helping
or hindering

of vital motion within the sensory subject's

body and as (D) instances of pain or pleasure within the

consciousness of the sensory subject.^
Unhappily, during his various discussions of the first
type of sense (A), Hobbes frequently conflates (C) the

notion of
organ of

a
a

phantasm of sense as motion within the sensory
percipient subject with (D) the notion of

phantasm of sense as

a

phenomenal appearance or an immediate

a

object of awareness. However, for the sake of brevity,

I

will forego presenting a needlessly extended discussion of

this distinction. Nevertheless, the reader should be alerted
that during my forthcoming presentation of Hobbes's first

variety of sense (A),

I

will be using the term 'sense'

phantasm of sense] to refer both to (C)
3

a

mechanico-

[or

physiological action and to (D) the immediate object of
conscious awareness.^
In this initial section of Chapter 1,

I

will concisely

present Hobbes's theory of human sensation as this is set
forward in Leviathan and De Corpora

will be presenting a

I

.

recapitulation of what Hobbes actually wrote about the
physiological process which he identifies as human
sensation.

I

will, however,

refrain from commenting upon the

specific difficulties which can be seen to emerge throughout
Hobbes

s

discussions of this topic and instead concentrate

upon what Hobbes believes it means for

experience
,

a

faculties.

human being to

sensory episode. 7

In Leviathan

organism with

a

a

,

Hobbes begins his account of the human

rather brief discussion of the human sensory

In the opening sentences of the initial

chapter

of this work, Hobbes explains that each thought which arises

in the mind of man "is the representation,

some quality, or other accident of

Q

*

In turn,

the basis of

each of these thoughts or ideas is that which Hobbes calls
sense. Hobbes immediately explains that there exists no

conception in

a

man's mind which "hath not at first,

totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of
sense.

Hence, as we will go on to discuss in more

detail later in this chapter, each consciously perceived
4

of

body without [him],

a

which is commonly called an object."

or appearance,

thought, idea, or mental image, whether it is perceived in
the act of sensation, or stored in the mind and later

recalled, as in the case of memories and "imaginations,"^^
is ultimately derived from some instance of human sensory

activity. Although the "raw data" which is presented in the

form of sensory images may be combined, parcelled, separated
and reorganized in a potentially limitless number of ways,
and the human mind possesses the capacity to carry out these

reorganizations, such operations can be carried out onl
upon those images which have at some earlier time been

acquired through sense.
Hobbes introduces his account of the causes of

sensation (A) in his 1656 work De Corpora by inviting his
readers to notice that our "phantasms or ideas are not

always the same; but that new ones appear to us, and old
ones vanish, according as we apply our organs of sense now
to one object, now to another."

Thus, we may notice that

when we are awake, possess properly functioning organs of
sense, and fail to experience any external hindrances to the

functioning of these organs (such as, in the case of sight,

blindfolds or other opaque objects), we experience

a

succession of phenomenal states which Hobbes refers to as
"ideas," as "images," and sometimes as "phantasms."

Hobbes reasons that since we continually experience
this successive flow of images (often against our will).
5

some cause must exist which accounts for the
generation of
new images and the "perishing" of old or
formerly

experienced ones. Hobbes concludes that these generations
and perishings are ultimately due to "some change
or

mutation in the sentient," that is, in some portion of
the
body of the person who experiences such sensat i ons
Throughout his various considerations of the topic of
sensation, Hobbes is careful to distinguish between the
subject of sensation, that is, the sentient being or subject
in whom the aforementioned alteration is effected, and the
p b j e c t of sensation, which Hobbes takes,

in all

instances,

to be some physical object which, by imparting motion within

the sentient being, accounts for such alterations, and thus
for the phenomena of sense.

Indeed, Hobbes claims that

sense is "some internal motion of the sentient, generated by
some internal motion of the parts of the object and

propagated through all the media to the innermost part of
the organ," and that "the cause of sense is the external
body, or object which presseth the organ proper to each

sense, either immediately

...

or mediatel y

(immediately in the case of touch or taste, and mediately in
the case of sight, hearing and smell).

In turn,

this

"pressure, by the mediation of the nerves and other strings
and membranes of the body, continueth inwards to the brain
and heart, causeth there a resistance or counterpressure of
6

the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour,
because

outward, seemeth to be some matter without."^®
Thus, Hobbes maintains that once the impulse or

"pressure” which had originally been generated by the object
of sense reaches the innermost part of the organ,

the end of

the transit line, as it were, the organ generates a

counterpressure, or reacts by producing

a

quantity of motion

which Hobbes specifies as being opposite (though not

necessarily equal) to the motion of the external object
which initiated this process. As

a

result of the organ's

endeavour outward, which may be construed as

a

reaction

against an externally generated endeavour to the "innermost
part of the organ," there occurs a phantasm or idea such as

"light and color," and "heat and sound.

Hobbes goes on to mention that "the motion of an organ,
by which a phantasm is made,

is not commonly called sense

unless the object be present."

1

fi

"The phantasm remaining

after the object is removed," he asserts, "is called fancy
and in Latin imaginatio.'^^^ Although he concedes that the

Latin word 'imaginatio' properly refers to the image (or

afterimage) made in seeing, he claims, nevertheless, that
the term is often (though improperly) used to refer to the

afterimage made by any of the five senses. Following common
usage, however, he stipulates that he will use 'imagination'
in this wider signification,

that is, to describe the
7

phantasm or the motion remaining
in any of the sensory
organs after the object which
caused it has been removed.
Thus,

imagination, as Hobbes tersely defines
it, is "nothing
but decaying sense,
or "sense decayed or weakened,
by the
absence of the object.

Hobbes contends that imagination (or
fancy) and memory
differ only in "that memory supposeth
the time past, which
fancy doth not
Moreover,
.

[i]n memory, the phantasms we consider
are as if
they were worn out with time; but in
our fancy we
consider them as they are; which distinction
is
not of the things themselves, but of the
considerations of the sentient.

Similarly, in Leviathan

Hobbes explains that "[t]his

.

decaying sense, when we would express the thing
itself,
mean fancy itself), we call the imagination,

.

.

.

(I

but when

we would express the decay, and signify that the
sense is

fading, old, and past, it is called memory.

Thus, the

distinction between memory and the imagination consists not
fh® nature of the previously produced, and presently

retained phantasm which is presented to the sentient, but
rather in the sentient's consideration of that phantasm.
Interestingly, at the beginning of section 12 of

chapter 25 of De Corpore

.

Hobbes announces that^^

8

there is another kind of sense.
namely
sense of pleasure and pain, proceeding not the
from
the reaction of the heart outwards but
from the
continual action of the outermost portion of
the
organ toward the heart. For the original of life
being in the heart, that motion in the sentient
which is propagated to the heart, must necessarily
make some alteration or diversion of vital motion,
namely by quickening or slackening, helping or
hindering the same. Now when it helpeth, it is [my
emphasis] pleasure, when it hindreth, it is pain,
trouble, grief &c.
.

.

Though his description of this "second type of sense" (B) is
rather brief, and not terribly detailed, what Hobbes appears
to be saying is that when an external object presses upon,
or transfers motion to the outermost portion of some sensory

organ of

a

particular human body, and as this pulse of

energy makes its way from the outermost, toward the

innermost portion of that organ (viz, that human's heart),
the motion associated with this pulse, by disturbing

adjacent internal bodily tissue, sometimes has the effect of
either helping or hindering the vital motion within that

human body (when such vital motion is understood to be "the

motion of the blood which circulates in the veins and
arteries

.

)

Crucially, Hobbes notes that the sense of pleasure and
pain should be distinguished from the variety of sense

"which is made by the reaction of the organ."

Thus, while

the variety of sense which Hobbes associates with phantasms
of colors,

shapes, smells, etc. are said to be "made" (in
9

Hobbes's words) by the heart's reaction to externally

generated motion, which is transferred to the heart through
the internal bodily tissue which constitutes the sensory

the variety of sense which Hobbes identifies as

pleasure and pain can be conceived of as being "made" as
that pulse of energy moves from the outermost portion, to
irinermost portion of the individual 's relevant sensory

organ.

Specifically, if that parcel of externally generated

motion, as it makes its way

t

oward the innermost portion of

the organ of sense, has the effect of enhancing the vital

motion within that individual's body, then the individual
will experience the sense of pleasure, and if that parcel of

motion has the effect of hindering the vital motion within
that individual's body, then the individual will experience
the sense of pain. Clearly, however, before we can

adequately understand the workings of this process by which
the sensations of pain and pleasure are generated, it

behooves us to examine Hobbes's descriptions of vital and
animal motion.
C.

Hobbes's Account of Vital and Animal Motion

Hobbes identifies, and goes on to discuss two types of

motion specific to the human body, namely, vital motion and

voluntary (or animal) motion. In Leviathan

,

Hobbes

charact eri zes vital motion as that which is "begun in

generation, and continued without interruption through
10

[one's] whole life; such as the course of blood,
the

breathing, concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc. to
which

such motions there needs no help of imagination."^^

^rpore

Hobbes describes vital motion as "the motion of the

,

blood, perpetually circulating.

arteries

In De

.

.

in the veins and

.

Animal or voluntary motion, on the other hand, is

characterized as "depend[ing] always upon

a

precedent

thought of whither, which way and what," that is, in such

manner as is first fancied in our minds.

As might be

expected, Hobbes describes both types of bodily motion in
terms of mechanical processes, and characterizes animal

motion as

a

feature of the organism which functions

primarily to enhance or preserve vital motion.
We might reasonably interpret Hobbes's vital motion as
the sum of the involuntary or autonomic motions of the human
body, which are necessary to sustain the proper functioning
of the organism.

If,

to use a convenient example,

of a particular individual

the heart

ceased to function, that is,

ceased to circulate blood, and thus to provide oxygen to the
various portions of that person's body, life in that

person's body would come to an end. Indeed, within his
writings, Hobbes identifies life with the vital motion which
serves to distinguish living from inanimate matter (which
is,

nevertheless, subject to being moved). In fact, in the
11

Introduction to Leviathan

.

Hobbes characterizes life as

’’but

motion of the limbs, the beginning whereof is in some
principal part within,” and in De Corpore states that "the
original of all life [is] in the heart
*^^^^^^ 9 ^ishes

.

Presumably, what

living objects such as men, dogs and insects,

from such non-living objects as stones, metal ingots, and

brick walls is not that objects of the former but not of the
latter variety are subject to local motion or motion

simpliciter, but rather that these former objects, unlike
those of the latter type, are subject to vital and animal

motion
Hobbes asserts, in section 12 of chapter 25 of De

Corpore

,

that vital motion is from time to time^^

hindered by some motion made by the action of
sensible objects, [and] may be r estored again
either by bending or setting str aight the parts of
the body; which is done when the spirits are
carried now into these, now into other nerves,
till the pain, so far as possibl e, be quite taken
away. But if vital motion be hel ped by motion made
by sense, then the parts of the organ will be
disposed to guide the spirits in such manner as
conduceth most to the preservati on and
augmentation by the help of the nerves And in
animal motion, this is the very first endeavour
moveth its
found even in the embryo, which
limbs with voluntary motion for the avoiding of
whatsoever troubleth it, or for the pursuing of
what pleaseth it.
.

.

Thus,

.

.

for example, an appetite toward some object can be

conceived as arising within

a

human being's body when
12

a

sensation of pain (caused by

a

hindering of vital motion)

motivates or moves that body in the direction of an object,
the acquisition of which will, in the estimation of that

human being, relieve his presently experienced sensation of
by restoring to a healthy state his bodv

*

s

currently

inhibited level of vital motion.
Crucially, both of the previously described varieties
of Hobbesian sensation are involved in the process by which

an appetite or an aversion,

toward or

a

that is to say, a tiny motion

tiny motion away from some external object, is

generated or experienced. Thus, for example,

a

sensation of

pain might be identified as the factor which initiates this
sequence, since such

a

sensed pain essentially establishes

goal to be achieved (namely the alleviation of pain within

the sensory subject's body) while a sensory survey of the

objects within one's environment (that is, instances of

sensation as it relates to the perception of external
physical objects) can be understood to provide suggestions
to the sensory subject regarding how the established goal

can be achieved.
In fact, Hobbes characterizes this imagining (in this

instance, the thought which arises in the mind of the

sensory subject) as "the first internal beginning of all

voluntary motion.

"These small beginnings of motion,

within the body of man, before they appear in walking.
13

a

sleeping, striking, and other visible actions,”
maintains
Hobbes,

are commonly called endeavours

.

Though at this

point, one might infer that all endeavours result
in or lead
to such visible actions as walking,

Hobbes

s

speaking and striking,

subsequent discussion makes clear that this is not

the case.

Immediately after beginning his discussion of the
interior beginnings of voluntary motion, Hobbes draws

a

distinction between the two types of such small interior
motions, namely appetites (or desires) and aversions. An
"endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it,"

Hobbes announces, "is called appetite or desire.

.

.

[a]nd

when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally
called aversion."

Hobbes further opines that while some

appetites such as the appetite for food, the appetite for

excretion "and some others not many" are born with man, all
others, which are appetites of particular things, are

acquired through experience. Moreover, Hobbes claims that
"of things we know not at all or believe not to be," we can

have

a

desire only "to taste and try."

Therefore, Hobbes believed that from birth, human

beings possess (or generate)
is,

a

small number of general

(that

generally directed) appetites, which are appetites for

objects that are necessary to maintain the vital motion of

14

that organism.

Corpore

,

Indeed,

in section 12 of chapter 25 of De

Hobbes claims that^’
little infants, at the beginning and as soon as
they are born, have appetite to a very few things,
as also they avoid very few, by their want of
experience and memory; and therefore they have not
so great a variety of animal motion as we see in
those that are more grown. For it is not possible,
without such knowledge as is derived from sense,
that is, without experience and memory, to know
what will prove pleasant or hurtful.

Hobbes contends further that "afterwards, by accustoming

themselves little by little, they come to know readily what
is to be pursued and avoided;

and also, to have ready use of

their nerves and organs, in the pursuing and avoiding of

good and bad
Thus,

.

the ability to successfully maintain

pleasurable state of bodily constitution, or

a

a

condition of

vigorous vital motion within one's body (through one's own
efforts), is an acquired skill which depends upon or

presupposes experience and memory. In turn, one's phantasms
of memory depend upon the prior realization of phantasms of

sense which are "made"

when the innermost portion of the

individual's sensory organ reacts to
is transferred to it,

a

pulse of energy which

through the now familiar pathway, from

39
an external sensory object or stimulus.

The most prominent instance of an appetite which is

born with man, namely the appetite for food, would be
15

characterized as

a

minute internal motion toward most any

type of nutritive foodstuff which will sustain the life of
that man,

rather than a tiny motion toward

a

particular type

of food such as cherry pie or Beef Wellington. Hobbes does

contend, however, that the overwhelming majority of the

Particular appetites which

a

man's body possesses or

experiences come to be developed as

a

result of the

individual's interaction with the objects in his
envi ronment

Thus, an individual

(designated p) might be imagined to

advance through the following sequence of events throughout
the course of his life:

tasted

a

at time tl,

person p, who has never

pineapple, is brought into contact with such

piece of fruit (object

F^)

,

a

places the interior portion of

a

piece of this fruit in his mouth, and through the usual
process, comes to experience

a

particular (pleasing)

gustatory sensation, which Hobbes would describe as
of phantasm.

In turn,

at some subsequent time,

t2

might find himself in the vicinity of some object

,

a

type

person p
F2,

which,

as a result of comparing presently sensed with formerly

sensed visual phantasms, he is able to identify as being

sufficiently visually similar to

F^,

association between supposed objects

to establish a mental
F2

and

F^.

P

might

recognize, in some not completely conscious manner, that the

phantasms caused by

F2

bear

a

striking resemblance to those
16

which had been caused by
a

portion of

and that at time tl, ingesting

F^,

provided him with

a

pleasurable sensation.

Hence, at time t2, p*s body can be conceived of as

experiencing an endeavour, that is,
apparent direction of object
toward

Fj

Fj

.

a

tiny movement in the

Though this endeavour

might eventually result in

a

fully-fledged,

perceptually observable corporeal movement toward the object
in question,

it

is crucial

to understand that by appetite,

Hobbes means merely an instance of minute movement (in this
case,

toward object F
2

)

.

Hobbes emphasizes this point by

registering his disapproval of those Scholastic philosophers
who "find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion
at all;

call

but because some motion they must acknowledge, they

it metaphorical motion; which is but absurd speech.
In this example,

for,

at time

p had no

and experienced no endeavour toward

previous experience with

a

pineapple.

F^

specific desire
based upon

a

This is true because,

up to point tl, p had never tasted or experienced the

gustatory sensation (or the visual sensation) specific to
pineapples. Hobbes's doctrine would allow, however, that at
time tl, p had a desire to "taste and try" the previously

untasted type of object which was then situated before him.
At time tl,

for example, p might have been experiencing

feelings of hunger (a specific feeling of uneasiness or
pain),^^ and might have decided to explore the possibility
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of satisfying his

(general) appetite for nourishment
by

consuming part of the still mysterious
though present object
Pj. Hobbes cautions,
nevertheless, that we have aversion for
things "not only that we know have
hurt us, but

also that we

do not know whether they will hurt
us, or not
D.

Hobbes on the Will

Appetites and aversions, which are tiny internal
motions, respectively, toward and away from
the apparent
locations^^ of specific external objects,

figure

prominently in Hobbes's account of the will. For
example,
Hobbes contends that from time to time, human beings
experience

a

succession of appetites and aversions for the

same object. These successive appetites and aversions,
hopes
and fears concerning a single object, Hobbes explains,
arise
as one successively contemplates the "divers good and
evil

consequences of the doing, or omitting of the thing [he has]

propounded

,

the thing propounded,

for example, being to

attempt to gain access to the object in question. In turn

whole sum of appetites and aversions which proceed
through the mind when the thing propounded is either done or
"thought impossible," is called deliberation.^^
Thus,

if at time tl,

person p has

a

desire to obtain

object o, based upon his estimate of the pleasant

consequences which are likely to redound to him as
of obtaining o,

a

and at time t2, p has an aversion to
18

result

obtaining object

based upon his estimate of
the probable
unpleasant consequences to himself
of obtaining
o

o, and if p
has no further appetites or
aversions with respect to the
obtaining of o, then his deliberation
with regard

to

attempting to obtain object

o

between times tl and t2 would

consist of the one appetite and the
one aversion previously
mentioned

Deliberation comes to an end, "when that
whereof [one
deliberates] is either done or thought

impossible; till then

[one retains] the liberty of doing
or omitting; according to
[his] appetite or aversi on
Thus, each deliberation may
come to an end in one of two ways.
Specifically, one can opt
.

to either perform the act propounded
or to refrain from

performing that act.
In turn,

the last appetite or aversion immediately

adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is
that
which we call the will
Hence, it is the case that
some,

.

though by no means all of the appetites and aversions which
one experiences result in such observable actions as

extending one's arm, or lurching one's body in the direction
of a desired object.
p

That is to say, the appetite of person

which is p's will or

''last

appetite in deliberation" is

separate from the observable action which results from or is
caused by the former. This is true simply because appetites
and aversions are defined as endeavours or tiny, sensorially
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imperceptible motions. rather than the voluntary motions
themselves. In fact, in De Corpora

,

Hobbes details

a

three-

step process by which these minute, internally
generated

motions lead to discrete, observable bodily motion. Hobbes
claims that the ’’first endeavour" either toward or away from
the object

’’

is followed by a swelling and relaxation of the

muscles; and lastly, these are followed by contraction and

extension of the limbs which is animal motion."'*^
One might be tempted to believe, especially in light of

Hobbes

s

discussions of physical science or natural

philosophy in De Corpore

,

that the will of

given occasion, constitutes

a

a

person, on any

resolution of the various

appetites and aversions which have affected him throughout
the corresponding deliberation. However, this position,

which construes the will as the vector sum or resultant of
the various appetites and aversions which were experienced

through the deliberative process, was not embraced by
Hobbes. Rather, in his various discussions of deliberation
and the will, Hobbes presents deliberation as the varying

succession of appetites and aversions, and the will as
simply the last appetite or aversion in the deliberative

process

We will now move on to examine and discuss two features
of human nature which Hobbes believed to necessitate that

the natural interactive state of human beings is (was, or
20

would be) characterized by unrestrained
conflict and
surreption, namely, ( 1 ) the a pparent
1
.egoist i c psychology
which Hobbes attributes to humankind
and (2) the approximate
physical and intellectual equality of
every human being with
every other.

—Hobbes

and Predominant Egoism

Gregory Kavka has recently categorized the
psychological theory which was held by Hobbes
as
'predominant egoism." Predominant egoism is the
position
"that self-interested motives tend to take
precedence over

non-sel f -interested motives in determining human
actions
[and that] non-sel f -interested motives usually
give way to

self-interested motives when there is
I

a

conflict."^®

take it to be the case that from the standpoint of

his political philosophy, what is interesting and

significant is that Hobbes is committed to the position that
in most instances, men will act so as to primarily benefit

themselves, and will not primari 1

consider the effect that

their action will have upon examples of human behavior which
are motivated by

a

passion or

a

desire to benefit another

person (when an alternative course of behavior open to the
agent will, in the estimation of that actor, likely result
in the realization of a greater benefit to the actor)

even according to the most optimistic reading of Hobbes,
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instances of such behavior can be assumed to
be few and far
between

Stated somewhat crudely, what can be gathered
from
Hobbes's various discussions of this topic is
that we should
not expect Hobbesian men to enter into, or to
remain parts
of already established commonwealths because
they possess a

general desire to benefit their fellow humans. Rather,
such

men can be expected to enter into commonwealths, and thus
to
voluntarily subordinate themselves to the will of the
established sovereign, precisely because they reckon that
doing so will likely result in more advantageous (long-term)

consequences to themselves than will any available
al

ternative
F.

Hobbes on the Natural Equality of Human Beings

In the final section of this chapter,

what

will present

take to be Hobbes’s concept of the natural equality

I

of human beings.

Hobbes

I

I

will base my presentation primarily upon

'

discussions of the natural equality of human beings which
are contained in Chapters 13 and 15 of Leviathan
I

.

(although

will, on a number of occasions, make reference to parallel

passages in other of Hobbes's works of political philosophy)

Throughout this section,

I

will be concerned not to critique

the doctrine of natural equality forwarded by Hobbes, but
rather, to explain precisely what this doctrine entails.
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Once again,

am including this discussion because

I

I

believe

that Hobbes’s doctrine of the natural equality
of human

beings plays

a

significant role in determining the character

that the state of nature or the natural condition
of

humankind assumes within Hobbes's writings.
Hobbes begins the thirteenth chapter of Leviathan by

discussing the natural equality of human beings. He asserts
that^^

[njature hath made men so equal in the faculties
and mind; as that though there be
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in
body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when
all is reckoned together, the difference between
man and man is not so considerable as that one man
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to
which another might not pretend as well as he.
of the body,

As is stated in this passage, Hobbes believes that the

natural equality of humans consists in some combination of
physical and mental capabilities (the combination of which
he characterizes as "all

.

.

.

reckoned together.")

Curiously, however, rather than immediately discussing why
the combined or "all reckoned together" type of natural

powers of all human beings are basically equal, Hobbes

chooses to consider, in turn, the two varieties of natural

power

With respect to physical strength, Hobbes claims that
even the weakest of (fully grown) individuals possesses
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strength sufficient to kill the strongest
"either by secret
machination or by confederacy with others
Indeed, this

.

concept of equality consists in (1) equali ty
in so far as
each man is capable of taking the life of any
other man,
either singly (i.e.

by exercising merely his own power), or

in league with other men,

as well

as,

(2)

equality in so

f ar

as each man is subject to being killed by either
a single

fellowman or by some combination of his fe 1 1 owmen

.

Hobbes contends that^^
to the faculties of the mind.
I
find yet
greater equality among men than that of
strength For prudence is but experience whi ch
equal time equally bestows upon those men in those
things they apply themselves equally to.
.

.

a

.

;

In this passage, Hobbes is asserting that human beings are

intellectually (roughly) equal, since all mature men possess
a

sense of prudence, of "know how," regarding the conduct of

life, which their lives'

experiences have bestowed upon

them.

When discussing the natural human intellectual
faculties, Hobbes contends "that prudence is but experience

which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things
they apply themselves equally to."

I

wish to suggest that

in this passage, Hobbes is attempting to further the claim

that equal experiences affect all, or nearly all human

beings partaking of those experiences in an approximately
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equal manner. Further, as the quotation on page
24 of this

chapter indicates, Hobbes is similarly forwarding the
claim
that the life's experiences of all mature human beings
are

sufficiently similar to allow one to posit the doctrine of
mental or intellectual equality which he was interested to

forward
As we have seen,
13 of Leviathan

,

in the opening paragraphs of chapter

Hobbes offers

a

series of relatively

straightforward reasons for believing (1) that men are
naturally equal to each other with respect to the faculties
of the body,

and (2) that men are naturally equal to one

another with respect to the faculties of the mind.

It seems

clear, however, that Hobbes was similarly interested to

advance the claim that human beings are naturally equal with
respect to the "all reckoned together” sense of their
physical and mental faculties. One is therefore naturally
lead to wonder what this "all reckoned together” conception
of the natural

equality of humans is meant to entail.

It seems clear that

Hobbes does not mean to suggest

that all men in the state of nature are equal to each other

with respect to the ability to perform any specific task.
Indeed, this equality which Hobbes attributes to men in the

state of nature, in the De Give and El ements renderings,

consists of the equal ability of men to do "the greatest of
all

things.” Surely, Hobbes's frequent references to "the
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weaker" and "the stronger" (in both strength and
wit) make
clear that Hobbes was not blind to the rather obvious
fact

that we do not all develop into a state of strict
physical
and intellectual equality.
In section

6

of chapter 11 of De Homine

.

Hobbes

characterizes the greatest of goods for each man to be "his
own preservation," and the greatest of "all evils" to be his
own death (especially, Hobbes wryly adds, when the latter is

accompanied by torture).

In light of this passage, we can

understand why Hobbes characterized killing another person
"the greatest thing." If the preservation of person p's
life constitutes p's greatest good, and the destruction or

termination of p's life constitutes p's greatest evil, then
causing the cessation of p's vital motion or vital

functioning constitutes inflicting the greatest evil which
can suffer. Further, if person q can cause the termination
of the vital motion within p's body (which given the

brittleness of the human frame, Hobbes considered to be
rather easy), then q can inflict upon p the greatest of
evils or more colloquially, can do "the greatest thing" to
P-

What is significant in Hobbes's analysis (and what
Hobbes's "all reckoned together" sense of natural equality
appears to entail) is that no man naturally possesses the
power to secure his future good through his own physical or
26

p

intellectual capabi 1 i t i es

.

In this sense,

all men can be

spoken of as being "naturally equal" to every other,
since
none is individually capable of guaranteeing the
continuance
of his own life.

The possibility of securing such a

position, and thereby, of protecting oneself against the

danger of death as

result of the aggressive behavior of

a

others, is clearly ruled out of the question by Hobbes, who

continually emphasizes that the precivil condition is
charact er i zed by

a

lack of personal security on the part of

each of its "members

Thus, remarks Hobbes, "it is

.

supposed from the equality of strength and other natural
faculties of man, that no man is of might to assure himself
for any long time of preserving himself thereby.
in the state of nature,

Though

irresistible might (and only

irresistible might) assures its possessor of such security
(as well

as natural dominion over others), because Hobbes

judged no man to be naturally possessed of such might, he

similarly believed that each man is naturally incapable of
so guaranteeing his own future well-being.

Further, and in

a

related sense, human beings in the

state of nature can be judged equal in so far as no man can
be expected to assure to himself the possession and

enjoyment of any socially desirable object or set of objects
for any considerable period of time.
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We may suppose, as above, that although
in the state of
nature, diverse men possess differing levels
of probable
success with respect to the activity of
attaining
the

— mporary

possession of socially desirable objects (based

upon considerations of physical strength,
intellectual
acuity, etc.), all men might nevertheless be
spoken of as
being equal in so far as no man possesses the
natural power
to secure his possessions against the united
depredations of

his opponents.

Significantly, this equality is to be

measured not by the probabi 1

i t

of

one's success in either

preserving one's life or in maintaining the possession of
some desired good, but rather by the possibi 1 i t

of

losing

one's life or one's goods.

Interestingly, Hobbes touches upon the topic of the
^^^tural

equality of human beings during his consideration of

the law of nature "against pride" in chapter 15 of

Leviathan ^^

.

However, at this point in the text, Hobbes's

commitment to the doctrine of natural equality seems

a

bit

precarious, and the reason which he offers for regarding
each of one's fellowmen as

a

natura

equal appears somewhat

pecul iar

Hobbes begins his discussion of this law of nature in

Leviathan by reminding his readers that he has already shown
that all men are by nature equal, and that the presently

observable inequalities of "riches," "power," and "nobility
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of kindred" have their basis in
the civil

law. He then

opposes Aristotle's doctrine that some men
are by nature
more worthy to command while others are by
nature more
worthy to serve, « as being both against
reason (as he
claims to have demonstrated before), and
against experience.
For,

announces Hobbes®^
there are very few so foolish that had not rather
govern themselves than be governed by others; nor
when the wise in their conceit contend by force
with those who distrust their own wisdom do they
always, or often, or almost any time get the
victory.

In this passage, Hobbes registers the belief that
nature

does not divide men into two classes, namely, those who are

created fit to govern (those who possess

a

certain kind of

natural knowledge), and those who are born fit to serve
(those who lack this type of knowledge) since
of the second category seldom,

if ever,

(1) members

acknowledge the

supposed natural superiority of their "betters" and since
(2)

when contests or battles between the "naturally wise"

and the "naturally strong" or "naturally ignorant" have

occurred, the former have seldom if ever been able to emerge

victorious. Let us now consider, in order, these two reasons

forwarded by Hobbes.
First, Hobbes believes that if such natural divisions

between natural governors and natural servants did exist.
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then such divisions would be
readily apparent to those
people who occupy the latter, as
well as to those who occupy
the former category. That is to
say, Hobbes appears to be
harboring the implicit assumption that
if such natural
divisions existed, any human being (after
due observation
and reflection) would be able to
determine whether he, or
any other particular human person,
was created to be a

leader or

a

follower, and would be willing to acknowledge

and assume the appropriate station
(either that of

a

ruler

or that of a ruled person) within the
society which he

occupi es
Simply, Hobbes is attempting to convince his
readers
that because almost no man judges it better to be
ruled by

another than to rule oneself, it is thereby the case that
it
is actually better for any man to rule himself
than it is to

be ruled by another.®^ Of course, Hobbes meant this

argument to relate especially to those men who are supposed,
or who would be supposed by "elitist” philosophers such as

Aristotle, to be natural servants, but who, by their actions
srid

their opinions, show themselves to be in disagreement

with such

a

supposition. Since such men show themselves to

disagree with the claim that they are natural servants (who
would be better off if they were governed by natural
rulers), it is thereby the case that such men are not

natural servants.
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Secondly, Hobbes is suggesting that if natural

distinctions of the aforementioned types did exist,
then
when contests” (presumably battles or skirmishes)
between
the wiser and the stronger occur, the wiser
(that is to

say,

those who are presumed to be naturally fit to govern)
would,

through the imposition of clever strategies, find some way
to defeat or control the stronger (that is,

the presumed

natural servants) all or most of the time. However, Hobbes

observes that since in such contests, the wiser seldom if
ever have the upper hand over the stronger, such natural
<^ist inct i ons

must not exist.

As had been the case with

Hobbes's first reason for denying this type of natural
inequality, this second reason appears to be based upon some
body of empirical evidence. That is to say, Hobbes is

suggesting that throughout the history of humankind (or, at
least,

that portion of it of which he is aware), contests,

battles, or one-on-one encounters have taken place in which

those who have presumed themselves to be possessed of the

kind of wisdom which allows them to govern well, have been

haplessly unable to subdue those men who are physically
stronger, but are less intellectually skillful.

Unfortunately, Hobbes does not offer any specific instances
of such occurrences,

but merely assures his readers that

such contests have often occurred in times of sedition and
civil war.
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Hobbes concludes his discussion of the ninth
law of
nature in Leviathan with the following curious

passage:^^

If nature

therefore have made men equal, that
equality is to be acknowledged; or if nature have
made man unequal
yet because men that think
themselves unequal, will not enter into conditions
of peace but upon equal terms, such equality
must
be admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of
nature, I put this. That every man acknowledge
other for his equal by nature.
;

What

I

find to be curious is that in this passage, as well

as in parallel passages from his other political writings,

Hobbes is saying that men should account each man equal by

nature whether or not nature has made men equal. Indeed,
during his treatment of this law of nature in The Elements

.

Hobbes forwards the astonishingly modest claim that since it
cannot be imagined how peace can be achieved if men do not

acknowledge equality with one another, men considered in
mere nature ought, for peace's sake, to admit such
equal i ty

7(1

On one level, we can see why Hobbes might have included

such an injunction among his laws of nature.

If men consider

themselves to be superior to, or to value themselves more

highly than they value others,

then they will be more

likely to "invade" and to contest for dominion. Roughly, if
one man considers himself to be superior to another, he will

likely think himself capable of gaining dominion over that
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other, either by force or by wiles.

In turn,

if one thinks

himself likely to gain the ’’upper hand" over
another, he
will have a tendency to attempt to exert (or
demonstrate)
his putative superiority over that person by
adroitly

employing his physical and intellectual powers. However,
if
one considers another to be his equal, he (the former)
will
be much less likely to attempt to overcome the latter

through force and (especially) strategy. Nevertheless, we
remember that Hobbes had spent time and effort

attempting to show that human beings are by nature equal

Why then did he feel it necessary to discuss the "contrary
to fact

claim that even if men are significantly unequal by

nature, they should, nevertheless be esteemed as equal?

Interestingly, what Hobbes appears keen to establish is
that those such as Aristotle who claim that the wiser sort
of men,

those who claim to possess an inherent virtue or the

appropriate type of "aptness" or natural knowledge, or
worthiness to command are clearly wrong. Indeed, Hobbes’s
claim is that the skill of establishing dominion or of
gaining and consolidating political power is not, and has
never been based upon any variety of philosophical or
technological know-how, but rather, is based upon one’s

ability to subdue one’s opponent, principally through
physical compulsion. As has been well documented, Hobbes

believes that

a

science of politics, that is,
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a

type of

philosophical or technological knowledge,
can be devised and
utilized to regulate the commonwealth.’^
Nevertheless,
Hobbes’s claim that in the state
of nature "there is no
place for industry ... no culture
on earth, no arts and

letters,

[and] no society"” clearly indicates
that he

considered impossible the development of
any such science of
politics in mankind's natural condition.
The doctrine of the natural equality
of humans is
presented at the beginning of chapter 13 of
Leviathan as one
of the main causes of, as well as
the basis for one of the
potential solutions to, what Hobbes characterizes
as the
central problem of political philosophy.
Specifically, the
natural equality of human beings gives rise to

a

"social"

condition which is unbearable, and from which all
rational
men desire to escape. Conceivably, if men were not
created
equal by nature, that is, if nature had created natural

rulers and natural servants, men could live in harmony in a

naturally hierarchical society. Nevertheless, the manner in
which Hobbes treats the crucial claim of natural equality in
chapter 15 of Leviathan suggests that the actual natural

equality of human beings may not play the fundamental role
which this author explicitly assigns to it.
Perhaps Hobbes was attempting to suggest that it is

merely the "acknowledgement" of an in-principle potentially
spurious natural equality on the part of all of the citizens
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within a commonwealth, or of all the
individuals within some
geographic area, which is essential to
provide the forces of
social cohesion required to establish
a commonwealth or to
prevent a commonwealth from dissolving.
That is to say, even
though Hobbes continually stresses the
claim that human
beings at^ fundamentally equal to one
another, perhaps it is
the mere acknowledgement of a natural
human equality by most
or all of the citizens of the commonwealth
which is of

primary significance in maintaining conditions of
peace and
avoiding the calamity of the natural state.
^orisidering this conundrum, we must admit that

to his derivation of the state of nature, what

emerges as the most significant feature of Hobbes’s doctrine
of the natural equality of human beings is the fact
that

since no man possesses the natural powers to successfully
resist the (possibly united) depredations of one or more of
his fellow men, and since each man possesses the natural
power, either singly or in concert with other men, to put an
end to the life of any man, then no man can be spoken of as

possessing a natural dominion over any other. As we will be
going on to see in chapter

2

of this dissertation, Hobbes

believes that a recognition of this fundamental "equality of
ability" on the part of all or most men gives rise to an

"equality of hope in the attaining of [one's] ends,"^^ and
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thus helps to determine that the character of
the resulting

natural condition will be

rather nasty one indeed.

a

However, from the standpoint of the formation and
Oj

^iritenance of such multiperson groupings as commonwealths,

what emerges as the most significant feature of Hobbes's

doctrine of the natural equality of human beings, is not the
—

that human beings are naturally equal to one another

(according to Hobbes's somewhat idiosyncratic conception of

human equality), but rather, the fact that human beings can
be persuaded, for the sake of fostering peace, and creating
a

tranquil and comfortable social setting, to acknowledge,

and to behave in accordance with the claim that human beings
are fundamentally equal to one another. Further, this

admission of equality, and

a

concomitant willingness to act

in accordance with this admission might rest upon the rather

obvious and rather easily perceived fact that each human

being is susceptible to having his life terminated by (for
example) the attack of some other human being or human

beings

Provided as we are with an understanding of Hobbes's
somewhat less than firmly-embraced belief in the natural
equality of human beings, as well as

a

familiarity with

Hobbes's predominantly self-interested, though not quite
egoistic conception of human behavior, we may now proceed to

examine the effect that these two features of Hobbes's
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anthropology have upon the character of the natural, presocial or pre-political state of human interaction.
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NOTES
Specif ical ly, I will be attempting to show how
Hobbes's
heory of human motivation and volition helps
give
rise to
w at has been termed "a predominantly
egoistic psychology."
s will become clear during the
course of the first chapter
ot this dissertation, an adequate
understanding of Hobbes's
redominant 1
egoistic theory of human psychology depends,
p
in part, upon an understanding of Hobbes's
theory of human
will and motivation, which, in turn, depends, in
part, upon
an understanding of the basic features of Hobbes's
"dual
aspect theory of human sensory activity.
1.

This developmental sequence can be understood in terms of
the following linear representation:
2.

Sensation

-*

Motivation

&

Will

Predominant
Egoism

so that human sensory activity (as understood by Hobbes)
a significant role in determining the character of how
an individual human being will act on any particular
5.
occasion, and in turn, the manner in which human beings are
motivated to act helps give rise to a psychol ogical theory
which has been characterized as "predominant egoism."
4.
plays

Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen
Bernard Gert
editor,
(Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978), pages 98-99.
,

,

3 Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes in 11
Volumes
William Molesworth, editor, (London: Bohn, 1839),
Vol
I
page 391
,

.

,

Hobbes, Engl ish Works

,

Vol.

I,

page 405.

Hobbes, Engl ish Works

,

Vol.

I,

pages 406-407.

6. Perhaps additional light can be cast upon the four
categories discussed in this and the previous two paragraphs
when one considers the following two-by-two matrix:
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A

Thoughts
Ideas
Phantasms
C.

D.

MechanicoPhysiol ogical
Processes

Seemings,

*=
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Minute reactions
at the innermost
portion of the
organ of sense.
(See p. 6-7)

Such ideas or

*

or

Representations
(of C)

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

immediate
objects of
awareness as
colors, sounds
and odors
(See table in
endnote #12)

B
1 easure
Pain

P

Helping or
hindering of
the body's
vital motion.
(See pp.

9-10)

The
conscious 1
perceived
feel ing
of pain and
pi easure

(See pp

.

9-10)

Within his writings, Hobbes speaks of two relatively broad
varieties of sense, namely (A) that variety which involves
or includes such categories as colors, odors and sounds, and
(B) that variety which involves or includes such categories
8.
as pain and pleasure. Further, Hobbes specifies that each
individual instance of sensory activity (of both variety A
and variety B) can be understood as both (C) a mechanicophysiol ogical process that occurs within the sensory
subject's body, and as (D) a representation, appearance,
seeming, feeling or other immediate object of awareness
which arises within the consciousness of the sensory
subject. In each such instance, the pain, pleasure, color,
sound, etc. of which the subject is consciously aware, is to
be understood as a representation to that subject of some
physiological process occurring contemporaneously within his
own body
7 Accordingl y
I will
discuss Hobbes's first variety of
sense (A) on pages 4-8, and Hobbes's second variety of sense
(B) on pages 8-10 of this chapter.
,

That is, of those faculties which relate directly to the
first variety of sense (A) mentioned above.
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9. Thomas Hobbes,
10.

Leviathan Edwin Curley
Indianapolis, 1994), page 6.

editor

.

(Hackett

11.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page

6.

12.

For a fuller explanation of Hobbes's thoughts
tne imagination and memory, see below, pages 7-8. concerning

Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore ( Engl ish Works Vol
I, page
389.) During the course of his various discussions of
specific phantasms (or phantasm types) in Leviathan
and
gorpore Hobbes identifies the following phantasm types De
being associated with the five conventionally recognized as
sense modalities:
.

.

,

SENSE MODALITY

c
H
A
R
A
C

P

H
A
N

T

T

E

A

R

S

I

M

S

S

T
I

C

*
*
*
*
*
*

SIGHT

HEARING

SMELL

SAVOUR

Light

Sound

Odor

Taste

TOUCH

Hardness
Softness
Smoothness
Heat
Roughness
Cold
Rarity
Wetness
Density
Oi 1 iness
(Figure)
Smoothness
Motion
Roughness
Rest
Rarity
*
Magnitude
Density
(Figure)
Motion
Rest
Magnitude
**************************************************
Col or

it

it

it

it

it

it
it

It should be noted that Hobbes's most sustained discussions
of the various types of phantasms occur in Chapters 7, 8 and
25 of De Corpore
and in Chapter 1 of Leviathan
Interestingly, on page 405 of De Corpore Hobbes
,

.

,

contends that smoothness, roughness, rarity and density
"refer to figure and are therefore common to both touch and
sight." Thus, Hobbes appears to register a belief in the
existence of so-called common sensibles.
13. Thomas Hobbes,

English Works

40

,

Vol.

I,

Page

391.

14. It should be noted that in chapter
25 of De Cornore
Hobbes presents his theory of human sensatioiT
not as aA
doctrine, but rather, as a "ways and
means by which the appearances or effects
of nature"
(i.e., phantasms of sense) "may be, I do
not say they are,
generated.
(Hobbes, Eng 1 ish Works Vol
I, page 388.)
.

15. Hobbes, English Works, Vol.
page 6.

16 Hobbes

Leviathan

.

page

Hobbes

Engl ish Works

.

18 Hobbes

English Works

.

Hobbes

Engl ish Works

,

17

19

I,

.

page 391; Hobbes, Leviathan

'

6.

Vol

I

page 392.

Vol.

I,

page 396.

Vol.

I,

page 396.

.

20 .Unhappi ly
as has already been seen to be the case with
phantasms of sense, Hobbes frequently conflates (1) the
notion of a phantasm of the imagination or of memory as
,

residual motion within the sensory organ of the percipient
subject with (2) the notion of a phantasm of the imagination
or of memory as a phenomenal appearance or an immediate
object of awareness. However, for the sake of brevity I will
refrain from presenting a lengthy discussion of this
distinction
21. Hobbes, Leviathan
page 8; Hobbes, English Works Vol. I,
page 396. Hobbes adds, somewhat surprisingly, that the decay
of sense should not be understood as a decay or weakening of
the motion made by the object. If this were the case, then
phantasms would "always and necessarily" be less clear (or
in the memorable words of Hume, less forceful and vivacious)
than they are in sense.
However, Hobbes observes, our experiences of dreams
should convince us that on some occasions, specifically,
during exceedingly vivid or "convincing dreams," phantasms
of the imagination, which are to be equated to or correlated
with residual motion in the sensory organ after the
perceptual object which caused it has been removed, are
equally vivid to those which result when the object is
present and imparting motion to the relevant organ.
Hobbes claims that dream images are often as vibrant as
those which are immediately caused or imparted by the motion
of currently present external objects, precisely because in
sleep, the organs of sense are not moved at present external
objects
,

.

41

Indeed, Hobbes tersely defines 'sleep'
as "the
privation of the act of sense," and
’dreaL’
as "tL
imaginations of them that sleep." (Thomas
Hobbes, The
Politic Tdnnies, Ferdinand,
iT
editor,
itor^2nd
2nd ed. (London: Cass, 1968), page
slumbering condition, the motions which had 8.) Thus in this
been previously
transferred by external objects, and wh^cr^Zln,
tTllt
some not precisely specified sense, in
the sensory
organs, are not obscured by immediate
motions, and can thus
give rise to rather vivid phantasms in
22.
dreams. Hence, in
dreams, the previously experienced phantasms
of sense of
23.
waking life are reexperienced as often as
their
motions come to be predominant.
24.
(Hobbes, Engl ish Works Vol
I, page 398).
,

.

.

Hobbes, English Works

.

Hobbes, English Works

.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

Vol.

I,

page 398.

Vol.

I,

page 398.

pages 8-9.

25. Hobbes, English Works
Vol. I, page 406. It should be
noted that in Chapter 6 of Leviathan Hobbes does mention
the pleasures of sense," and does contend that the "motion
which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it
delight and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital
motion and a help thereunto." (Hobbes, Leviathan pages 2930) Unhappily, the description of this second type of sense
(B) which is contained in Leviathan is even less detailed
than that which can be found in De Corpore
.

.

,

.

26. See my discussion of vital motion,

27. Hobbes,

Leviathan

.

below, pages 10-12.

page 27.

28. Hobbes, English Works
Vol. I, page 407. It should be
noted that, within his writings, Hobbes does not, to the
best of my knowledge, specifically discuss the distinction
between vital motion, which applies specifically to (the
bodies of) living organisms, and motion simpl iciter which
relates to living, as well as to non-living material bodies.
Nevertheless, on page 109 of De Corpore (Hobbes, English
Works Vol. I, page 109.), Hobbes defines motion
(simpl iciter or local motion as "the continual
relinquishing of one place and acquisition of another," and
on page 407 of the same work defines vital motion as "the
motion of the blood perpetually circulating in the veins and
arteries." (Hobbes, English Works Vol. I, page 407.)
.

,

,
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consstitutes'^a
Eng

''ital

motion

thought which arises
^
is fancied in fhn
"
mind f tl
incidence of a
phaSt^S^T^f sense o^fmanJ^n .
memory), we can
reasonably infer that an^indi^’^°a
a phantasm of
sense (or of memory or of the”'^'^^- ^
stands as a
necessary prerequisite tL^t
individual’s engaging in a
voluntary
att
t
motion. For a fuller
discussion of the relatitLhtiT
and voluntary mot
i
'

Hobbes's

somethtt^brifrdistSssittt of

motion," one is led to ooncludt
assified as (living) biological
organisms What
wnat Hnbh^c:
Honbes
does not mentinn Kn
-^nnsonabl y be expected to have
believed
tttt
such arbtLt tLttratrt®: "°n-conscious physical objects
being
moved by ttt attttt o? fvt"
thus subject
.

4-

.

not subject tt" Lth°^n“;rntt

ptocttselThtth^^"

movement of blood ttttugrtte ttmtt
uttrnys?tm"'’the
movement of oxygen throughout the
human respiratory syittm

d°tg:sti“tL°'

“

H^kV,

should be noted that

atthtt’t
snecific
terms "vital*”*"°^
31. Hobbes,

Eng 1 ish Works

cLntrr9t'’^r
hapter 25 of

^e

following claim:

I

am presenting a discussion of

of vital motion only beLuse thT.
of human voluntary motion makes

Corpore

human motion which he
.

,

Vol

.

I,

page 407.

pleasure and pain in
we might reasonably forward the

From a physiological standpoint, if some
activity in the
individual's sensory organ supports or enhances
vital
mo ion, then that activity results in a
conscious feeling of
pleasure to the individual.
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Conversely, if some activity in the individual's
sensory organ constricts or limits vital motion,
then that
activity results in a conscious feeling of
pain to the
individual. It should be noted that the sensation
pleasure or pain within the consciousness of the of
individual
IS caused d irectly by the enhancement
or restriction of
vital motion in the body and only indirectly
by the fact
that the organ's motion causes such enhancement
or
restriction.
Further, it is not necessary that the individual in
question recognizes that his experienced feeling of
pleasure
or pain results from the enhancement or constriction
of
vital motion in some portion of tissue within his body.
Even
though Hobbes would probably expect anatomists and other
relevant specialists to recognize that pleasure or pain is
caused by the enhancement or constriction of vital motion,
it is doubtful that he would expect non-specialists or
"menin-the-street" to recognize the relationship between
sensations such as pleasure and pain, and such vital bodily
motion as the circulation of blood throughout the body.
It would seem that in this process, the individual
consciously pursues an object because he believes that the
acquisition or consumption of that object will result in his
t’s^lization of some quantity of pleasure. For example, if
under such circumstances, we were to ask the individual why
he pursues the object in question, the individual would
likely respond that he does so because he believes that the
acquisition or consumption of the object will make him feel
better or will produce some quantity of satisfaction or
pleasure, and not because he believes that the acquisition
or consumption of the object will likely have the effect of
enhancing the vital motion (i.e., the circulation of blood,
etc.) within his body.
Thus, we can understand that in a purely physiol ogicomechanical sense, the individual's attraction to, or
motivation toward the object in question is a physical
reaction which has as its goal the preservation or
enhancement of the vital motion within the individual's
body, (and hence, the preservation of that individual's
life)

However, when we consider the individual as a sentient
or conscious being, we can understand that the enhancement
of the body’s vital motion results in the individual’s
experiencing pleasure, so that the individual consciously
pursues a desired object (of which kind he recalls having
had previously extracted pleasure) precisely because he
expects its acquisition or consumption to provide him with
some degree of pleasure.
44

33. See Hobbes, Leviathan, page 27, where Hobbes
states that
it IS evident that the imagination is the first
internal
beginning of all voluntary motion."

Hobbes

Leviathan

.

page 28.

37.
35 Hobbes
38.

Leviathan

.

page 28.

.Hobbes

Leviathan

.

page 28.

34

.

.

36

39.

Hobbes, English Works

.

Hobbes, Engl ish Works

.

Vol

.

I,

pages 407-408.

Vol.

I,

page 408.

Thus, an experienced actor, that is, one who has "come to
know readily what is to be pursued and avoided" and who has
a ready use of his nerves and organs, in the pursuing and
avoiding of good and bad’* (i.e., pleasures and pains) can be
conceived of as being one who has attained a high level of
facility in (1) producing or maintaining the sense of
40.
pleasure
and in (2) eliminating or avoiding the sense of
pain
within
his body. Since this skill is characterized as
41.
depending upon experience and memory, we may infer that
phantasms of sense and phantasms of memory play a
significant role in the process of creating appetites and
aversions in the body of a human being and eventually of
determining how that individual will act on a given
occasion

Hobbes, Leviathan

,

page 28.

Hunger might be characterized as pain caused by a
slackening of the type of vital motion related to the
nutrition of the human body, (see Hobbes, Leviathan page
,

27

.

)

In turn, such a feeling of discomfort might give rise
to an appetitive passion, which minutely moves the
individual's body in the direction of some object, the
possession of which that individual believes will have the
probable effect of alleviating his present state of
discomfort or pain by enhancing the vigorousness of the
vital motion within (the appropriate portion of) his body.
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42. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 28. Interestingly,
asserting that human beings possess a (second Hobbes is
order) desire
o sensorial ly experience hitherto
unexperienced objects
which might eventually be discovered to prolong
or enhance
life by promoting vital motion, as well as
a general
aversion to heretofore unexperienced objects,
the latter of
which appears to be grounded upon a desire to
avoid any
with which might result in a hindering
of the body s vital motion. Thus, with respect
to this
matter, the human organism is endowed with a general
inquisitiveness or curiosity regarding the effects of
unexperienced objects, as well as a general diffidence
regarding the effects of such objects, that is to say, a
general tendency toward, as well as a general tendency away
from these unfamiliar potentially life enhancing, yet
potentially destructive objects.
43. It should be noted that when one asserts that an
individual experiences an endeavor toward some object o,
what he means to suggest is that that individual experiences
an endeavor toward the apparent location of o. This is true
since the location of the object cannot be directly known or
discerned, but can only be indicated to the sensory subject
via representative phantasms of sense.
44. Hobbes, Leviathan
page 33. Hobbes maintains that "[t]hat
which men desire, they are also said to love: and to hate
those things for which they have an aversion." (Hobbes,
Leviathan page 28.) Thus, Hobbes rather unremarkably
defines love of an object or hatred of an object to be
relative to the individual who either loves (that is,
experiences a motion toward) or hates (that is, experiences
a motion away from) the object in question Somewhat more
remarkable, however, is Hobbes's claim that the terms 'good'
and 'evil' are to be defined in terms of the preferences,
appetites and aversions of the person who uses those terms.
For example, Hobbes states that when a person refers to
some object x as 'good,' the latter person is simply
expressing the fact that he has a desire or appetite for the
object in question, and when he designates some object y
'evil,' he is expressing the fact that he finds y to be an
object of hate or aversion.
Hence, Hobbes contends that "we
all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either
feel at present or expect hereafter," and that "the words
'good' and 'evil'
are ever used with relation to the
person that useth them." (Hobbes, Leviathan pages 28-29.)
,

,

.

.

.

.

,
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t»e going on to discuss in
greater
etail in chapter 3 of this dissertation,
in the absence of
a coercive power sufficiently strong
to guarantee compliance
with sovereign commands, in the prepolitical
condition which Hobbes variously refers to as social
the Natural
the State of Nature, each person is
permitted to fix the referents of the terms 'good'
and
evil
based upon his own individual appetites and
aversions, that is based upon how he is "moved' by the
various objects, the ideas or images of which come into
his
,

.

mind

Indeed, Hobbes denies that there exists anything which

IS simply or absolutely good or evil, "nor any common
rule
of good or evil, to be taken from the nature of
the objects

themselves; but from the person of the man, when there is no
commonwealth." He does concede, however, that within a
commonwealth, a "common rule of good and evil" is to be
taken from the judgment of "the person that representeth it;
or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall
by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof."
(Hobbes, Leviathan page 29.)
Clearly, Hobbes does not mean to suggest that while in
a p r e -po 1 i t i ca 1 condition, the nature of the objects which
are variously called 'good' and 'evil' do not serve to
determine the manner in which such objects are designated,
once the commonwealth has been established, the rules
governing good and evil are to be taken from the nature of
such objects. Rather, what he is claiming is that, once a
commonwealth has been erected, the definitions and measures
of what is to be deemed 'good' and what 'evil' are to be
determined by the will of the person who has been authorized
to fix such definitions and to determine such rules (i.e.,
the sovereign).
However, since in this initial chapter I intend merely
to present a discussion of the salient features of Hobbes's
conception of the human organism, I will postpone a more
robust account of the process by which men surrender, among
other things, the right to fix the definitions of good and
evil until a later chapter.
.

45. Hobbes,

Leviathan

,

page 33.

46. Hobbes,

Leviathan

,

page 33.

47. Hobbes,

Leviathan

,

page 33.

48. Hobbes,

Engl ish Works

,

Vol

.

47

I,

page 408.

49^Perhaps at this juncture, it
should be noted that
conflictf and surreption

”

“°">d be) one of

a

"wLles^r
wnoiesaie

..,p
'

^
survival (auch aa food,
wate^ etc.)
water,
ef^r are
present in insufficient supply to
this condition's inhabitants. Rather, sunnort
Hobbes's
dp^
escriptions appear to render it the case
merely
that
since
s respective appetites for
the same desirable,
nonshareable and indivisible objects (which
in some
instances might be characterized as
nonessential or
satisfied, some conception of
scarcity mutTl
must be associated with this milieu.
example, while describing the character
of the
natural condition of humankind in The
Elements Hobbes
men's appetites carry themselves to one
neither be enjoyed in common
nor
(Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.) He claims
that in such cases,
the stronger must enjoy it alone, and
that It must be decided by battle who is
stronger." (Hobbes
Elements of Law page 71.)
In B e Give Hobbes mentions that very often
the
which men commonly desire can be neither enjoved in objects
common
nor divided. Thus, it Is clear that, at least in
some cases,
the objects which men commonly desire are either
in short
supply, or are not easily accessible, that is, are
properly
characterizable as scarce resources. It does not appear to
be the case, however, that these scarce objects are
necessarily resources which must be possessed by the
appropriate desirous or appetitive man in order to
facilitate his continued survival. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
page 115.)
we may note that in Leviathan Hobbes presents
the common appetite for a single object as the most
significant factor in determining that the natural
interactional condition of humankind is properly
characterizable as a "war of each against all." A
comprehensive examination of Hobbes's Leviathan derivation
of the state of nature will be presented on pp
61-75
below.
.

,

,

.

.

Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), page 64.

50.

48

,

Sl.See

for example, Hobbes’s discussion
of the passions
’charity’ in sections 16 and 17 of
Chanfer Q f
(Hobbes, Elements of Law

)—

page^43-44

.

52. This point is forcefully confirmed
in Section 2 of
Chapter 1 of
Give where Hobbes asserts that ”[w]e
53.
do not
erefore by nature seek society for its
own sake, but that
54.
honour or profit from it.” (Hobbes, Man
and Citizen page 111.)

^

,

'

,

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 74.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 74.

55. Indeed, in chapter one of De Give
we find Hobbes
commenting upon the brittleness of the frame of
the human
body, and in chapter fourteen of The Elements
we find him
observing how little force is needed to effect
the ’’taking
away of another man’s life.” See Hobbes, Man
and Citizen
page 114; and Hobbes, Elements of Law page 70.
58.
,

,

,

56. Hobbes,
59.

Leviathan

.

page 75.

57. Hobbes, Leviathan
page 75. Since ’’prudence is but
experience,” and since experience is ultimately reducible to
sequences of sensory perception(s ) we can see that Hobbes’s
theory of^human sensation plays a crucial foundational role
in Hobbes’s theory of prudence or natural wit.
.

,

Hobbes, Man and Citizen

,

page 48.

Recall Hobbes’s claim that ’’when all is reckoned
together, the difference between man and man is not so
considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself
any benefit to which another might not pretend as well as
he.” (Hobbes, Leviathan page 74.)
,

60. For a more robust description of the state that
interpersonal relationships are likely to assume in the
state of nature, see my extended discussion in chapter 2 of
this dissertation.
61. Hobbes,

Elements of Law

,

page 74.
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63 See my discussion of competition
for desired physical
'^'’e state of nature on
I 5-66 of
pp
1.
Chapter
?haptet 2 of this a"
dissertation.
.

65. A doctrine which effectively
denies that
fundamentally naturally equal to one another.human beings are
66. Hobbes,

Leviathan

.

pages 96-97.

67. In this matter,

I
construe Hobbes's argument to be
roughly the following:

(Almost) every person judges it to be the case
that it is
better for him (understood reflexively) to rule
himself than
It IS to be ruled by another.
2. If (1), then for each person, it is
better to rule
oneself than it is to be ruled by another.
3. Therefore, for each person, it is better
to rule oneself
than it is to be ruled by another.

or,

if you prefer.
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2.
1. (Almost) every person
judges it to
better for him (understood reflexivel be the case that it is
y) to rule himsel f than
3.
it is to be ruled by another.

If (1), then for each person,
it is better to rule
oneself
than to be ruled by another
4.

If, for each person, it is
better to rule oneself than
IS to be ruled by another, then
natural

it

servants do not

exist (and human beings are fundamental!
y equal to one
another (in the relevant sense)).

Therefore, natural servants do not exist
beings are fundamentally equal to one another(and human
(in the
relevant sense)).
This argument can be seen to embody the informal
commonly referred to as argumentum ad populum, or
an
appeal to popular opinion, to wit, the conditional
statement
in premise (2) asserts that if (virtually)
every person
judges it better to rule himself, than to be ruled
by
another, it is thereby the case that, for each person,
actually better for him to rule himself than it is to it is
be
ruled by another. Obviously, however, an opponent
of Hobbes
might enquire as to why the united opinion of mankind
should
guide us in making decisions about what is true in this
matter
Moreover, premise (1), apparently an empirical premise,
IS subject to debate. Surely Hobbes presents us with
no
incontrovertible (or even compelling) evidence that this
statement is true.
al lacy

68. See, for example, Hobbes's claim in The Elements of Law
that "when there was any contention between the finer and
the coarser wits (as there hath been often in times of
sedition and civil war) for the most part these latter hath
carried away the victory," (Hobbes, Elements of Law. naae

88

.

)

as well as his assertion in De Give that "neither if the
wiser and the stronger do contest, have these ever or after
the upper hand of those ." (Hobbes Man and Citizen, paae
,

143
69,

.

)

Hobbes, Leviathan

In the parallel

,

page 97.

passage from De Give
51

,

Hobbes contends that

[w]hether therefore men be equal by
equality is to be acknowledged, or nature the
whether unequa 1
because they are like to contest
for domini”?
obtaining of peace that they
^
be esteemed as equal.
.(Hobbes, Man and
Citizen page 143.)
'

.

'

.

,

Hobblrurg;s'?hat^

71.

72.

corresponding passage from T he Element s,

as long as men arrogate to themselves
more honour
than they give to others, it cannot be
imagined
how they can possibly live in peace: and
consequently we are to suppose, that for peace
sake, nature hath ordained this law.
That every

man acknowledge other for his egua i
Elements of Law page 88.)

.(

Hobbes

,

,

70. See endnote # 69.
73.

Which Hobbes believed at least some men had
tendency to do; see below, ch. 2, pages 56-57.

74.

a

strong

For example, see Quentin Skinner's discussion of
Hobbes's
science of politics" in Chapter 8 of Quentin Skinner's
Reason and Rhetoric in th e Philosophy of Hobbes
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pages 294-326.
.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 75.

76.
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CHAPTER

II

HOBBES'S DERIVATION OF THE STATE OF
NATURE
A.

Introduction

Each of Hobbes's three major works of
political
philosophy contains a chapter in which he
purports to derive
or deduce the bellicose state of
nature from a consideration
of (1) the natural equality of
human beings, and
the

(2)

passions which motivate human beings to act in
particular
ways.^ In this chapter of my dissertation,

I

will carefully

examine the derivation of the state of nature (or
the
natural condition of mankind) which can be found in
Chapter
13 of Leviathan

.

By considering this derivation,

I

will explain why

Hobbes believes that the interactional situation which would
result from the placement of two or more men (each of whom

possesses the previously described human character) within
the same geographic region would be

a

belligerent and licentious state.

will devote a healthy

portion of this chapter to

a

I

rather uncertain,

discussion of the two types of

human beings whom Hobbes respectively designates "moderate
men" and "dominat ors

,

"

and to an analysis of the function

that each plays in determining the character of the state of

nature.

Even though

I

will

concentrate my presentation

upon the account which is set forward in Leviathan
from time to time, make reference to interesting

similarities and differences between the Leviathan

,

I

will,

derivation and those derivations which
can be found in De
Eleraents of T.aw

.

I

win

reserve for chapter

discussion of the three conceptions of
the state of
nature which I believe can be legitimately
culled from
Hobbes s various political writings.
3

a

Despite the differences which are apparent
among the
various ’'deductions'* of the state of nature,
Hobbes’s
strategy remains essentially the same in
his three major
political works. Specifically, Hobbes begins each

"derivation” by remarking upon the natural equality
of the
physical and intellectual qualities of all human

beings, and

proceeds thereafter to draw
of men,

a

distinction between two types

which distinction is purportedly based upon

a

corresponding diversity of passions, or diversity of bodily
constitution. Specifically, Hobbes contends that some men
[sc.

"dominators"] are frequently affected by overwhelming

passions which cause them to challenge, perturb, and

eventually to lash out against other men. Hobbes describes
such men as being affected by "a vain glory" and

a

false

esteem of their own powers [inani gloria et falsa virium
aes t

imat i o ]

.

^

This combination of passions^ has the

following effects upon those men who are bedeviled by them:
Primarily, such men are convinced of the falsity of the

doctrine of the fundamental natural equality of human
beings, in so far as they believe themselves to be

significantly superior to all or most of those men who
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happen to be around them. Secondly, such
men are intent upon
validating their own feelings of, and claims
to superiority
over others by actively "challenging"
those others for
publicly acknowledged "respect and honors."
Thirdly, such

men purportedly "take pleasure in contemplating
their own
powers in acts of conquest," that is, enjoy
"demonstrating"
their supposed superiority above others by
undertaking

(voluntary) acts of physical aggression.

Hobbes contrasts men of the former variety with those
men [sc. "moderates"] who "rightly value their own powers,"
who "look for but an equality of nature," and who would "be

glad to be at ease within modest bounds."^

Thus, while

dominators refuse to acknowledge an equality of their powers
with those of other men, moderates freely admit an equality
of nature.

Moreover, while dominators are eager to engage in

physical battles with other men for the purpose of garnering
honors,

respect and praises, moderates are described as

being disinclined to undertake such potentially dangerous
battles for the mere purpose of buttressing the level of

esteem with which they are regarded by their peers.
Finally, while dominators are described as sometimes

endeavoring to conquer other persons "for delectation only,"
that is, because they genuinely enjoy doing so, moderates
can be expected to engage in such imperious and

"anticipatory" activity only for the purpose of preserving
their goods and their lives (i.e. "for conservation.")
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A significant point in Hobbes's
analysis is that the

presence of (some) dominators within

a social

milieu

increases the incidence of acts of interpersonal
violence,
and moreover, that the presence of dominators
within that

milieu can be understood to have

a

pervasive and deleterious

effect upon the voluntary behavior not only of other

dominators, but of moderate men as well. Importantly
then,
even though dominators are described as constituting
merely
part of the social milieu, their presence can, nevertheless,
be understood to have a profound effect upon the behavior
of

most or all of the men in their vicinitv.^

Dominators and moderates differ not only because the
actions of the members of the former category are more
likely than are those of members of the latter to be

motivated by such passions as anger and vain-glory, but
moreover, because the opinions and actions of members of the
former category are much less liable to be affected by
rational arguments than are the opinions and actions of

members of the latter category. In light of the various
comments Hobbes makes about this issue,

I

believe that

dominators can be properly understood as men whose violent
passions predominate over their faculties of reason,^

Before presenting Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the
state of nature,

I

will briefly discuss Hobbes's explicitly

acknowledged distinction between dominators and moderates.
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B^ some

Thoughts on the

Di

sHn ctlon

and Dominators
It appears certain that
the widespread known presence

of dominators within a social
milieu has the effect of

coloring the character which the
resulting interactional
situation among those constituent
individuals

assumes. As

will become clear during the course
of chapters
6

of this dissertation,

within

3

4

,

,

5

,

and

the known presence of dominators

population can be similarly understood
to have
enormous consequences upon (1) the
willingness of
a

the

members of that population to enter into
collective
organizational units such as commonwealths, as
well as (2)
the willingness of members of already
established

organizational units such as commonwealths to
remain members
or parts of such units. Thus, my immediately
forthcoming

exploration of the distinction between dominators and

moderates can be seen to be relevant to my subsequent
discussions of the formation and maintenance of the
commonwealth, and should thus be included in this present

chapter
It is

apparent that we can trace much of the

disharmonious temper of the condition which Hobbes
designates

the state of nature” or ”the natural condition

of mankind" to the presence of certain antisocial passions,

most notably 'pride' and 'vain glory,' within the bodily

constitutions of some of the men who populate this
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condition. As we have seen, this is true both in Hobbes's

earlier political treatises, in which vanity or vain glory
is explicitly identified as the prime generating factor of

the bellicose natural condition of mankind, and in

Leviathan

,

where the pernicious influence of such passions

is somewhat more carefully,

if not intentionally,

concealed.

Given the aforementioned equality of human intellectual
facilities, dominators presumably possess the ability to

reason from premisses to conclusions (which Hobbes describes
as a rather mechanical

faculty).^® However,

either because

of the overwhelming influence of their antisocial passions

(such as anger and

a

desire for vengeance), because of their

inclination to significantly overrate their own level of
power vis-a-vis that of other men, or because of

a

disinclination to exercise their faculties of reason,
dominators do not make full active use of these rational
faculties. Thus, it would seem that dominators are

frequently prompted to act in an antisocial or imperious
fashion for the following two reasons:
(1)

Although dominators can formulate and practically use

(i.e.,

employ through voluntary activity) valid arguments,

they have a tendency to insert in their arguments (or

instances of practical reasoning) premises which are based
of
upon false estimates of their own status vis-a-vis those

statements
other men. Such premises might be understood as

reasoner is
or claims based upon the belief that the
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significantly more valuable or more
worthy of respect than
those men around him.
nominators are often unable to benefit
from the
conclusions of reason because of the
presence of such
(2)

violent passions as anger and an inveterate
desire for
vengeance
In the first instance,

(1),

it might be true that

although dominators can reason correctly, they
often arrive
at false conclusions due to the faulty
nature of
their

presuppositions, and the falsity of the corresponding
premises. Consequently, when dominators use such

conclusion to guide or work in conjunction with

a

a

motive

passion, the resulting voluntary action, though perhaps

effective in securing the actor temporary access to some

desired good, will, in the long term, likely lead to
mistrust, social instability, and

a

rather unenviable living

situation
In the second case,

(2),

it might be true that even

though dominators can, and often do, reason correctly by

employing valid arguments and true premises, the results (or
true conclusions) of this reasoning process cannot be

properly employed or put into practice either because (2A)
such men possess insufficiently strong passions or endeavors
to comply with or motivate the course of action associated

with the result of this reasoning process or (2B) on those

occasions when such conclusions could be profitably put into
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voluntary actions of such men
are motivated by
such perturbations as anger
and
which effectively bypass the conclusions of
reason. In oases
of type (2A),

the

dominator can be understood as
failing to act in compliance
with the conclusion or dictate
of reason because he fails
to
possess any sufficiently strong
desire or other passion to
carry or "assist" that conclusion.
In cases of type (2B),
the dominator can be understood
as failing
to act in

compliance with such

a

dictate because the passion or desire

would otherwise motivate acting in
such a manner is
notably weaker or less persistent
than the more violent
passion which, in a sense, overwhelms
the
u^hich

former.

of the former type (2A),

reasoner's lacking

a

In cases

the difficulty lies simply in the

sufficient motive for acting in

accordance with his dictate of reason, while in
cases of the
latter type (2B), the difficulty lies in the
predominance of
violent passions which interfere with the reasoner's
internal process of translating the dictate of
reason into
the utility of practice.

Thus, we may conclude that the voluntary actions of

dominators are less amenable than those of moderates to the

suggestions or precepts of reason. This will be true if we

understand precepts of reason to be those which, if
faithfully followed by all or most men, will lead to

condition of peace, an avoidance of
all

likelihood,

a

a

a

violent death, and in

maximization of one's life span. Because
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the moderate is not frequently
affected by the disruptive
passions (of the above described
type), he is better able
than the dominator to act
in accordance with the laws
of

nature which Hobbes describes
as "precepts of reason,"
and
which we might understand as
rules for interpersonal conduct
which, if widely observed,
will foster a condition of
social
peace. By contrast, since the
disruptive passions have a
profound effect in determining the
behavior
of the

dominator, we might reasonably infer
that such passions are
frequently of sufficient force to
overpower or overrule
whatever (comparatively weak)
"passions toward peace" the
dominator might experience, and hence
to cause him to
refrain from acting in accordance with
the precepts toward
peace (or laws of nature) which reason
suggests.
C.

The Leviathan Derivation

In his various derivations of the
state of nature,

Hobbes endeavors to imagine how

a

number of solitary human

beings would most likely behave if they were
forced to

confront one another in

a

condition bereft of

a

common

sovereign mechanism that is of sufficient strength to

guarantee

a

condition of peace and safety. In his

derivations, Hobbes presupposes

a

conception [or

understanding] of human beings as fundamentally equal,

predominantly egoistic creatures. Moreover, Hobbes believes
that some (never precisely specified) proportion of men can
be properly characterized as dominators, whose violent
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passions frequently effect the character
of their voluntary
behavior

When he begins his actual Leviathan
derivation of the
state of nature, Hobbes speculates
that the natural equality
of human beings would give rise
to a recognition of such
equality on the part of many or most men.
This, in turn,
would foster an equality of hope for the
attainment of those
physical objects which one desires. Further,
this equality
of hope, coupled with the influence
of Hobbes's

predominantly egoistic psychology, would give rise
to a
general willingness to enter into interpersonal
competition
for the purpose of establishing sole control over
desired

objects. This, in turn, and would eventually lead to
the

occurrence of actual, perhaps violent competitive struggles.
Further, since each man in this condition would eventually

come to recognize that those around him harbor

a

willingness

to enter into competitive struggles, and would eventually

come to observe (or be involved in) such struggles, then
each man would develop

a

general diffidence or uncertainty

regarding the future behavior of those around him. Such an

attitude of diffidence, coupled with (1)

a

recognition that

the behavior of those men around him could result in the

termination of his own life and (2) an intense fear of
losing his life, would eventually lead each man to recognize
that he must engage in "anticipatory" activity in order to

make more likely the continuance of his own life (and to
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make less likely his own violent
death). Finally, Hobbes
contends that the social condition
which would result from
these circumstances could properly
be characterized as a
condition of war, since he understands
war to consist "not
in battle only, or the act of
fighting,
but in a tract of

time wherein the will to contend by
battle is sufficiently
known

Even though Hobbes gives his reader the
initial

impression that this derivation constitutes

a

direct

unilinear sequence of steps, it quickly becomes
clear that
there are various elements or factors which

impact upon this

process, but nevertheless are not directly caused
by the

immediately prior step. Indeed, several of these elements
or
factors are directly related to the presence of dominators

within the social mix.
For example, we might reasonably maintain that the

presence of dominators will make the competitive struggles
for material goods more intense or more frequent than would

be the case if the population were composed exclusively of

moderates. This would be due primarily to the fact that

a

dominator can be expected to act unsociably by striving to
obtain and retain those goods "which to himself are

superfluous and to others necessary

.

Moreover, we might

reasonably contend that the presence of dominators will
result in

a

greater number of aggressive acts intended to

assure to the actor honor, glory or praise than would be the
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case if the population were
composed exclusively of
moderates
.

Further, Hobbes contends that
the right of nature
licenses men to do anything which
they consider necessary to
preserve their own lives, even though
some of the
individuals in the social mix, (that
is, dominators) can be
expected to engage in violent acts even
whan they do not
sincerely believe that such acts constitute
necessary means
to their own self-preservation. This
third point is

forcefully confirmed when Hobbes asserts that
some men can
be expected to engage in violent acts
not for the
sake of

conservation or self-preservation, but merely
because such
activity provides them with some degree of

"delectation.*'^^

Thus, the character of the derivation of the
state of

nature as

a

direct linear sequence is undermined by the

following three considerations:

(A)

dominators (whose

influence would seem to fall outside of such

a

direct linear

sequence) can be expected to increase the number and

intensity of interpersonal competitive struggles by

attempting to gain access to and retain those goods which
they recognize to be necessary to support the "conservation"
of their rivals but not of themselves;

(B)

dominators can be

expected to add to the index of violent acts by engaging in

strategies designed to assure to themselves greater honor
and respect; and (C) dominators can be expected to initiate

violent acts even when they do not sincerely believe that
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such acts constitute
necessarv
cessary means to
guarantee their own
P-seruation. .one of these
three elements can he
seen to
neatly into the direct
unilinear developmental
seguence
described on pp 62-63
above.
..

.

Moreover, the right of
nature, which also does
not fit
neatly into Hobbes's
derivation, can he seen to
play a somewhat enigmatic
role. Specifically,
the right of
nature is introduced as
licensing men to engage
in whatever
acts they consider
necessary to preserve their

L^yi^

lives, yet

Hobbes specifies that
some men can be expected
to act in
violently aggressive ways
even when they do not
sincerely
believe that such acts are
necess;,,-v
necessary to preserve their
own
1

i

ves

.

This being said,

I

will now proceed to examine
Hobbes’s

actual La yiathan derivation
of the state of nature.
In paragraph

6

of chapter 13 of Leviathan

.

Hobbes

enumerates three principal causes
of quarrel among men in
their natural state, namely,
competition, diffidence, and
glory.

Regarding the first, Hobbes was of
the opinion that
man’s equality of ability^
naturally gives
rise to an

equality in hope for the attainment
of one’s ends. Thus, if
two men desire an object which
only one of the
two can

possess, the two become enemies with
each endeavoring to
destroy or subdue"’* the other, since
destroying one’s
adversary will allow one free (albeit,
temporary) access to
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that desired object. Hobbea
auggeata that a recoanitl^ef
the fundamental equality of
human beinga will encourage men
to enter into such competitive
struggles. For example, in
the state of nature, if both
individual A and individual B
desire some object O, if A recognizes
that B desires O, if B
recognizes that A desires O, if A
recognizes that he is
roughly equal to E
and if B recognizes that he is
roughly equal to A, then in all likelihood
both A and B
would be willing to enter into a battle
with the other for
the sole possession and control of O.
This would be true
since each would think himself to be
reasonably assured of

victory (or,
a

a_t

the very least

,

at no disadvantage)

in such

battle. Further, such an orientation toward
the

acquisition and consumption of desired objects can
be

understood to be fostered (or encouraged) by Hobbes's

predominantly egoistic psychology which specifies that
self interested motives tend to take precedence over
non-

self-interested motives in determining human actions."^**
This tendency to be willing to enter into competitive

battles for the sole control of desired objects will be even

stronger if we take seriously Hobbes's claim that most men
have

a

tendency to overvalue themselves vis-a-vis other

humans
Moreover, Hobbes claims that given the previously

described ("all reckoned together" type of) equality among
human beings, if any man "plant, sow, build or possess
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a

convenient seat, others may probably be
expected to come
prepared with forces united to deprive him
of'^^

his goods

as well

as his life. Further, Hobbes contends
that after

such plunder has occurred, the invader may
expect to be in
like danger of invasion by another. Hence,
there naturally
arises a general diffidence of one’s fellow men
among persons
in this precarious condition.
This diffidence, in
turn,

gives rise to acts of "anticipation.”

Hobbes notes that by 'anticipation' he understands the

activity "by force or wiles, [of mastering] the persons of
all men that one can so long,

till he see[s] no other power

great enough to endanger him."^^ Seemingly, anticipation
can take either of two forms. The first consists of striking
out against one (or more) of one's rivals because one

believes that that rival has designs upon attacking him (the
former )
For example, we might imagine that individual A has

secured possession of some physical object which he believes

individuals B and C desire. Further, we might suppose that A
believes that
col

1

B and C

(either individually, or more likely,

ectively ) are planning to attack him for the purpose of

dispossessing him of this coveted object. In this first
variety, anticipation might consist of A's attacking B and C

(presumably separately) before they can attack him. We can
quite easily see that the dynamics of the state of nature,

encouraged by

a

universal fear of death and
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a

widespread

-spiciousn^ss fostered by
uncertainty (regarding how
one's
fallow inhabitants

win voluntarily

act), could give rise
to
instances of "higher order"
anticipation in which, for
^>=an,ple, B wi 1 1 attack
A because he thinks

that A will aoon
attack B in order to
prevent B's attack on him
(A).
Though it does seem plausible
that such instances of
"atriking first" would occur
in the state of nature,
Hobbes
consistently characterizes
anticipation as an activity
Wherein one attempts to
systematically "master or subdue"
(rather than simply to kill,
destroy or harm) the "persons
of all the men he can."
Therefore, the fundamental aim
of
anticipation is not simply to
destroy one's fell ow
25
man.

but rather,

to conquer,

and consequently, to use the

latter's power for one's own
defensive purposes.
Indeed, when discussing this
issue, Hobbes claims that
even men "who would be at ease
within modest bounds," i.e.
moderates, must seek to increase
their power by invasion
since "they would not be able, long
time standing on their
own defense to subsist.
Further, he contends that "such
augmentation or dominion over men [is]
necessary to a man's
conservation."^^ [my emphasis]
As has already been mentioned in
chapter

1

of this

dissertation, Hobbes regards the termination
of one's own
life (or the termination of the vital motion
within one's

own body) as the surrmum malum or greatest
evil that can

befall any man. Thus, because Hobbes attributes
such
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importance to the passion which he
designates "a fear of
death," we might safely infer that
this passion plays a
significant role in determining the
character of the

voluntary actions of men in the state of
nature. Indeed, in
^ ements—of
Law Hobbes lucidly states that^^
,

forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to
will and desire bonum sibi
that which is good for
themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful:
but most of all that terrible enemy of
nature,
it is not against reason that a man
doth all he can to preserve his own body and
limbs
both from death and pain.
.

Certainly, in light of Hobbes's various pronouncements

concerning the fear of death and the desire to preserve
one

s

life,

it would be difficult to overestimate the

significance that these two passions have in determining the

voluntary behavior of individuals, and the eventual
interactional character of the state of nature.
Thirdly, Hobbes introduces and describes what

I

find to

the most intriguing of the principal causes of quarrel in

the state of nature, namely, a desire for glory.

Specifically, Hobbes contends that in the state of nature
(where there exists no central authority or sovereign power

which is of sufficient strength to "overawe" all men),
"[e]very man looketh that his companion should value him at
the same rate he sets upon himself: and, upon all signs of

contempt, naturally endeavors

...

to extort a greater

value from his contemners by damage, and from others by the
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example."” However, because
most men net a higher value
upon their own intellectual
powera than they net upon the
intellectual powers of nearly
any other man, and because
we
might reasonably assume that
men who would be willing to
attack others in order to obtain
"trifles, as a word, a
smile [or] a different opinion, "«
would require but the
flimsiest of excuses in order to
begin carrying out such
acts of "invasion," the state
of nature would clearly be one
of unrestrained, unpredictable,
and in many
cases,

frivolously based violence.

With respect to the latter point, it
is conceivable
that after becoming aware of the
presence of
dominators

within his vicinity,

a

moderate man will attempt to garner

honors and respect, but will do so for the
sake of obviating
the offensive attacks of the other men in
his vicinity, (the
latter of whom will, if the stratagem is
successful, stand
in awe of the recipient of such honors
and respect and will,
in consequence, be discouraged from assailing
that

recipient

)

Hobbes is quick to emphasize that such instances or

voluntary acts of invasion or preemptive violence are no
more than what the invader's conservation requires and are

generally allowed. Presumably, what Hobbes is saying is that
since in the state of nature, invasion is generally required
for a man's self preservation, it is generally allowed or

sanctioned by the right of nature. However, Hobbes states
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that "some men," namely,
those men we have called
dominators, take pleasure
in contemplating their
own pew,
ler
in acts of conquest,
and pursue such conquering
activity
"further than their security
requires.
Thus,

in Leviathan,

(as in Hobbes's earlier
political

rks),

engaging in the type of
conquering activity which
some men pursue farther than
they sincerely believe their
security requires is allowed
(in a weak sense) to all men
in
the state of nature (and
exercised specifically
by

dominators), but is not sanctioned
by the right of nature.
Hence, the distinction apparent
in Hobbes's earlier works
between an action's being sanctioned
by the right of nature,
and an action's being permitted
merely in virtue of not
being forbidden by any extant sovereign
authority again
emerges in Leviathan
.

In L eviathan

,

Hobbes defines the 'right of nature'

as 32

the liberty each man has to use his own
power, as
he will himself, for the preservation
of his
nature; that is to say, of his life, and
consequently of doing any thing which in his own
judgment, and reason, he shall conceive the
aptest
means thereunto.
For example, since the use of force or wiles,
that is, of

anticipatory strategies, to master the persons of other men
is necessary to insure one's safety or conservation,
Hobbes

claims it is "generally al lowed.
in this

However, he does not,

location, specify who allows such activity (i.e..
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God or other men), and why
the adjective 'generallyia
used. (Does Hobbes mean to
suggest, e.g., that some
"specific" instances exist in which
self preservation
requires the dominion over other
men but in which attempting
to gain such dominion is not
allowed?)^*

Further, in De_Cive, when Hobbes
discusses the desire
and will to hurt which all men
in the state of nature
possess, he announces that this will
is "not equally to be
condemned.
That is, those men who are caused
to desire
to harm others by vain glory and
excessive self-esteem, are
worthy of a greater degree of condemnation
than are those

whose desire to harm is caused by the necessity
of
preserving their lives.
A unique feature of Hobbes's Leviathan
derivation of

the state of nature concerns the apparent
prominence of

place given to the common appetite for

a

single object among

two or more men in helping to generate

a

social condition

which is properly charact eri zabl e as "a war of each
against
all." Though while in his earlier political works, Hobbes
had discussed the conflict caused by a common desire for

a

single object, he had discussed the generation of such

conflicts only after having described the conflicts

generated by "vain glory" and "comparison," and had done so
in a rather cursory fashion.

natural state chapter,
is

a

By contrast, in Leviathan

common appetite for

a

's

single object

presented as the predominant interactional feature which
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fosters the generation of
al

a

wholesale war of each against

1

Strikingly, what uniquely emerges
in Hobbes's Leviathan
derivation of the state of nature
is an orientation among
Its inhabitants toward the
bases of a commodious existence
and tbe presence of a desire
to obtain tbe corresponding
goods (ratber than a desire for
the bare necessities of lifa
or the bases for a mere
subsistence level of existence). For
example, one will notice that
when Hobbes discusses the

competition for desirable material
goods, he lists as
examples of the latter a convenient
seat, which a man can be
conceived of as building and possessing,
as well

agricultural crops which

as

man can be conceived of as

a

planting, sowing and harvesting.
In essence,

in his Leviathan derivation, Hobbes
imbues

his state of nature's inhabitants with
somewhat more

sophisticated or highly developed desires and tastes
than
had been explicitly included within his earlier
derivations.
In fact,

in an illuminating passage from the final paragraph

of chapter 13 of Leviathan

.

Hobbes asserts that "the

passions that incline men to peace are fear of death; desire
of such things as are necessary to commodious living and a

hope by their industry to obtain

them."^’^

Thus, according to Hobbes's Leviathan derivation,

fundamental equality of human powers (and

a

widespread

recognition of such) coupled with some degree of
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a

interpersonal competition for desired goods,
and intense fear of death

^

a

a

widespread

recognition of the presence

of dominators within one's vicinity
gives rise to a general

diffidence among men. Such diffidence might be
interpreted
as stemming from a widespread inability
to reliably

predict

the voluntary actions of one's fellow men, and
as embodying
an attitude of justifiably chary suspicion and
a tendency to

expect (or to actively prepare for) rapacious or violently

antisocial behavior from such men. Moreover, Hobbes believed
that this general diffidence would gradually give rise to

acts of "anticipation," and eventually, to a condition of

war of every man against every other man.

Nevertheless, it might serve us well to regard Hobbes's

Leviathan derivation of the state of nature as constituting
a

change of emphasis from his earlier works, rather than

a

wholesale change of the doctrine by which the state of
nature as

a

war of each against all can be imagined to be

generated
Even though on one level, the war of each against all
can be traced to the enmity and finally to the physical

conflicts which arise due to
more) men for

a

single

a

common appetite among two (or

desired object, which eventually

prompts those two (or more) men to attempt to obtain that
object through some voluntary activity, it appears that on

deeper level this process can be understood as being

predicated upon the necessity of adopting
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a confrontational

a

mode of action in response to the
presence of dominators in
one's vicinity. In turn, the behavior
(i.e., the voluntary
activity) of dominators can be understood
to he motivated

by

the frequent presence, within their
own bodies, of such

perturbational passions as those which cause "a
vain esteem
of one's own powers
.

It

is therefore due to the presence of men
who are

bedeviled by the passions of vain esteem, pride and

a

desire

for glory that an augmentation of dominion of
persons

becomes

a

necessary means to each man's conservation, and it

is for this reason that such passions

(and the voluntary

acts which the latter motivate) can be understood to

determine the interactional character of Hobbes's Leviathan

presentation of the state of nature.
D.

Concluding Remarks

To recapitulate, we have seen that Hobbes includes

within each of his three major works of political philosophy
a

derivation of the interactional state of nature which is

based upon his construal of the nature of individual human
beings. Further, we have commented upon the significant role

which the natural equality of human beings plays in this
derivation, as well as the importance which can be

attributed to Hobbes's predominantly egoistic psychological
theory. Moreover, we have emphasized the importance which
the presence of so-called dominators in the interactive
mi lieu has in determining the character of Hobbes's state of
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nature and, as such, the role which th
e perturbational
passions play in determining the
interactional character of
this condition.

Although Hobbes initially presents

a

distinction among

men in the state of nature between those
who are content
with an equality of nature and those who
are eager to

demonstrate their supposed superiority over others
in acts
of predation and conquest, by the end of
each of Hobbes’s
three natural state chapters, all men can, for the
reasons

indicated above, be expected to behave in roughly the
same
manner.
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We will now move on to consider the three

conceptions or varieties of the state of nature which

I

believe can be found in, or reconstructed from Hobbes's

writings
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Hobbes, Elements
of Law
page 71, and Hobbes, Leviathan page 75.
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-

.

.

.

.

,

.

Even though it is conceivable that some
moderate men in
he state of nature will choose to attempt
to garnish
praises, we must nevertheless understand
that they will do so
because of the influence of their
perturbational passions and the incidence of the
accompanying vainglorious beliefs, but rather because
such
men sincerely judge this activity to be a necessary
means to
preserving their own lives. See below, pages 70-72.
6

n^

Hobbes, Leviathan page 75.
After discussing, in section 2 of chapter 14, of The
El ements—of Law the natural equality of human
beings, Hobbes
begins section 3 by drawing a distinction between two types
of men, which distinction is purportedly based upon or
caused by a corresponding "diversity of passions."
7.

.
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their°f^'l
fellows,

pagr?l

claims that "some [men] are vainly
precedency and superiority above
while other men are moderate and look for
nature." (Hobbes, Elements of

)

Hobbes proceeds, in section 4 of chapter
1
to present and discuss the aforementioned
g
distinction between the temperate man who rightly
power (i.e., the moderate), and the vainglorious values his
man who
supposes himself naturally superior to others (i.e.,
the
ominator)
In this section, Hobbes proclaims that the
temperate man "according to that natural equality
which is
among us^,^ permits as much to others as he assumes
to
himself." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen page 114.) By
contrast
the vainglorious man who possesses a "fiery spirit "
and who
supposes himself above the rest, will have a license to do
as he lists and to "[challenge] respect and
honors as due to
him before others." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen page
114.)
Hence, the "moderate" or temperate man would appear to
possess a rather more realistic assessment of the natural
character of men, since he, unlike the "dominator,"
recognizes the natural equality of humans. As a consequence
of possessing this realistic view of the natural human
powers, the temperate man is disinclined to challenge others
for
respect and honors." Since the moderate man recognizes
that he is fundamentally equal to other men with respect to
his physical powers, he would appear to be less likely than
the vainglorious man to confront situations in which he
believes that others are undervaluing his abilities. Because
the vainglorious "dominator" considers himself to be
superior to others, he will believe that he is being
undervalued (or treated with less than the appropriate level
of respect) even on those occasions when he is being treated
no less respectfully than are his fellows.
Moreover, the "dominator" is more willing than the
"moderate" to "do as he lists" by taking more than he allows
others and by aggressively challenging those whom he
believes have slighted him precisely because he is more
convinced than the moderate that he will be capable of
demonstrating his supposed superiority over a rival in a
physical conflict. That is to say, since the moderate man
correctly judges that the prospect of emerging victorious in
any one-on-one physical battle is rather uncertain, he will,
in all likelihood, take steps to avoid the possibility of
defeat (which might result in the loss of his life) by
endeavoring to eschew such battles. By contrast, since the
vainglorious man is likely to hold unrealistically
optimistic beliefs concerning his ability to defeat others
in battle, it seems that he will be willing to initiate and
engage in such battles somewhat more frequently than will
ot4
=

g Cive
.

,

.

,

,

the moderate.
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Though Hobbes does not, in any of his three
works
philosophy, specify the precise percentage on
of
dominators (who are liable to act upon the
desire to provoke
rs through taunts or other signs of
contempt or upon the
putatively scarce material
goods) within the human population, he does
state in the Elements that the "greatest partnevertheless
of men do
upon no assurance of odds, through vanity or
comparison or
appetite provoke the rest who would otherwise by
contented
with equality." (Hobbes, Elements of Law page
71.) This
opinion should, however, be contrasted with Hobbes's
claim
in The Author's Preface to De Give that men
are not evil by
nature, and that "the wicked [are] fewer than the
righteous." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
page 75.)
Additionally, note well Hobbes's somewhat troubling
asseveration in Chapter 13 of Leviathan that "almost all men
possess a vain conceit of [their] own wisdom." (Hobbes
Leviathan page 74.)
Though Hobbes does waver a bit on the question of the
exact proportion of dominators among humankind, what does
emerge as significant in his various discussions of this
topic is that each sizable group of human beings contains
some proportion of men who might properly be designated
'moderates,' as well as some proportion of men who might
appropriately be labeled 'dominators.'
8

'

,

.

.

9 The point made in this paragraph will be discussed at
greater length in the section entitled "Some thoughts on the
distinction between dominators and moderates" which begins
on page 57 of this dissertation.
.

10. See Hobbes's discussion of

reason as a mechanical human
faculty in the opening paragraphs of Chapter 5 of Leviathan
(Hobbes, Leviathan pages 22-23.), as well his discussion of
the relationship between reason and the passions
( speci f i ca 1
those which he designates the "perturbations
1 y
of the mind which frequently obstruct right reason") in
Chapter 12 of De Homine (Hobbes, Man and Citizen pages 55,

.

56.

,

)

11. See Hobbes's discussion of the specific perturbations of
the mind such as anger, pride, excessive self esteem and
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen
Pnvi<; in Chapter 12 of De Homine
pages 55-61
.

.
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,

^

12 Hobbes
I
iathan page 76. Moreover, since Hobbes
believes that human beings will eventually
they must engage in anticipatory activity recognize that
if they wish to
continued survival, we might reasonably
ontend that the fully developed state of nature
will
include many actual instances of violent
interpersonal
conflict and not just a mere willingness on the
part of men
to engage in such violent conflict.
_

,

14.
13. Hobbes
Leviathan, page 95. See Hobbes’s discussion of
the
law
of
nature
concerning mutual accommodation and
15.

endnote #36, below.

Hobbes, Leviathan

page 75.

.

Perhaps this developmental
the following manner:

Equality

+

sequence can be diagrammed in

Predominant egoism

1

Recognition of Equality

i

Willingness to Engage
in Competitive Struggles

«-

Desire for Goods ^

Predominant
Egoism

i

Actual Occurrence of
Competitive Struggles

Presence of nominators

1

1

Diffidence of
Fellow Men

Interpersonal
Violence

Desire for
Glory

1

Recognition of Need
for Anticipation
(Even among Moderates)

•-

Interpersonal
Viol ence

Presence
of

nominators

1

State of War
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hough we might initially conceive this
developmental
sequence as encompassing only the elements
on the left side
of this page, when we more closely
consider Hobbes's
erivation, we find that the presence of
dominators within
the social mix has the effect of (A)
increasing the
frequency with which competitive struggles
occur, of (B)
increasing the number of "glory based" acts
of violence and
thus fostering ^ widespread diffidence of
one's
fellow men
(which, in ^turn, will foster a recognition
of the need to
engage in anticipatory acts), and of (C) increasing
the
number of violent acts which are performed "for
delectation
only.
(and of further fostering a widespread diffidence
.

etc
18.

'

.

)

16. See my

discussion of the right of nature on pages 70-72.

17 Construed, most rudimentari
as an ability to strike
1 y
out against, and to take away the life of any other
person.
20.
,

21. Hobbes,

Leviathan

.

page 75.

l^'Io which case the rough equality which B recognizes
relates to the equal ability of A and B to take away the
life of the other (and, of course, the equal vulnerability
of A and B to have his life taken away by the other).
Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory

,

page 64.

Though perhaps only "slightly stronger." Since the
natural powers of one's own mind, which, in Leviathan
Hobbes thinks nearly all men have a tendency to overvalue,
might enable its possessor to concoct clever strategies with
24.
which to outsmart his opponent, such (putatively superior)
intellectual powers would certainly not directly enable him
25.
to defeat his opponent in hand-to-hand combat. See Hobbes,
Leviathan page 75.
,

,

22. Hobbes,

Leviathan

,

page 75.

23. In the El ements
Hobbes expressed a belief that in the
absence of any coercive restrictions, dominators will
actively take measures to demonstrate their supposed
"precedency and superiority over others through the use of
force." (Hobbes, Elements of Law page 71.)
,

,

Hobbes, Leviathan

,

page 75.

Which nevertheless, does have its place in the state of
nature
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26. Hobbes,

leviathan

page 75

.

.

the text, 'H^fbif^^ls^?o%iscuss*'th'"^^^'
Possible defensive
of being conan^rJ
^ subdued
by other men in the
state of nature
29.
28.
benefits

30. Hobbes,

Element s of Law

Hobbes, Leviathan

^

Hobbes, Leviathan
31. See Hobbes,

seek^peaL^as
does

,

,

page 71.

page 75.
page 76.

Leviathan

page 75

.

Dararfrai-.K

32. Hobbes,

Leviathan

.

u

enjoinf him to
it) when he

f ar'^arhe^has^h

Lt sinLreW L^Lv^t^ar

guarantee
guaran?erhil
his own survival

o

/i

ini^ia^es are‘n:celsarr?r
^
.

page 79.

Paragraph 4, line 5. Hobbes
during his explanation of how a
widespread
<=ondition of war. See my discussion
of
thff point anfmv°a^
^°'"°"'P®Pyan9 explanation of Hobbes's
concept
conLnt of "anfi
anticipation" on pages 67-68, above.

makefthi;

•

34^As mentioned earlier, Hobbes claims
that some men in the
state of nature take pleasure in
contemplating their own
power in acts conquest which they pursue
35.
farther than their
security requires." (Hobbes, Leviathan
page 75 ) Telling y
the actions of this typ^ar;
"anora" :
though there is a clear sense in
36.
w^’ir
w acts
r"'are physically possible and
ch such
thus able to be
performed (and hence, allowed). By contrast,
when Hobbes
discussed those acts of invasion which men "who
would
be glad to be at ease within modest bounds"
obbes Leviathan page 75.) must employ in order
(
to
lives and physical soundness, he proclaims
that such augmentation of dominion over men
ought to
be allowed.
(Hobbes, Leviathan page 75.)
,

,

,

.

.

.

.

,

.

Hobbes, M_an and Citizen page 114. Additionally, see my
discussion of diffidence and anticipatory strategies on
pages 66-68, above.
,

During his discussion of the fifth law of nature, "that
every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest," in
Chapter 15 of Leviathan Hobbes points out
.
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that there is in men's aptness for society,
a
diversity of nature, rising from their diversity
of affections; not unlike that we see in
stones
brought together for building an edifice
that stone which by the asperity and
irregularity of figure, takes more room from
others, than it itself fills; and for the
hardness, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby
hindreth the building, is by the builders cast
away as unprofitable and troublesome: so also, a
man that by the asperity of nature, will strive to
retain those things which to himself are
superfluous and to others necessary; and for
the stubbornness of his passions cannot be
corrected, is to be left or cast aside, as
cumbersome thereunto. For seeing that every man,
not only by right but also by necessity of nature
is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain
that which is necessary for his conservation; he
that shall pose himself against it for things
superfluous is guilty of the war that thereupon is
to follow. (Hobbes, Leviatha n page 95; Cf
Psalms
118:22)
.

.

In this passage, Hobbes is asserting that there exist some
men whose incorrigible tendency to take more than their fair
share from the stock of available material resources makes
them particularly unsuited for life within cooperative
social groupings. When he speaks of those men whose stubborn
passions cannot be corrected, "who will strive to retain
those things which to himself are superfluous and to others
necessary," and whose nature forces them to (figuratively)
take more room than they are entitled, Hobbes appears to be
making a clear reference to dominators In turn, when Hobbes
contends (in Chapter 13 of Leviathan ) that a common desire
for some coveted material object gives rise to competitive
conflicts among men, and that such conflicts will eventually
lead to a wholesale condition of war, we might, in light of
the abovequoted passage, plausibly infer that Hobbes
considered dominators to bear special responsibility in this
process. That is to say, the presence of dominators might be
considered to make competitive conflicts for desired objects
more widespread than it would be in their absence since such
men would be willing to enter into competitive conflicts for
the control not only of those objects which they believe to
be necessary to sustain their continued existence, but
moreover, for those objects which they recognize to be
necessary to sustain the existence of other men in their
vicinity (their likely rivals), but not to sustain their own
.

lives.
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37. Hobbes, Leviathan
pag e 78. Moreover, in Leviathan
Hobbes emphasizes to a gr eater degree than he had
in
©aflier works, the necess ity of engaging in the types his
of
activity which he calls " anticipation" in order to
guarantee
or make more probable one s continuing survival
Indeed, in
Leviathan Hobbes especia lly emphasizes that if an
inhabitant of the state o f nature were to attempt to
preserve his life without striving (successfully) to conquer
other men, whose combined natural powers the former could
use for his own defensive purposes, that inhabitant would
stand a negligible chance of surviving for any sustained
period of time.
.

.

.

,

38. Hobbes, Levi a than
page 76. Indeed, Hobbes describes
dominators as "taking pleasure in contemplating their own
power in the acts of conquest which they pursue farther than
their security requires, while in the Latin version of
Leviathan Hobbes claims "that there are those who from
pride and a desire for glory would conquer the whole world."
(Hobbes, Leviathan p. 76.)
,

,

.

39. An issue which remains questionable in my mind, however,
concerns the character which social relations in the state
of nature would assume if dominators were excluded from this

social milieu. I raise this issue because although Hobbes
consistently draws a distinction between moderates and
dominators, he nevertheless claims that since all men think
well of themselves and hate to see the same in others, "they
must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of
contempt and hatred." (Hobbes, Elements of Law page 71.)
One naturally becomes curious as to whether Hobbes here
means to suggest that (1) because all human beings hate
perceiving others to be superior, or even equal to
themselves, and because some men experience strong
antisocial passions which they cannot or will not suppress,
there will necessarily arise verbal taunts, insults and
presumably acts of interpersonal violence which will be
perpetrated by dominators; or whether he means to suggest
that (2) because all human beings hate perceiving others to
be superior, or even equal
to themselves, it is necessarily
true that even within a natural state populated wholly by
moderates, verbal taunts, insults, etc. would be initiated.
A careful (albeit isolated) reading of this passage seems to
reveal that Hobbes intended the second interpretation,
though it is unlikely that Hobbes was interested to discuss
such a count erf actua 1 situation.
,
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Since he appears to have believed
that a
ui
categorized
az
domina^ors"
and
annr^crh°*
since he appears committed to the
further belief that
the presence of some dominators
within a social milieu will
in some way, affect the behavior
of all or neariraH
moderates within that milieu, one might
aver thlt Hobbes
analysis of this "oounterf actual "
stat^ of nat
speculation, and
hen«
'

uLrofi[:b^:."^

40. Albeit

for different motivational
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r easons

CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF THE STATE OF NATURE

Introduction

A.

In this chapter,

I

will examine the expository feature

or heuristic device employed in Hobbes's
political

philosophy which is commonly referred to as "the state of
nature" or the "natural condition of humankind." The state
of nature plays a prominent role in Hobbes's philosophy,

since it is meant to represent the pre-political state of

human interaction, that is, an interactive condition which
is characterized by the absence of an effective common

sovereign power and the retention of
on the part of each individual
or,

as we shall

a

"right to all things"

inhabitant or "natural man,"

see later in this chapter, on the part of

each multiperson sovereign unit.^

Admittedly, Hobbes's account (or more properly, "series
of accounts")

of the state of nature will

strike the

attentive reader as being somewhat sloppily organized and

desultorily presented. In fact, an uncharitable critic might
judge that, taken together, Hobbes's various references to,
and descriptions of, the state of nature represent a

hodgepodge of inconsistent, mutually cont radi ctory
seemingly ad hoc pronouncements concerning

a

,

and

concept which

this author forwards as a significant expository device, but

which he seemingly expended little effort to clearly develop
and perspicuously express. For example, at times Hobbes

insists that the state of nature has never
existed in the
course of human history, yet at other times he

remarks that

such

state not only existed in the histories of "our

a

ancestors" but continues to exist in the savage parts
of
America, as well as in the contemporary international arena.
Thus,

I

do not mean to suggest that within each of his three

major political works, Hobbes presents

a

systematic

discussion of the three conceptions of the state of nature
which

I

will discuss below, or that Hobbes makes a special
to describe, compare and contrast the three

conceptions which

I

will mention.

I

do mean to suggest,

however, that each of Hobbes's various references to, and

discussions of "the state of nature" can be associated with
one of three relatively broad conceptions of

a

pre-political

state. Each of these three conceptions can be designated

"pre-political" precisely because each lacks

a

common

coercive mechanism or common sovereign authority which is of
sufficient power to command obedience from or maintain

a

condition of peace among the various individuals or
"persons"

who inhabit, or constitute the "matter" of this

interactional condition.
I

do contend further that Hobbes believed the state of

nature to be an abiding condition of human interaction. By
this

I

mean that Hobbes believed that given the nature of

the human organism, a condition approximating the state of

nature will be observable in the arena of human interaction.
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regardless of whether the entities interacting
are natural
persons or such artificial entities as sovereign
states.

Prel iminarv--A Note on Methnrl ^
In chapter

as

1

of

Corpore

,

Hobbes defines philosophy

'such knowledge of effects or appearances,

as we acquire

by true ratiocination from the knowledge we
have first of
its causes or generations:

and again, of such causes or

generations as may be had from knowing first their
effects."^ In turn, he asserts that^
the subject of philosophy, or the matter it treats
of, is every body of which we can conceive any
generation, and which we may, by any consideration
thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is
capable of composition or resolution; that is to
say, every body of whose generation or properties
we can have any knowledge.

Finally, Hobbes claims that the principal parts of

philosophy are two,®
[f]or two chief kinds of bodies, and very
different from one another offer themselves to
such as search after their generation and
properties; one whereof being the work of nature,
is called a natural body, the other is called a
commonwealth, and is made by the wills and
agreements of men.

Indeed, he asserts that "from these parts spring" the two

types of philosophy, namely, natural philosophy and civil
phi 1 osophy

7

While attempting to elucidate the manner in which "the
knowledge of any effect may be gotten from the knowledge of
88

the generation thereof," Hobbes offers as an
example the

two-dimensional geometric figure known as
contends that if

a

a

circle. Hobbes

man were to visually examine

figure resembling a circle which is drawn on

a

a

plane

piece of

paper, that man could not, merely by exercising his sense of
sight, determine whether that figure is a circle or is

merely

a

ciifcle.

figure which greatly approximates the shape of
He contends, however, that

a

"nothing is more easy

to be known by him that first knows the generation of the

propounded figure,"® that is, whether the propounded figure
is an actual

circle or simply

a

figure which is shaped very

similarly to that of a circle. Thus, if the onlooker were
aware of the fact that the figure in front of him "was made
by the circumduction of a body whereof one end remained

unmoved,

he would be certain that this figure is a true

circle, rather than

a

figure which merely appears to the

sense of sight to be, or significantly approximates the
shape of, a circle.
By considering Hobbes’s example of the generation of

a

circle, as well as his definition of philosophy, we might

reasonably forward the following claim concerning the

significance of Hobbes's state of nature and Hobbes’s
various discussions of the generation of commonwealths:

Hobbes believed that, from
all

a

methodological standpoint

philosophy can be characterized as being of one of two

broad types, namely analytic (or resolutive) philosophy and
89

synthetic (or compositive) phi 1 osophy

.

When discussing

the state of nature, and the generation of
commonwealths

from out of that state, Hobbes can be understood to
be

engaging in the variety of philosophy characterized as
synthetic, in which one acquires knowledge of

a

body by true

ratiocination from the knowledge which he first has of its
causes or generation. Specifically, Hobbes begins his

project with

a

knowledge of the **disposi tions

and manners of men," imagines

a

of men with such dispositions,

,

affections

situation in which

a

number

affections and manners are

forced to confront one another without the benefit of an

effective peace-preserving sovereign power, and subsequently
reasons how such

a

collection of "masterless" men (or, as we

shall go on to see later in this chapter, masterless

collective sovereign persons)^^ can reasonably be

understood to generate durable political groupings or
political bodies which contain (more or less) effective^^

sovereign mechanisms.
If a man were to

contend that one is able to acquire

adequate phi 1 osophi ca

knowledge concerning the nature of

political bodies merely by studying the history of such

bodies as have existed throughout the ages, Hobbes would

clearly disagree. Knowledge of this latter type would

constitute mere prudence or experiential knowledge and would
not be properly charact er i zed as sapience, scientific

knowledge or exceptionless knowledge of effects from known
90

causes. Hence, although Hobbes includes
accounts and

descriptions of actually existing historical
commonwealths
within the corpus of his philosophical writings,
one should
not conclude that in doing so he is attempting
to equate
political history with political philosophy. Rather, one

should recognize and acknowledge Hobbes's claim that
of the history of political bodies will

a

study

provide one with

insight into the nature of what must be true of any unit of

political organization.
Therefore, when Hobbes discusses the nature of the

organizational units of the types described on pages 86-104,
below, he can be understood to be describing units which

bear similarities to, but are not simply identical with the

various patrimonial units and fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS

which have appeared on earth at various times and in various
places
1

14

Significantly, then, although Hobbes believes that

specific sovereign multiperson units (of the types described
on pages 99-119, below) have existed at various times and

places throughout the course of human history, the

analytical models of such units which Hobbes forwards in his

philosophical writings should be looked upon as examples of
"ideal

limiting cases"^^ and not as examples of actually

existing states.
Perhaps significantly (and perhaps fortunately, for our
own purposes), in chapter

6

of De Corpore

91

,

Hobbes alters his

definition of philosophy to read that philosophy is
"the
knowledge we acquire by true ratiocination of
appearances

or

apparent effects, from the knowledge we have of such

possible production or generation of the same; and
production, as has been,
have of the effects.

gj^

may be

,

of such

from the knowledge we

In light of this definition, we can

understand that when Hobbes discusses the modes of the
generation of commonwealths from out of the state of nature,
he is not attempting to describe the actual manner in which

historically existing commonwealths were formed out

of some

previously existing "natural" interactional state, but
rather, the manner in which various political bodies can be

conceived as being created from out of previously existing

matter (viz, human beings, or less stable organizational
units). Thus, in

Leviathan

,

a

famous passage from chapter 17 of

Hobbes claims that the unity of the natural

persons who constitute the commonwealth^^
is made by covenant of every man with every man,
in such manner
every man should say to every

authorize and give up my right of governing
myself to this man ... on this condition, that
thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all
his actions in like manner.
man,

I

Even though it may not be, and probably is not the case that
any particular existing commonwealth was established as

a

result of an explicit contract of the type of which Hobbes
speaks, one can, nevertheless, conceive of commonwealths

(either of the actually existing (historical) variety, or of
92

the ideal general

(philosophical) variety) being generated

in the manner that Hobbes describes.

entering into of

a

Thus, the explicit

social contract among the natural persons

in the state of nature can best be understood
as the result
of an exercise in philosophical speculation by
which one

attempts to imagine how an ideal type of (political) body
be generated from out of preexisting matter.^®
C^.

Hobbes’s Three Conceptions of the State of Nature

Unfortunately, attempting to understand precisely what
Hobbes meant to describe as the state of nature in his
(1)
political
writings is somewhat complicated by the fact that

he does not use this term univocally.

In fact, within his

writings, Hobbes uses the designation "state of nature” to
refer
to (at least) the following three concepts:
(2)
a rational construct or construal of humankind's natural
condition "wherein particular men are in a condition of war,
one against another,"
that is, of each person against every
other person. ( Leviathan p. 78) Significantly, Hobbes
believed
that "there had never been any time, wherein
(3)
particular men were in a condition of war against another."
,

(ibid.

)

A social condition in which small groups of human beings
contend against each other, and in which no common power
(i.e., no mechanism of sovereign authority which is common
to all individuals who populate this condition) exists.
Hobbes referred to the small groups of individuals which are
to be found in this condition as "f ami 1 ies

The "condition of war [of] one against another," which
"in all times" exists between "kings and persons of
sovereign authority." ( Leviathan page 101.) Hobbes referred
to the large multiperson units which are to be found in this
condition as bona fide principalities or fully sovereign
states
,
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As has been noted above,

Frangois Tricaud, following

Paul Johnson, suggests that Hobbes might
have offered the

state of nature as
or

'an ideal

a

'tendential law' a 'limiting concept,'

limiting case,' so that one might understand

the state of nature as a representation that need
not be

assigned to any definite moment in historical or prehistoric
time.

»f

20

Though

I

believe that such an interpretation, by

itself,

fails to capture the complexity of Hobbes's state of

^^ture,

I

further believe that, in

a

sense, all three

conceptions of the state of nature which

I

have hitherto

presented can be looked upon as ideal limiting cases. The
character of these three respective ideal limiting cases can
be understood to vary as a function of the background

assumptions which Hobbes builds into each of the respective
conceptions. Thus, for example, one might suppose that the

state of nature-2 represents Hobbes's descriptive analysis
of the social

condition which would obtain if

a

number of

small paternal or despotical groups were forced to interact

with each other in the absence of any terrestrial sovereign

which could determine the character of such encounters.

Hobbes's analysis of this condition (which should,
believe, be reckoned as the result of

a

I

series of thought

experiments) was probably affected by his observations of
the behavior of men in civil societies, his observation of
the behavior of men during the English Civil Wars of the

mid-seventeenth century, his understanding of the character
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of primitiv e societies in
seventeenth century America,

and
his reading of the histories
of ’’the now civilized,” though
previous 1
"savage parts of the world.
If my objectives
come to be realized, the following
detailed discussion of

these three conceptions of the state
of nature will make
clear their character as paradigm units
or ideal limiting
concepts
D.

The State of Nature-1

The first conception of the state of nature
is similar
to the conception employed by such
twentieth century

commentators on Hobbes as Gauthier, Kavka and Hampton,
who
have interpreted Hobbes's political philosophy
according to
the norms of contemporary game theory and who, for
the most

part, consider the state of nature to embody the

relationship between and among participants (or unitary
actors) which is commonly known as the "prisoners' dilemma."

These commentators, for the sake of analysis, consider the

participants in the state of nature to be rational actors
who are interested in maximizing their own utility and who

possess no interpersonal attachments of

a

familial, a

friendship-based, or any other variety. When discussing this

conception of the state of nature, Hobbes makes clear that
the actors in this state possess various civilized qualities
or "marks of civilization." Hence,

even though Hobbes

contends that "there had never been any time, wherein

particular men were in

a

condition of war one against
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another," he nevertheless believed
that "it may be perceived
what manner of life there would be,
were there no common
power to fear; by the manner of life,
which men that had
formerly lived under a peaceful government
use to degenerate
into,

in a civil war.”^^

Indeed, we might reasonably conclude that
the state of

nature-1 represents the result of

a

thought experiment in

which Hobbes attempted to envision the
participants in this
state as rational (and passionate)^^ actors who
have had

the benefit of living under civil conditions
but who find

themselves presently bereft of

a

sovereign mechanism which

can successfully maintain such peaceful

(or non-warlike)

conditions. Hobbes himself suggests that the probable

behavior of men in such

a

condition is based upon his

observations of the modes of behavior assumed by men during
the English Civil Wars of the mid-seventeenth century.

However, the state of nature-1 appears to be ideal or

abstract in so far as all distinctions between master and
servant among human beings are denied. Thus,

I

contend that

the state of nature-1 represents Hobbes's most abstract

model of how human beings, who share many of the civilized

qualities of modern men, would interact with each other if
their social condition were reduced to one in which no

contractually established relationships of subordination and

domination were to exist.
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As a prelude to his discussion of paternal
conmionweal ths in each of his three principal
treatises on

political philosophy, Hobbes presents

a

somewhat more

detailed description of the state of nature-1 than
can be
found in that work's natural state chapter. For example,

paragraphs 4-9 of Chapter 20 of Leviathan

.

in

Hobbes presents

a

description of the state of nature-1 in which he specifies
that (1) gender-based differences between males and females

exist, and that (2) human reproductive activity occurs, so
that infants can be expected to be biologically generated

within such
20 of

a

state. Further,

Leviathan

nature-1,

(3)

,

in the same section of Chapter

Hobbes specifies that within the state of

"the natural inclination of the sexes one to

another and to the children" exists, (4) age-based

differences are present and
(A)

a

distinction is drawn between

adults and (B) infants and small children and (5)

a

significant difference with respect to the level of physical
and intellectual powers is drawn between (A) adults and (B)

infants and small children. Finally, Hobbes informs his
readers that within the state of nature-1, there exist

neither (6) laws of matrimony nor (7) laws for the education
of children.

It

should be noted that these seven

additional characteristics are presumably always present
among the human beings who constitute the state of nature-1,
even though Hobbes chooses to mention and discuss them only
in those chapters of his political writings which
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specifically concern the topic
of paternal dominion,
what
appears to be significant about
the state of nature-1 ia
that (1) It is a highly
abstract rendering of
tbe natural

human interactional condition
and (2) it appears that Hobbes
believed it to be a rather contrived
and potentially, a
rather evanescent condition which
would quickly be
superseded or replaced by an interactional
condition of the
type which I will call the state
of nature-2. The second of
these two points does stand in need
of further explanation.
Although I believe that Hobbes did not
mean the state
of nature-1 to embody or describe
an actually existing
historical condition, I do believe that
Hobbes would endorse
the claim that if the circumstances
which characterize
the

state of nature-1 were to be artificially
created, this
state would quickly develop into a condition
characterized
by small

(if,

at first,

only two-person) groups witbin which

relationships of servitude exist. This would be

predominantly due to two factors which encourage the
formation of groups, namely the persistence of anticipatory
activity, and the presence of human reproductive activity.
Thus, even though Hobbes famously denies the existence
of a natural

sociability or gregariousness among human

beings (interpreted as ”a natural fitness to form

societies”

)

there exists

he does, nevertheless, strongly suggest that
a

tendency for human individuals to form small

groups (due to procreation or conquest), and for smaller
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groups to coalesce (principally through conquest)
into
larger ones.
I

feel

justified in treating the state of nature-1 as

a

conception distinct from the state of nature-2 since the
state of nature-1, unlike the state of nature-2 represents
the analytical units which occupy this condition as natural

human beings or natural persons rather than as defensive
groups made up of two or more natural persons.
E.

The State of Nature-2

While the state of nature-1 is intended to represent

a

condition in which each natural person is understood to have
retained his/her right of nature, and in which no person has
(either explicitly or tacitly) subordinated him/herself to

another, the two conceptions of the state of nature which

remain to be considered do clearly support interpersonal

relationships of domination and subordination, as well as

multiperson groupings.
For example, at various locations throughout his

writings, Hobbes describes a state of perpetual war which

persists in America "even in the present age," and which had

existed in other nations "in former ages."

In fact,

Hobbes includes within the natural state chapter of each of
his three major political works a description of this

bellicose state which he identifies as the state of
nature.

Thus,

in Leviathan

,

Hobbes claims that "the

savage people in many places of America, except the
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government of small families, the
concord whereof dependeth
on natural lust, have no government
at
all;

brutish manner as [he had] said before."”

and live in that

Indeed, in each

of the three natural

state chapters, Hobbes’s strategy is
similar. Specifically, in each of these
chapters, Hobbes
briefly discusses the natural equality of
human beings,

presents (or deduces) the natural Interactional
state of
human beings as a war of each against all,
discusses the
inconveniences which attend such

a

state,

then goes on to

claim that the state of nature has existed in the
history of
now-civil nations and continues to exist in some portions

of

the world.

Interestingly, however, with respect to his three

principal political works, it is only in the Leviathan

presentation that Hobbes explicitly identifies the units
which are engaged in this historically instantiated
perpetual war as "small families."^®
At a later point in each of these works, Hobbes

describes

a

historical period in which "men have lived by

small families to rob and spoil one another," and in which

"rapine was

a

trade of life."^^

Clearly, the concept of family which Hobbes has in mind
in these descriptions differs a bit from that which we

normally associate with

twentieth century nuclear family.

a

For example, in Leviathan

.

Hobbes contends that

a

family

might consist of "a man and his children," or "a man and his

servants," or "a man and his children and servants
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together.

Interestingly, Hobbes does not indicate
that

the mother or mothers of the aforementioned
children is/are

normally reckoned to be part of families.
Perhaps in
Hobbes s scheme such female members are
normally to be
reckoned among servants, i.e., those who are
subject to the
decision-making authority of the "man."

Nevertheless, Hobbes believes that from the standpoint
of history,

those patrinomic groupings which he designates

"families" constitute the earliest basic unit. For example,
^ Dialogue be tween

Common—Laws

of England

Philosopher and

a

a

Student of the

Hobbes deems it "evident that

,

dominion, government and laws are far more ancient than

history or any other writing, and that the beginning of all

dominion amongst men was in families.

In fact,

in the

section from the Di a 1 oque entitled "On the laws of meum et
tuum," Hobbes presents

a

fairly detailed sketch of the

social conditions which characterize such "families."

Specifically, Hobbes states that^^
1.

The father of the family by the law of nature was
the absolute lord of his wife and children,

2.

The father of the family made what laws amongst them
he pleased,

3.

The father of the family was judge of all their
controversies

4.

The father of the family was not obliged by any law
of man to follow any counsel but his own.
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5.

What land soever the lord sat down upon and made
use
his own and his family's benefit, was his
propriety by the law of first possession, in case it
was void of inhabitants before, or by the law of
war, in case they conquered it,

6.

In this conquest, what enemies they took and saved,
were their servants.
'

7.

Such men as wanting possessions of lands, but
furnished with arts necessary for man's life, came
to dwell in the family for protection, became their
subjects, and submitted themselves to the laws of
the family.

Hobbes confidently asserts that "all this is consonant, not
only to the law of nature, but also to the practice of

mankind set forth in history.
In chapter 20 of Leviathan

.

Hobbes claims that^^

great family, if it be not part of some
commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of
sovereignty, a little monarchy; whether that
family consist of a man and his children; or a man
and his servants; or of a man and his children,
and servants together: wherein the father or
master is the sovereign. But yet a family is not
properly a commonwealth; unless it be that power
by its own number, or by other opportunities, as
not to be subdued without the hazard of war.
a

In the El ements

,

Hobbes further obscures the distinction

between "families," which

I

interpret to be characteristic

of the state of nature-2 and fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS,

which

I

interpret to be characteristic of the state of

nature-3, when he states that "when
another, there is

a

a

man hath dominion over

little kingdom. And to be

a

king by

acquisition, is nothing else, but to have acquired
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a

right

of dominion over many."”
Though the text is not entirely
clear on this point, what Hobbes
appears to be saying is

that

tiny kingdom, if you will, a
proto-commonwealth or
state of nature-2 type grouping,
can be understood to arise
whenever a person gains dominion
over a single (other)
a

person. However, it would seem
that

COMMONWEALTH or

a

fully-fledged

COMMONWEALTH in the proper sense can only
be understood to arise once a
sufficient (though not
a

precisely stated) number of servants or
subjects are
acquired by a single master or sovereign.
Nevertheless, Hobbes claims that^’

where a number of men are manifestly too
weak to
defend themselves united, every one may use
his
own reason in time of danger to save his
own life
either by flight or by submission to the enemy
as
he shall think best; in the same manner as
a very
small company of soldiers, surprised by an army
may cast down their arms, and demand quarter or
run away, rather than be put to the sword.
Thus, the crux of the distinction between state of
nature-2

and state of nature-3 type groupings concerns the

effectiveness of the group to repulse attacks from external

aggressive units. We might imagine that if

a

four member

state of nature-2 type grouping were to confront an
imperial istical ly-minded twenty member family, then each of
the four persons who comprise the smaller of the two groups
is

justified in doing whatever he deems necessary to

preserve his life, including disobeying the directives of
that small group's leader.
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What

I

find to be somewhat troubling in Hobbes's

presentation of the distinction between families and
COMMONWEALTHS, however, concerns the statement that

a

family

is not properly a COMMONWEALTH unless "it be
of that power
of its own number

hazard of war
9^^oup

.

...

as not to be subdued without the

Presumably, even when

launches an attack upon

a

a

twenty member

four member group, the

members of the former group face the prospect of death while

attempting to subdue or destroy the members of the latter.
Thus, even when a group of twenty men strikes out against

a

group of four, it is conceivable that in launching such an
attack, the members of the former group will be actively

involving themselves in the hazards associated with war.
Perhaps, Hobbes merely meant it to be the case that the

master of one group can be spoken of as being in

a

position

to conquer the members of another group without risking the

hazards of war when the members of that latter group
(sovereign and subjects included) decide (individually or in
unison) that attempting to defend the integrity of their

group would, in all likelihood, lead to the termination of
their natural lives, and thus opt to transfer allegiance to
the sovereign of that latter group without offering a shred
of resistance.
F.

The State of Nature-3

In a famous quotation from Leviathan

chapter, Hobbes maintains that 42
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'

natural state

^
kings, and persons of sovereign
authority, because of their independency,
are in
continual jealousies, and in the state
and posture
gladiators; having their weapons
pointing and
eir eyes fixed on one another; that
is, their
torts, garrisons, and guns upon the
frontiers of
continual spies upon their
neighbors; which is a posture of war.

Hobbes hastens to add, however, that because
such kings and
persons of sovereign authority ’’uphold thereby
the industry
of their subjects; there does not follow
from it
that

misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular
men
Thus,

I

contend that Hobbes envisioned as one conception

of the state of nature an interactional

condition composed

of hona fide principalities or fully sovereign
states.

this construal of the state of nature (which

henceforth refer to

a

I

In

will

the state of nature-3), each sovereign

COMMONWEALTH is to be looked upon as being an interactional
unit and as being headed by some institutional sovereign

authority (which need not be
Moreover,

I

a sinql

natural person)

believe that the state of nature-3 can be

regarded as differing from the remaining two conceptions in
that the various natural persons who compose the several

sovereign states are capable of living relatively safe, in
some cases, relatively comfortable and flourishing lives. In
fact, Hobbes emphasizes this point when he responds to the

criticism that the lives of subjects within COMMONWEALTHS
are ’’miserable” and extremely deprived of liberty by

105

claiming that (A) the state of
man can never be without some
incommodities and that (B) the
greatest incommodi ty^^

to the
thl people in general
respect of the miseries.

that can possibly happen

is scarce sensible in
of that dissolute
.

.

condition of masterless men, without
subjection to
laws, and a coercive power to tie
their hands from
rapine and revenge.
Further, in L eviathan's natural state
chapter, Hobbes claims
that the state of nature is a rather
incommodious condition
indeed, and bereft of the conveniences
and comforts (both
material and psychological) which characterize
bona fide

COMMONWEALTHS
The state of nature-3 is similar to the two
remaining

construals of this state to the extent that within
this
condition, there exists no terrestrial sovereign
mechanism

which can force the relevant individuals or units
(in this
case (the heads of) sovereign states) to keep the
covenants

which they had previously made.

It

is the case that within

the state of nature-3, the heads of each independent

political unit retain their respective rights of nature to

exercise whatever strategies they deem necessary to preserve
the existence and vitality of their respective political

units.

It is thus not the case that within this state the

head of each unit has transferred his right to exercise all
the means necessary to preserve its survival to some pan-

national sovereign authority. Rather, Hobbes clearly
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envisioned each state of nature-3 unit to maintain
its
sovereign independency.
This does not, however, mean that covenants between
the

heads of sovereign states cannot be entered into or that

such covenants will not bind the covenantors to the

performance of the terms to which they had agreed. Indeed,
Hobbes claims that "if a weaker prince, make

disadvantageous peace with
to keep it; unless.

.

.

a

a

stronger, for fear; he is bound

there ariseth some new, and just

cause of fear, to renew the war.”^^ Absent the incidence of

such

a

"new fear," the covenant made is valid, i.e. binds

both covenantors, even though no terrestrial supra-natural

mechanism to insure such compliance exists.
An additional feature that characterizes the elemental

units (i.e., the COMMONWEALTHS or sovereign states) which

comprise the state of nature-3 is that within such units,
good deal of organized effort is expended upon, and

a

a

robust

stock of resources is devoted to, the aggressively active

defense of that unit. Recall, for example, Hobbes's

previously quoted claim that

"in all times," heads of

COMMONWEALTHS are "in the posture of gladiators, having
their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
that is, their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers
of their kingdoms,

as well

heads of states "live in

a

as his assertion that the

condition of perpetual war [my

emphasis] and upon the confines of battle, with their
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frontiers ar..ed, and oannons
planted against their neighbors
round about."” Presumably, the
oonditions of peace which
obtain within a COMMONWEALTH
make possible not only
the

development of the arts and industries
which provide a basis
for commodious living, but
moreover, the arts and industries
which provide a basis for the
development of a sophisticated
and redoubtable system of defense
against external
aggressors.

Indeed, the extensive systems of
forts,

garrisons, guns and cannons which are
utilized by the heads
of sovereign states can hardly be
imagined to be available
to the

fathers" or "masters" who command the
"families"

that characterize the somewhat aspersory
state of nature-2.
In fact,

it seems that the presence of vast
stocks of

(desired and easily transferable) commodities
within the

boundaries of sovereign states increases the likelihood
that
the rulers of one's neighboring states will
take the steps

required to establish adequately sturdy means of

fortification (and, it seems equally likely, the resources
required to launch

a

successful offensive invasion). This,

in turn, will give rise to a desire on the part of each

ruler to eschew being overrun by the armies of neighboring

states which, in all likelihood, will encourage the

development and utilization of such hardy and sophisticated
systems of defense.
In "A Review and Conclusion" of Leviathan

somewhat awkwardly forwards

a

,

Hobbes

twentieth law of nature which
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enjoins ’’that every man is bound by nature,
as much as in
him lieth, to protect in war the authority,
by which he is

himself protected in time of peace.

Hobbes "he that pretendeth

a

Further, proclaims

right of nature to preserve his

own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to
destroy him by

whose strength he is preserved[

.

] ’’^^

However, it appears

that these directives apply only in cases where the

individual judges that his endeavoring to protect the

established authority will not lead to his (the former’s)
certain or probable ruin. Further, it would appear that
these directives apply only where there exists

a

sovereign

authority which is of sufficient strength to establish
conditions of internal peace. Thus, if the sovereign has
been able to maintain conditions of peace within

a

COMMONWEALTH, and if the sovereign’s continuing ability to

maintain such conditions directly depends upon the active
support of his citizens, then those citizens are obligated
to preserve sovereign power by taking an active part in

defensive (or offensive) war. Hence, occasional active
fighting might be interpreted as an unpleasant pastime which
must be pursued in order to insure future conditions of

peace
Crucially, it appears that the war engaged in by men
living within (and fighting on behalf of) established

COMMONWEALTHS (1) is conducted in an organized manner,
(2)

occurs somewhat less frequently than does war engaged in
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by men who do not live within
established COMMONWEALTHS and
(3)

contains

degree of predictability which cannot
be
attributed to the war which affects men
who live beyond
a

the

pale of fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS.

With respect to the first factor, Hobbes’s
already
mentioned references to the hardy means of
defense which are
developed and employed within COMMONWEALTHS
strongly
suggests that a standing army capable of
carrying
on an

effectively conducted battle will be at the
disposal of many
or most successful established sovereigns.
By
contrast, one

would imagine battles waged outside the confines
of

a

COMMONWEALTH, that is battles waged between families,
to be
rather disorganized, rather primitively conducted,
and

rather less smoothly executed than are those which are

conducted under the auspices of COMMONWEALTHS.
Secondly, Hobbes claims that sovereigns can generally

maintain

conditions of peace and safety within their

COMMONWEALTHS, and can thus make possible the development of
the arts which provide the technological basis for the

various industries. These industries, in turn, furnish the
basis for

a

comfortable or commodious mode of life.

Moreover, by dwelling within the COMMONWEALTH, subjects can
expect to spend much less of their time engaged in actual

preemptive or defensive battle, and much less of their time
concerning themselves with the prospect of being attacked by
men in their vicinity. Of course, men who live within
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COMMONWEALTHS, can, from time to time, be
expected to be
called upon to perform military service,
though

it must be

remembered that defending one's COMMONWEALTH
is the price
one normally pays for living under conditions
of
peace,

enjoying

a

comfortable life, and so forth.

Thirdly, when

a

subject within

a

COMMONWEALTH is

inducted into the armed forces, he must, while enduring
the

conditions of battle, maintain

a

stance of vigilance.

However, when he is not situated within the precincts of
battle, he can normally expect not to be harassed by the

offensive (and defensive or anticipatory) acts of other men.
Thus, men who are called upon to perform military

service might be expected to obey this sovereign directive
for a variety of reasons: First, considerations of fairness
or reciprocity might be thought to dictate that since the

sovereign has made actual
subject can live

a

a

social condition in which the

relatively peaceful and comfortable life,

the latter owes to the former a debt of military service.

More importantly, by entering into the COMMONWEALTH, each
subject has submitted himself to the will and judgment of
the sovereign, and has agreed to be bound by the decisions

and directives of the latter.

However, a problem arises when we turn to consider that

within the "families" or small groups characteristic of the
state of nature-2,

a

man can "use his own reason in time of

danger to save his own life either by flight or by
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submission to th e enemy as he shall think best[.]"^® Men
residing within "families" are afforded this privilege

despite the fact that they have consented to be ruled by
the

master of their respective family. Thus, one might object
that considerati ons of justice dictate that even within

state of nature- 2 type "families," subjects have an

obligation to ob ey the directives of their family head,
including the di rective to defend the integrity of that
group
What differentiates the situation of

within

a

a

person who lives

fully-fledged COMMONWEALTH, from that of

who lives within

a

a

person

"family," depends upon the latitude

allowed to the latter, but not to the former, to determine

whether his endeavor to preserve the integrity of his group
will seriously threaten or endanger his life. Presumably, it
is taken as given that within a COMMONWEALTH,

the

previ ous 1 y- remarked-upon robust means of defense will

furnish the subject with

a

reasonable assurance that the

fighting in which he is ordered to engage will not lead to
his probable demise. Of course, by engaging in actual

fighting, the subject thereby places himself in
of physical

a

position

danger, and thus risks the loss of his life.

However, the willingness to engage in such fighting might be

encouraged by an awareness of the relatively low probability
that one will
a

lose his life in this fighting, as well as by

recognition of the benefits which one realizes by virtue
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of
a

living within

a

COMMONWEALTH (accompanied, of course, by

desire to enjoy the benefits of

civil existence).

a

In

essence, the citizen exchanges his de facto right to

determine whether to defend his commonwealth for the
benefits and security which are normally provided by

conditions of peace.
Unfortunately, Hobbes fails to offer
reason why

a

a

compelling

man is obligated to obey his sovereign's order

to engage in a battle in which that man stands

a

reasonably

good chance of losing his life. Hobbes clearly indicates
that^^

no man is bound
either to kill himself or
any other man; and consequently, that the
obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the
command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous
or dishonorable office, dependeth not upon the
words of our submission; but on the intention,
which is to be understood by the end thereof.
.

.

.

"When therefore our refusal to obey," Hobbes continues,

"frustrates the end for which sovereignty was ordained then
there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise there is."

c n

Thus,

even citizens within COMMONWEALTHS are allowed some latitude
in refusing to bodily defend the COMMONWEALTH of which they

are part. Furthermore, Hobbes contends that "[u]pon this

ground,

a

man that is commanded as

a

soldier to fight

against the enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to

punish his refusal with death may nevertheless in many cases
t 9

refuse without injustice."
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For example, Hobbes
admits that

a

man called upon to

perform military duty may
substitute

a

-sufficient soldier-

in his place.

Moreover, Hobbes directs that
allowance
should be madp fni- natural
timorousness; not only to women
but also to men of
feminine courage.-” Further,
i

•

•

.

he

contends that since avoiding
battle is not injustice but
cowardice, some allowance must
be made for those who are
naturally fearful of or averse
to engaging in battle.
However, the manner in which
Hobbes words these
exemptions suggests that he
believed most men would not be
eligible for exemption from military
service based upon
considerations of natural timorousness.
Clearly, given
Hobbes's claim that for each man
his own death represents
the summum maJum,” few sensible
men can be expected to
embrace military combat as an especially
desirable pastime.
In fact,

fear would appear to be an appropriate
passion for
a man to be affected by when
he is confronted with the
prospect of entering into an activity as
threatening to life
and limb as war. Seemingly, Hobbes believed
that a desire to

maintain

a

commodious mode of life, as well as fear that

civil conditions will break down (and, perhaps,

a

strong

aversion to being ruled or dominated by the officials
of
rival conquering power) would,

for most men, outweigh the

fear of losing one’s life even in

military battle.
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a

rather precarious

a

therefore contend that the following conditions
characterize the three respective conceptions of
the state
of nature:
I

Ap In the state

of nature-1, no sovereign multiperson
associations! groupings exist

A2

.

Aj

.

62

-

In the state of nature-2, small multi-person
groups
which are headed by an absolute ruler or leader exist
In the state of nature-3,

large multi-person groups
called "COMMONWEALTHS," each of which is headed by an
authentic effective sovereign power, exist

In the state of nature-2, individuals living within such
groups are bound by sel f -incurred contractual agreements
to follow the rules and directives of the (absolute)

group leader, so that laws established by the heads of
exist and oblige members of these groups

.

C2

.

In the state of nature-3,

individuals living within
COMMONWEALTHS are bound by sel f -incurred contractual
agreements to observe the laws of their sovereign, so
that laws established by the sovereign exist and bind
subjects of the COMMONWEALTH

In the state of nature-2, the multi-person groups are
described as being comparatively unstable units which
can be easily conquered by, and thus incorporated into,

slightly larger groups
Cj

.

Dj

.

D2

.

In the state of nature-3, the multi-person group or
"COMMONWEALTH" is described as being a stable unit whose
sovereign devotes a good deal of resources to the
defense of its borders

In the state of nature-1,

a war of every man (and woman)
against every man (and woman) exists

In the state of nature-2, a war of every group against
every other group (or of every group leader against

every other group leader) exists
Dj

.

a war of every COMMONWEALTH
against every other COMMONWEALTH (or of every sovereign
against every other sovereign) exists

In the state of nature-3,
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Ej.

In the state of nature-1, no common
power to "keep them
all in awe" exists

E2

In the state of nature-2, outside such small
groups no
common power able to keep all men (or all group
leaders)’

-

"in awe" exists

Ej.

In the state of nature-3,

F^.

In the state of nature-1,

F2

In the state of nature-2, there exists a common
disposition among all group leaders to fight (in order
to preserve the integrity of their respective group)

Fj

-

.

outside such COMMONWEALTHS, no
terrestrial common power able to keep all men (or all
sovereigns) "in awe" exists. That is, no effective
terrestrial supra-national sovereign exists

there exists a common
disposition (presumably, among all) to fight

In the state of nature-3, there exists a common
disposition among all sovereigns to fight (in order to
preserve the integrity of their respective COMMONWEALTH)

Gp In the state

of nature-1,

no laws of "mine and thine"

exist
G2

.

In the state of nature-2,

G3

.

In the state of nature-3,

laws of "mine and thine" exist
within, though not between and among (the sovereigns of)
such COMMONWEALTHS

In the state of nature -1
purported! bind)^’

H,

H2

laws of "mine and thine"
established by the respective group leader, exist
within, though not between and among (the leaders of)
such groups

.

Hj.

the laws of nature exist (and

In the state of nature-2,

the laws of nature exist and
purportedly bind group leaders (as well as those who are
not group leaders)

the laws of nature exist and
purportedly bind sovereigns (as well as those who are
not sovereigns)

In the state of nature-3,
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n,ad.,
I

*

2

and are

ths stat© of nature- 2
cont
binding, between group leadersracts can be made, and are
(as well as between
natural persons living within
such groups
,

I 3*

state of nature-3, contracts
can be made, and are
inding, between sovereigns (as
well as between natural
persons living within COMMONWEALTHS!
In the state of nature-1,
a
existence" is
not available to men living "commodious
in this condition

J

*

2

In the state of nature-2,
a "commodious existence"
is
not available to men living
within such

groups

J 3-

In the state of nature-3, a
commodious existence is
available to men living within COMMONWEALTHS

K,

In the state of nature-1,

present
K.

gender-based
are
acknowledged but are not emphasized by differences
Hobbes. Wives or
women are sometimes regarded as being
subject to the
absolute rule of their group leader, though
there is no
in principle reason why a woman could
not be a group
eader either in a "family” by acquisition,
or
(especially) in a "family" by preservation.^®

K3

Lj

.

.

In the state of nature-3,

gender-based differences
acknowledged but are not emphasized by Hobbes. Men are
and
women appear to be equally regarded as citizens
of
their respective COMMONWEALTHS

In the state of nature-1,

conducted
L

.

2

L3

gender— based differences are

.

human reproductive activity is

In the state of nature-2,

human reproductive activity is
conducted, and the offspring of such unions are to be
regarded as subject to the absolute rule of the leader
of the group into which they are born.

In the state of nature-3,

human reproductive activity is
conducted, and the offspring of such unions are to be
regarded as members of the COMMONWEALTH of which their
parents are citizens^®
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M,

In the state of nature-1,

M

In the state of nature-2,

the "natural
the sexes, one to another, and to the inclination of
children" exists

the "natural inclination of
the sexes, one to another, and to the
children," exists

2

n the state of nature-3, the "natural
inclination of
the sexes, one to another, and to the children"
presumably exists

M,

Nj.

In the state of nature-1,

N2

.

In the state of nature-2,

Nj

.

In the state of nature-3,

Oj

.

age-based differences are
present and a distinction is drawn between infants (or
smaller children) and adults

age-based differences exist,
though the distinction between infants (and smaller
children) and adults does not seem to play a significant
role in Hobbes’s discussion(s ) of this condition

age-based differences exist,
though the distinction between infants (and smaller
children) and adults does not seem to play a significant
role in Hobbes's discussion(s ) of this condition

In the state of nature-1, differences with respect to
the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn
between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children

Oj.

In the state of nature-2, differences with respect to
the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn
between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children,
but does not seem to play a significant role in Hobbes's
discussi on ( s ) of this condition

O3

In the state of nature-3, differences with respect to
the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn
between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children
but does not seem to play a significant role in Hobbes's
discussion of this condition

.

Pp In the state of nature-1, no laws of matrimony exist
?2

.

P3

.

In the state of nature-2,

laws of matrimony, as
specified by the group leader, may exist within groups
laws of matrimony, as
established by the sovereign, may (and in all
likelihood, do) exist within COMMONWEALTHS

In the state of nature-3,
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Qj.

In the state of nature- 1

children exist
Q2-

no laws for the education of

,

In the state of nature- 2
laws for the education of
children as established by the group leader,
may exist
,

within groups

Q3.

In the state of nature- 3
f

all

^

f

,

likelihood, do) exist
G.

laws for the education of
sovereign, may (and in

Concluding Remarks

Before concluding this chapter,

a

number of cautionary

notes or caveats are in order. First of all,

I

do not claim

that Hobbes anywhere sets forth the three conceptions of the

state of nature in
Indeed, as

I

a

perspicuous and systematic fashion.

asserted in the opening paragraphs of this

chapter, Hobbes’s respective discussions of the state of

nature might strike the casual reader as being sloppily
organized, and indeed as being internally inconsistent.
Secondly,

I

must admit that the model of the state of

nature presented in this chapter represents

a

reconstruction

of material which can be found in various of Hobbes's

philosophical writings.
do not claim that Hobbes anywhere refers to the respective

I

conceptions of the state of nature in the way that

I

have

(namely, as the state of nature-1, the state of nature-2,
etc.), or that Hobbes was especially interested to draw

clear boundaries between the state of nature-1 and the state
of nature-2,
3

,

the state of nature-2 and the state of nature-

and so forth. Moreover,

I

do not claim that the model of
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the three conceptions of the state of nature
presented in

this chapter represents the sole faithful
reconstruction of

Hobbes

s

state of nature which can be culled from the

latter

s

various pronouncements on this issue.

Nevertheless,

do contend that my presentation does

I

accurately capture

a

sense of the various interpretations of

the state of nature or natural condition of humankind which

Hobbes offers in his various writings.
My presentation in this chapter was motivated by

desire to impose

a

a

sense of coherence upon the various

passages from Hobbes's oeuvre which advert to the natural

condition of humankind, and to defend Hobbes of the charge
that his state of nature represents

a

confused and perhaps

valueless philosophical contrivance. Within his writings,
Hobbes draws

a

clear distinction between historical and

hypothetical accounts of the state of nature, as well as an
explicit distinction between "families" and bona fide

COMMONWEALTHS. Thus,

believe that

I

I

possess

a

firm textual

basis for claiming that the three previously described

conceptions of the state of nature can be drawn or
reconst ructed from Hobbes's various philosophical writings.
I

will now move on to discuss the three methods by

which Hobbes believed

a

commonwealth can come into existence

or arise from out of the state of nature.

Thus, chapter

4

this dissertation will contain descriptions of the three

types of Hobbesian commonwealth which
120

I

have respectively

of

des i gna ted

acquisi t i on

"commonwealth by institution,"
and

"commonwealth by

commonwealth by preservation."
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1.

NOTES

2.

Por a description of raultiperson
units
^
discussion on pages 99-119, below. sovereign

,

ee my
see
mv

be they artificial or natural
persons

noted that I am including this rather
elongated discussion of Hobbes’s understanding
4.
philosophical method in order to show that the of
activity of
attempting to imagine how political bodies
5.
can
be
conceived
as being generated from the state
of nature is a properly
6.
philosophical (as opposed, for example, to a
merely
7.
historical) one, and in fact, is an activity
properly be characterized as an exercise in which can
synthetic
philosophy.

9.

Hobbes, English Works

.

Hobbes, English Works

.

Hobbes, English Works

.

Hobbes, Engl ish Works

.

Vol

.

I,

page

Vol.

I,

page 10.

Vol.

I,

page 11.

Vol.

I,

page 11.

3.

8. Of course, Hobbes is speaking somewhat loosely
when he
claims that a true circle can be drawn or inscribed on a
10.
sheet of paper. Since true (ideal) geometric figures such as
squares and circles are composed of lines which have no
width, and since any graphic representation of a circle must
be composed of lines which have some width, we must look
with
some suspicion upon Hobbes's use of this example.
12.
Nevertheless, when Hobbes describes the construction of
a circle, the significance and cogency of his example
becomes somewhat more compelling.

Hobbes, Engl ish Works

Vol.

.

Hobbes, Engl ish Works

.

I,

Vol.

I,

page
page

6.
6.

11. As we have seen above, from the standpoint of the matter,
or the type of body studied, Hobbes draws a distinction
between natural and civil philosophy. See above, page 88.

For a discussion of masterless collective sovereign
persons, see my discussion on pages 99-119, below.
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More in the case of state of nature -3 type groupings
(or
fully fledged) COMMONWEALTHS, less in the c ase of
the
relatively unstable organizational uni ts wh ich are
characteristic of the state of nature- 2 In this and
following chapters, I will employ the term 'commonwealth'
refer to the groups char act er i s t i c of ei t he r the state of
nature-2 or the state of nature-3, and the term
'COMMONWEALTH' [printed in capitals] t o ref er specifica 1 ly
to the groups characteristic of the st ate o f nature-3.
For
my respective discussions of the state of n ature-2 and the
state of nature-3, see below, pages 99 -104 and pages 10 413

.

.

114.

14. See, for example, his description of "the several kinds
of commonwealth" in chapter 19 of Leviathan and his
discussion of paternal and despotical dominion in Chapter 20
of Leviathan
(Hobbes, Leviathan paaes 118-127 and pages
.

128-135.

.

)

15. In an article entitled "Hobbes's Conception of the State
of Nature," Frangois Tricaud suggests that "the state of
nature is a model (taking the word in such sense as
physicists and economists make use) whose function is not to
reproduce the true condition of mankind but to illuminate
it." (Frangois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of
Nature From 1640 to 1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in
G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan, editors. Perspectives on Thomas
Hobbes
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), page 110.) Similarly, in
,

"Hobbes and the Wolf Man," Paul Johnson claims that "the
state of nature for Hobbes is not a real state presenting
men with practical problems, but what we would now call an
ideal limiting case like the concepts of a pure inertial
state or a frictionless plane are in physics." (Paul
16.
Johnson, "Hobbes and the Wolf-Man," In J.G. Van der Bend,
editor, Thomas Hobbes: His View of Man
(Amsterdam: Rodolpi,
17.
1982), page 42.) Though I will present a more robust
discussion of the concept of the state of nature as "an
ideal limiting case" later in this chapter, at this point in
the discussion, I wish only to suggest that the single
individual persons or collective organizational units which
occupy (the various conceptions of) the state of nature can
similarly be understood to represent 'ideal limiting cases'
(akin to frictionless surfaces and widthless one-dimensional
lines) rather than any actually existing men and women or
historically instantiated governmental organizations.
,

Hobbes, English Works
Hobbes, Leviathan

,

,

Vol

.

I,

page 109.
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pages 66-67 (my emphasis).

18 It should be noted that the three methods
by which Hobbes
believes a commonwealth can be generated will be
discussed
in chapter 4 of this dissertation.

19 Seemingl y
the condition of civil war which follows the
dissolution of a (civilized) COMMONWEALTH can be identified
as an instance of the state of nature-2, since we
would
reasonably expect some sort of multiperson coalitions or
defensive groups to be manifested under such conditions.
.

,

20.Frangois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of
Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in G.A.J.
Rogers and Alan Ryan, editors. Perspectives on Thomas
Hobbes page 111.
.

21. Indeed, with respect to the fourth source listed in the
previous sentence, the opening pages of Thucydides' History
Pelopenesian Wars an English translation of which
was executed and published by Hobbes during his early years,
contains a description of the social condition in ancient
Greece which fairly well approximates the descriptions of
the state of nature-2 which can be found in the thirteenth
and seventeenth chapters of Leviathan as well as in various
other locations throughout Hobbes's writings. See Hobbes,
English Works Vol VIII, pages 1-8.
,

,

,

22. Hobbes,

Leviathan

,

page 77.

23. It is the opinion of the present writer that the
conventional interpretation of the prisoners dilemma (such
as that set forward by Gauthier in The Logic of Leviathan )
does not adequately reflect Hobbes
analysis of the state
of nature since such an interpretation insufficiently
reflects the influence of the antisocial passions upon the
voluntary behavior of the inhabitants of that state. Thus,
while discussions of game theoretical strategies likely to
be employed by the paradigmat ical 1 y rational actors who find
themselves in prisoners dilemma type situations, while
significant and interesting in their own right, nevertheless
fail to capture the passionate character and the resulting
behavioral strategies which are likely to be employed by the
individuals involved. Thus, throughout the course of this
chapter, I will concern myself not with how human beings
considered as paradigmatical 1 y rational creatures would
choose to voluntarily act under such conditions, but rather
with how we would expect human beings of the constitutional
and behavioral character described by Hobbes to voluntarily
act if they were forced to interact with one another under
said conditions.
'
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reccgni"f?hat tlTslT.

Similarities with
consider^:^;

-ntract theory „i„

ITnlV
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25 Descriptions of this more
robust characteri zation of
state of nature-1 can be found in
sections 9 7 «->f ck *
of
Give (Hobbes, Man and Citir.en
pages
1^:® °f Chapter 4 of Book 2 of ?he Elemenfi’Af r.a„
.

M

^^2^

131-134.), and perhaps most
sections entitled "Dominion Paternal
28.
^ Generation but by Contract," and "On
EZcation"^in t^
^
Chapter 20 of —
Leviathan.
fHohhrt
^Hobbes, Leviathan
pages 128-130.)
27.
11
illuminatfluminatingly,
igTr

m
tn°th
the

'

.

26. See,

apter

for example, Hobbes's footnote to
Section 2 of
of De_Cive, in Hobbes, Man and
Citizen page 110.

1

,

Hobbes, Man and Citizen

.

page 118.

Further, in D_e Give Hobbes describes this
war as perpetual in its own nature," " becausecondition of
in regard of
the equality of those that strive, it cannot
be ended by
victory.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen page 118.), and in the
El ements
Hobbes claims that our knowledge of the behavior
of men in their natural condition is derived
"both by the
experience of savage nations that live at this day, and by
our ancestors the old inhabitants of Germany, and other
30.
now
civil countries." (Hobbes, Elements of Law page
73.) In the
corresponding passage from De Give Hobbes cites as an
example of those who dwell in a perpetual condition of war,
even in the present, "those of America," and as examples of
those who had previously endured such a condition those of
other nations which now indeed are become civil and
flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor,
nasty, and deprived of all that pleasure and beauty of life,
which peace and security are wont to bring them." (Hobbes,
Man and Citizen page 118.)
,

,

,

,

,

,

29 Leviathan

,

page 77.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 77.
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31.

Hobbes offers the opinion that

’’-in

all

(Hobbes, ^viathan page 106.) Similarly,
in the
corresponding passage from the Elements
Hobbes claims that
°'d^^time, we read that rapine was a
trade of life " even
tb
though cruelty was forbidden by the
law of nature "
(Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 100.) And
finally, in De
,

.

'

fi^iAo
iving, ^and
an^ as It were

"""

^

of

certain economy, which they called
XfloxpiKnv
living by rapine; which was neither
agaiLt the
law of nature nor void of glory to those
who exercised it
Mith)Valor, not with cruelty." Hobbes, Man and
Citlxen page
Similarly, the opening pages of Hobbes's
1628 English
32.
translation of The History of Thucydides contains
description of the nomadic, precarious, and rather a brief
33.
unprofitable way of life practiced by the ancient
34.
inhabitants of the land "which is now called Hellas "
It is
clear
even to the casual reader that this description,
35.
bears
a more than superficial resemblance to
the condition which I
have designated Hobbes’s state of nature-2.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

a

page 132.

Hobbes, English Works

.

Hobbes, Engl ish Works

.

Vol

.

VI, page 147.

Vol VI, page 147.

Hobbes, English Works Vol. VI, page 147. An interesting
feature of the Dialogue account of the state of nature-2
concerns the inclusion within families of those men who
desire to possess land and who have acquired skills or "the
arts necessary for a man's life" which will presumably
foster the development of commodious living within the
family. Thus, according to the Dialogue account families
are comprised of a father or lord, his children and wife,
his servants who have been acquired and "saved" through
conquest, and (unlike the earlier accounts) subjects who
have voluntarily submitted themselves to the laws of the
family. Thus, an element of commonwealth (or perhaps, protocommonwealth) by institution enters into Hobbes's Dial ogue
account of the patrimonial grouping which he designates 'a
.

,

f

ami 1 y

'
.

36. Hobbes,

Leviathan

,

page 132.
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from chapteFF'of^^De^C^' fhtt -ll'
else but to have

39. Hobbes,

41.

Leviathan

Hobbes’s claim
is nothing

page 132.

.

by a new captivity, where the
servant having done
his endeavor to defend himself,
hath therebv
performed his covenant to his former
master^ and
for the safety of his life, entering
into
covenant with the conqueror, is bound to a new
his best
endeavour to keep that likewise.
(Hobbes, Elements of Law pages 129-30.)
,

Similarly, in De Give

,

Hobbes contends that

if the servant be taken prisoner,
the old
servitude is abolished by the new; for as all

other things, so servants are also acquired by
was, whom in equity the lord must protect
if he
will have them to be his.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen page 209.)
,

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 132.

42
eviathan p. 78. It should be noted that in the author's
^
preface
to De Give Hobbes claims
,

.

that the dispositions of men are naturally such,
except they be restrained through fear of
some coercive power, every man w: 11 di st rust and
dread each other; and as natural right he may so
by necessity he will be forced to make us e of the
strength he hath, toward the pri ervat ion of
himself. (Hobbes, Man and Citiz^
pag e 9 9- )
,

,

As confirmation of this,

he observes that
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[w]e see all countries, though
they
with their neighbors, yet guarding be at peace
their frontiers
with armed men, their towns with
walls and ports
and keeping constant watches. To
what purpose is'
neighboring
power. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
page 99.)
^

dedication to the same work, Hobbes contends
hat the saying man to man is an
arrant wolf" is true "if
we compare cities." with respect to
43.
relations between
*'*'®*'
defend themselves
44.
bv taklna°to^th^®^f’'''® ^ sanctuary the
two daughters of war,
violence: that is, a mere brutal rapacity."
45.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen pages 89-90.)
,

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 78.

page 117.

Hobbes, Leviathan page 86. See also page 140 of
Leviathan where Hobbes states that
.

46.

in states and commonwealths not dependent upon
one
another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an
absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge most
conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live
in a condition of perpetual war, and upon the
confines of battle, with their frontiers armed,
and cannons planted against their neighbors round
about

47.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 78.

Hobbes, Leviathan page 140. Similarly, while discussing
the mutual fear men have of each other in Chapter 1, Section
2 of De Give
Hobbes observes that "[k]ingdoms guard their
coasts and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are
compact within walls: and all for fear of neighboring
kingdoms and towns." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen page 113.)
,

,

,

48. Hobbes,

Leviathan. page 490.

49. Hobbes,

Leviathan. page 490

.

50. Hobbes,

Leviathan, page 132

.

51. Hobbes,

Leviathan, page 142

.

52. Hobbes,

Leviathan, page 142

.
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53 Hobbes

Leviathan

.

page 142.

54 Hobbes

Leviathan

.

page 142.

.

page 142.

55 Hobbes

,

Leviathan

56 Hobbes

,

Man and Citizen

.

page 48

.

According to at least some passages in Leviathan

57

.

58. See my discussions of commonwealths
(and families) by
acquisition and by preservation on pages 131-152 of
chapter
4 of this dissertation.
59. But note well

Hobbes’s claim that

[i]f a man and woman, monarchs of two several
kingdoms, have a child, and contract concerning who
shall have the dominion of him, the right of the
dominion passeth by the contract. If they contract
the dominion followeth the dominion of the
place of residence. For the sovereign of each
country hath dominion over all that reside
therein. (Hobbes, Leviathan page 130.)
,

.

60. See, for example, Hobbes’s claim that within
commonwealths, the dominion over a child

is decided by the civil law; and for the most part
but not always, the sentence is in favor of the
father; because for the most part commonwealths
have been erected by the fathers, not by the
mothers of families. But the question lieth now i g
the state of mere nature; where there are suppose CL
no laws of matrimony.
(Hobbes, Leviathan pages 128-29.)
.

.

.

,

such as those which exist within commonwealths.
61. In fact, a problem would seem to arise when we come to
consider Hobbes’s occasional references to ’’multitudes of
lawless men” (Hobbes, Engl ish Works Vol V, page 184.) and
"the manner of life there would be were there no common
power to fear [based upon] the manner of life, which men
that have formerly lived under peaceful governments use to
degenerate into, in a civil war.” (Hobbes, Leviathan page
.

.

,

78

.

)
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Specifically, a critic of my reconstruction of Hobbes's
state of nature might urge that a separate conception
of
this state which is historical (rather than hypothetical)
and which construes the actors or individuals who inhabit
this condition as utterly solitary (i.e. without any sorts
of social ties) should be included within my taxonomy.
To such a critic, I would reply that even in those
circumstances in which society has broken down, there do
nevertheless remain some residual social ties among men and
women. Thus, it is inconceivable that Hobbes would have
considered as a historical possibility an actually
instantiated war of each against all. Indeed, on page 78 of
Leviathan Hobbes denies that "there has even been" a
condition of war of this type.
,
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CHAPTER IV

VARIETIES OF HOBBES IAN COMMONWEALTH
A.

Introduction

In the opening section of chapter 8 of De Cive

.

Hobbes

draws a distinction between a natural government "which
may
also be called acquired because it is that which is gotten
by power and natural force," and an instituted or framed

government "which receives its original from the consent of
many, who by contract and faith mutually given have obliged

each other.

In this fourth chapter of my dissertation,

I

will examine Hobbes's conceptions of a natural commonwealth

(which he divides into a commonwealth by acquisition or

a

despotical government, and a commonwealth by preservation or
a

paternal government), and a commonwealths by

institution.

I

will begin by discussing Hobbes's

conception of a commonwealth by acquisition.
B.

In Leviathan

,

Commonwealth by Acquisition
Hobbes proclaims that "dominion acquired

by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers
call despotic,

from A£oic6tec which signifieth a lord or

master; and is the dominion of the master over the

servant."

Hobbes specifies that
this dominion is then acquired to the victor when
the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of
death covenanteth, either in express words or
other sufficient signs of the will, that so long
as his life and the liberty of his body is allowed
him, the victor should have the use thereof at his
pleasure

1

Significantly, the relationship which obtains
between
the servant and the master (or between the
citizen

and the

sovereign in a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition) can
properly be
characterized as a contractual one. Thus, in a commonwealth
by acquisition (though as we will later see, not
in a

commonwealth by institution), the sovereign enters into

a

contractual agreement with his subject(s) and is bound to

perform the terms to which he has agreed.
Moreover, in Leviathan

.

Hobbes asserts that it is not^

the victory which giveth the right of dominion
over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is
he obliged because he is conquered, that is to
say beaten or taken, or put to flight; but
because he cometh in and submitteth to the
victor

In all

three of his principal political works, Hobbes

is quick to distinguish between a servant, who is trusted

with his corporal freedom, and
trusted. Thus, in De Give

,

a

slave who is not so

he specifies "that there is a

confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of
pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his corporal
liberty," and that "not everyone who is taken in the war and
hath his life spared," is supposed to have "contracted with
his lord."® Indeed, Hobbes claims that those who have been

taken in war, who have had their lives spared, and who

continue to serve within "prisons" or "bound within irons,"
i.e. slaves,

"offend not against the laws of nature if they

fly or kill their lord."^

Thus, Hobbes attempts to show
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that,

the contractual bonds which characterize the

relationship between the servant and the master (or
between
the subject and the sovereign within a COMMONWEALTH
by

acquisition) are incurred as

a result

of a free choice on

the part of each of the contracting parties.

Although in each of his three principal political
works, Hobbes specifies that the sovereign by acquisition

enters into a contractual agreement with each of his

subjects, it is clear that such an agreement is not entered
into by both contractors upon equal terms. This claim is

most forcefully asserted in Leviathan where Hobbes states
that the victor is not "obliged by an enemy's rendering

himself, without promise of life, to spare him from this his

yielding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer
than in his own discretion he shall think fit."^ Thus, if M
has S at the point of a sword, and S offers to "strike a

deal" with M, M can choose to decline S's offer without

seriously endangering the loss of his life. Indeed, in this

situation M can immediately kill

chooses to do so.

S if he

Even if M does enter into a contractual agreement with

Hobbes seems clearly to be asserting in Leviathan

,

S,

M can

discontinue honoring the covenant into which he has entered,
whenever he thinks it discreet to do so.

Q

Indeed, Hobbes defines or describes 'quarter,' taking
alive, or zoogria (Zwypla) as evading "the present fury of
the victor by submission and [compounding one's] life with
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ransom and service.

Further, Hobbes specifies that the

person who "hath quarter, hath not his life given but

deferred till farther deliberation; for it is not yielding
on condition of life but to discretion
In the Elements of Law

and especially in De Give,

,

Hobbes clearly underplays the sovereign-by-

acquisition's/master's "discretion" in determining how long
he will refrain from killing or placing his servant in

chains, and instead emphasizes that the subject’s obligation
to obey the sovereign is contingent upon the latter's

continuing to honor the terms of the contract into which he
had entered. Thus, in De Give

Hobbes contends that^^

.

[t]he obligation therefore of a servant to his
lord, ariseth not from the simple grant of his
life; but from hence rather, that he keeps him not
bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives
from contract; but where is no trust there can be
no contract.
There is therefore a confidence
and trust which accompanies the benefit of
pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his
corporal liberty.
Wherefore such kinds of
servants as are restrained by imprisonment or
bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of
servant given above; because those serve not for
contract's sake, but to the end that they might
not suffer. And therefore if they fly or kill
their lord, they offend not against the law of
nature
.

.

.

.

Thus, the servant is contractually bound to obey the

master so long as the latter refrains from placing the
former in chains or prison. Since contractual bonds

presuppose trust, the servant who is committed to chains and
custody, and is thus no longer trusted, is thereby
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discharged of the obligation in foro interna to
his quondam
master.
Despite the unequal power relationship which
characterizes the agreement into which the sovereign
or
master and the citizen or servant enter, it is
significant
that in establishing a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition
(or its

corresponding smaller scale analog), the sovereign does
enter into a contractual relationship with his subject or
servant. As we will later see, this is clearly not the case

when the commonwealth by institution is established.
C.

Commonwealth by Preservation

Hobbes continues his presentation of natural (as
opposed to artificial) governments by discussing the "Rights
of Parents over their Children." In De Cive

Hobbes begins

.

this discussion by criticizing those earlier writers who had

attempted to prove that a parent enjoys dominion over his
child simply because the former begat the latter "as if it

were of itself evident, that what is begotten by me is
mine."^^ In Leviathan

,

he stoutly asserts that^^

the right to dominion by generation is that which
the parent hath over his children
[a]nd is
not so derived from the generation, as if
therefore the parent had dominion over his child
because he begat him; but from the child's
consent, either express or by other sufficient
arguments
.

.

.

Hobbes explains that mere generation does not confer

dominion since dominion is indivisible (i.e., since no man
can serve two masters). However, since two persons, namely,
a

male and a female, "must concur in the act of
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generation,

it is impossible that dominion should be

acquired by generation only.
Thus, Hobbes begins his argument against the claim that

generation automatically confers dominion of the generator
over the generated (i.e., of the parent over the child) by

claiming that dominion is indivisible since no man can serve
two masters.

Indeed, he begins by stipulating that no human

being can be ruled by more than one natural person.
Secondly, Hobbes introduces the factual empirical claim that
two persons, namely a male and

a

female, are required to

generate or to bring into existence any individual child.
Thus, since two persons are jointly required to generate a

child, if mere generation of that child were sufficient to

confer dominion upon the generator, then both the father and
the mother would have a right to dominion over their child.

However, since sovereign power is indivisible, i.e., cannot
be distributed between two or among more than two people,

then it is not the case that merely generating a person

automatically confers dominion upon the generator.
Hobbes then informs his readers that "some" who have

recognized the indivisibility of sovereignty have attributed
such dominion "to man only as being of the more excellent
sex," or have ascribed "dominion over the child to the

father only, ob praBstantium sexus/' or have, "by reason of
the pre-eminence of sex," attributed lordship to the

father.

He claims, however, that those who hold this
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position are clearly wrong, since "there
is not always that
difference of strength or prudence between
the man and the
woman as the right can be determined
without war."^* Thus,
Hobbes's belief in the natural equality of
human beings,
which was discussed in some detail in
chapter
1

of this

dissertation, can again be seen to play a part
in his theory
of sovereignty. Specifically, Hobbes
claims that
if there

existed

significant

natural differences between men and

women with respect to levels of physical strength
or
(intellectual) prudence, then such differences would render
it the case that dominion over the child naturally
attaches

to the stronger or the wiser (i.e., the male) parent.

However, since such natural divisions do not exist, dominion
over the child does not, "by reason of the pre-eminence of
sex,

naturally attach to the male parent.
Strikingly, Hobbes claims that in "the condition of

mere nature,"

if the mother and the father make no contract

to establish dominion over their child, the dominion lies

"with the mother." For example, in De Give

,

he claims

that^®

by right of nature the conqueror is lord over the
conquered. By the right of nature, therefore, the
dominion over the infant first belongs to him who
is first in his power. But it is manifest that he
who is newly born is in the mother's power.

Thus, not only does Hobbes deny that dominion over the child

naturally adheres to that child's father, but moreover, he
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claims that dominion does, in some natural sense,
belong to
the mother. Though one might initially be perplexed
by

Hobbes's claim that dominion naturally belongs to that
child's mother, rather than to his father, one must remember
that Hobbes's discussion here concerns the relationship

between the mother, the father and the child in the state of
nature, specifically, in what

I

have earlier characterized

as the state of nature-1.

During his discussion of the origins of the

commonwealth by preservation, Hobbes specifies that in the
state of nature "it cannot be known who is the father, but
by the testimony of the mother.

Thus, the state of

nature (i.e., the state of nature-1) is a condition not only
bereft of marital institutions, but moreover,

a

condition in

which relationships between men and women are, for the most
part, rather fleeting ones. Nevertheless, Hobbes explicitly

states that in order to retain the right of dominion over
the child, the mother must perform actions beyond that of

merely giving birth. Indeed, he remarks that since "the
infant is first in the power of the mother.

.

.

she may

either nourish it or expose it. If she nourish it, it oweth
its life to its mother; and is therefore obliged to obey
her."^^ Thus,

the obligation of the child to obey his

mother arises not from her having given birth to, but
rather, from her having taken the steps necessary to

preserve the life of her child.
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On the other hand, Hobbes claims that if the mother

exposes her child and if another person finds and nourishes
that child, then the child incurs an obligation to obey his

preserver. Hobbes explains that the child "ought to" obey
the person by whom his life is preserved "because
pi^fiserva t i on of

life being the end, for which one man

becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise

obedience to him, in whose power it is to save or destroy
him."^^

Hobbes contends that in the "mere state of nature,
where there are supposed no laws of matrimony and no laws
for the education of children, "either the parents between

themselves dispose of the dominion over the child, or do not

dispose thereof at all.

If

they dispose thereof, the right

passeth according to the contract.

Thus, it is

conceivable that in the state of nature-1,

a

male and a

female who are jointly responsible for the generation of an
infant can contract to transfer dominion over the child from
the mother to the father. Moreover, such a contract can be

conceived as transferring dominion over the child without

transferring the right of nature of either of the
contracting parties. That is to say, such

a

contract can be

understood as transferring dominion over the child to one of
the parents (usually the father) without transferring

dominion over the mother. Indeed, Hobbes mentions that if

a

man and a woman, who are monarchs of "two separate kingdoms
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and thus, who confront each other in the state of
nature^*

have a child "and contract concerning who shall have

dominion over him, the right of dominion passeth by the
contract.

Moreover, he cites the erroneous historical

example of the Amazons who (he claims) "contracted with the

men of neighboring countries to whom they had recourse for
issue

1.28

What

I

take to be an interesting feature of this

contract is that it is not necessary that both (or even one)
of the contracting parties be the parents of the child. By

this,

I

simply mean to point out that the mother (or by the

person who currently has the child under his/her control),

may enter into such a contractual relationship with any
(fully grown) person whatever, and thus it is not necessary
that she enter into this contract with the child's father.
(Indeed, as

I

suggested in the previous sentence, it is not

necessary that even one of the two persons who enters into
such a contract be the biological parent of the infant whose

proprietorship is being transferred. Thus, if a mother
abandons her child, the latter of whom is found and

preserved by person p (who, we may stipulate, is not

biologically related to the child), person p may enter into
a

covenant with person q (who, we may also stipulate, is not

related to the child) through which guardianship of the
child is transferred to q in exchange for some other

benefit )

.
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Thus, Hobbes presents a rather involved account of
the

manner by which

a

fully grown person comes to have dominion

over a child which may be summarized in the following
fashion: When a woman gives birth to a child, she may either

breed up, that is, support the preservation of that child,
or she may expose it to the elements,

i.e., abandon it.

If

she decides to exercise the former option, she thereby

retains dominion over her child by virtue of having

supported the latter's preservation.

If

she decides to

exercise the latter option, and if another person finds and
'breeds up" the abandoned child, that other person acquires

dominion over the child for the same reason. After having
acquired dominion over the child in one of these ways, the

mother or preserver may contract to transfer such dominion
to another person (presumably, in exchange for some other

benefit). Thus, dominion over an infant can be exchanged

through contract, provided that both of the contracting
parties are adults (and hence, capable of understanding the

mechanics of contract making and keeping), and that one of
the two contracting parties has dominion over the infant by

virtue of present possession.
Importantly, when the child comes to enjoy the full use
of his intellectual and physical

faculties, he continues to

owe obedience to his preserver since, as Hobbes contends,
"it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved."

Thus,

even though the infant child cannot be conceived of as
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entering into a contract with his preserver, once that
child
reaches adulthood or the age of reason (or in any case,
the

age at which he can be conceived of as understanding
the

mechanism of

a

contract) he is to be understood as having

entered into

a

tacit contract to obey the person who has

preserved him.^^
We can therefore observe that Hobbes’s account of
patrimonial dominion or commonwealth by preservation

contains discussions of two distinct types of contract, the
first of which is employed to determine or "fix" dominion

over an infant child, and the second of which results from
the child’s acceptance of benefits which had been bestowed

upon him during his nonage.
D.

Commonwealth by Institution

Hobbes claims that while in natural commonwealths, the
lord or the sovereign "acquires to himself such citizens as
he will," in institutive commonwealths "citizens by their

own wills appoint a lord over themselves, whether he be one

man or a company of men, endued with the command in chief."
He begins his discussion of a commonwealth by institution by

inviting his readers to consider the process by which

a

multitude of men join together "of their own free will." In
fact, he commences chapter 18 of Leviathan by asserting
that^^
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[a] conmonwealth is said to be
instituted
multitude of men do agree, and covenant, when a
every one
with every one that to whatsoever
man or assLbly
part, the
rfohr;to ® presentf fi"®"
right
the person of them all, that is
their representative; every one, as
well he that voted for it, as he that
voted
against it, shall authorize all the actions
judgments, of that man or assembly of men, and
in the
same manner as if they were his own, to
the end
to live peacefully amongst themselves,
and be

uelTL

protected against other men.

Thus, we might imagine a multitude of ten men
whom we might

designate pl-plO, each of whom retains his right of
nature,
and none of whom has yet agreed to transfer his
decision
making power to any other person. Hobbes is keen to

emphasize that even though the actions of many men can
concur to one end, such actions must be understood to

proceed from the several wills of the men who constitute
that multitude. Indeed, he asserts that ”[s]ince the

conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to
preserve peace and to make a lasting defense, it is
requisite that in those necessary matters which concern
peace and self defense, there be but one will of all

men.”

Thus, we might imagine that each person pl-pIO,

residing in the state of nature of some variety,

individually desires that some state of affairs be brought
about. We might imagine, for example, that each person

recognizes that the course of a certain river must be

diverted before the flow from that waterway is able to cause
a

severe flood in the plain in which all of them live.
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It

would seem that according to Hobbes, even before
any variety
of commonwealth is instituted, the various
persons

can (more

or less) spontaneously join together to help
achieve some

common mutually beneficial goal.
In the example of the conforming of many wills
to one

end, namely, to the end of diverting the course of the

immanent ly destructive river, each person desires that the
river be diverted, and each person separately and of his own

volition decides to enter into the cooperative project of

diverting the course of this body of water. That is to say,
in this prepolitical state, each person enters into this

project because he has

a will

to do so and not because he

had been instructed or ordered to do so by a sovereign

individual or council to whom he had formerly transferred
his decision-making power. However, Hobbes believed such

spontaneously initiated cooperative projects to be of
insufficient strength to form the basis for any long-lasting
or durable civil arrangement.

4 i

Surprisingly, Hobbes suggests that
in some cases,

a

number of men can,

repulse attacks or defend territory without

being led by the will of a formally established permanent

sovereign power (although, as was mentioned earlier, in
order for any common goal to be achieved, some system or

order-issuing, and rule-following, even if it is exceedingly

rudimentary and evanescent, would need to be in existence)
35
Accordingly, he contends that it is not enough
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should deaira should
last all the time of their life,
that they be
in
by
one
judgment for a
;•
limitoH
imited time;
as in one battle, or one
war For
obtain a victory by their unanimous
end^^*'
endeavour against a foreign enemy;
yet
““"“"nn enemy,
or he that by one part is held
for an enemy is bi
by the difference of their interests ">nnt Leds,
bv°thrdifr
dissolve, and
fall again into a war amongst
themselves.

Moreover, he contends that if the actions
of

a

multitude of

be directed according to their particular
judgments and particular appetites, they can
expect thereby no defense, nor protection,
neither
against a common enemy, nor against the
injuries
of one another. For being distracted in
opinions
concerning the best use and application of their
strength, they do not help but hinder one another
and reduce their strength by mutual opposition
to
nothing, whereby they are easily not only subdued
by a very few that agree together; but also,
where there is no common enemy, they make war upon
each other, for their particular interests.
Thus, given the diversity of individual passions, and
the

predominantly self-seeking behavior of human beings, it is
impossible that a multitude of human beings left to their
own devices, and thus unrestrained by any established

sovereign power, will naturally organize into cooperative
and defensible civic units.

Indeed, Hobbes contends that

"there be something else required besides covenant, to make
their agreement constant and lasting: which is a common

power to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to
the common benefit.

Ergo, Hobbes believed that in order
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to procure a more certain, safe, and
comfortable life, a
number of men will enter into a series of
contractual

agreements with one another to confer sovereign
decisionmaking power on a single individual or assembly.
Hence, we can imagine that person pi enters into
a

covenant with person p2 which specifies that both

contracting parties agree to be bound by the decision of
some sovereign individual or assembly and to accept and

"authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man or
assembly of men.

.

.

as if they were his own."^® Hobbes

asserts that in instituting the commonwealth, "each
individual enters into a contract with every other" so that
pi must be understood to contract with persons p3-pl0 as

well as with p2
PlO

on pp

.

.

(see my previous discussion of persons

pj-

143-144) Moreover, Hobbes contends that in

entering into the contract, each party agrees to transfer
his decision-making power to the individual or assembly of

men which is selected by the greater part of that multitude.
Thus, after every man enters into a contract with every

other, an election is conducted in order to choose an

individual person or assembly as the depository of the

sovereign power.
Hobbes contends that after the individual enters into
the covenant with his fellow subjects, he agrees to obey the

natural person or group of natural persons that is offered
the gift of sovereignty by the majority of him and his
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fellow contractors. Indeed, Hobbes asserts
that if this
contractor^^

oluntarily entered into the congregation
of them
that were assembled, he sufficiently
declared
thereby his will, and therefore tacitly
covenanted, to stand to what the major part
ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand shall
thereto, or make protestations against any
of
their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant
and thus unjustly.
'

Moreover, Hobbes points out that the alternative to

accepting the decree of the greater part is life in the
state of nature "wherein [each man] might without injustice
be destroyed by any man whatsoever."^® Thus, Hobbes

proposes two reasons why a man should agree to be ruled by

whomever the majority chooses, even if the majority's choice
does not conform to his own. First, since this man has

entered into a contractual agreement, he is bound to perform
the terms to which he has agreed, in this case to accept as
his sovereign the man or assembly of men that is chosen by a

majority of the contractors. Second, Hobbes points out that
failure to accept as sovereign the man or assembly that is

chosen by a majority of the contractors will result in being

excluded from the incipient commonwealth, and thus,
returning to the solitary and uncertain conditions of the
state of nature. Indeed, in such a situation, one acts
justly and prudently by remaining within the commonwealth,
that is, by accepting as one's sovereign the man or assembly

which is elected or chosen by the majority.
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Hobbes cautions that it is not enough
to obtain the
requisite security that every one covenants
with

the rest

"either by words or writing, not to steal,
not to kill, and
to observe the like laws; for the
pravity of human

disposition is manifest to all, and by experience
too well
known how little.
men are kept to their duties
.

.

through

conscience of their promises

.

Thus, Hobbes contends that

some coercive mechanism must be established
which will

guarantee the keeping of contracts, as well as the
keeping
of the natural and civil

laws through the use of

punishments. Even though the individual members of

a

multitude of men might uniformly enter into a cooperative
arrangement with the intention to follow the laws of nature
(which Hobbes claimed to be easily known to all men), Hobbes

believed that the self-serving passions of men would
eventually lead to law breaking, dissention, and eventually
the dissolution of this group. Further, Hobbes believed that
in order to prevent such an unappealing eventuality, it is

necessary to establish a sovereign mechanism which is of
sufficient power to guarantee that contracts are kept and
laws are obeyed. Once the sovereign is instituted, he can

then develop a system of penalties according to which the

punishment assigned to be administered to the person who
violates a given law is greater than the benefit which is
likely to be realized by the violator as a result of

breaking that law.
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If

an effective system of penalties is in
place,

individuals, who are able to observe that the
penalties

assigned to the violation of laws exceed in severity
the
probable benefits of violating them, and that such
penalties
are likely to be imposed for violations, will be
deterred
from violating these laws. Once a sufficient number
of

citizens is so discouraged from breaking these laws,

a

general climate of safety will ensue. This, in turn, will
lead to the further reduction of the number of violations of

the law, and thus, to the realization of a condition of

greater safety. This "climate of safety" can be understood
to result from the perception on the part of a substantial

portion of the commonwealth's (or COMMONWEALTH'S) populace
that the laws can be kept without running a substantial risk
of being harmed or being taken advantage of by one's less

conscientious fellow-citizens.
Clearly, however, this transformation from a condition
in which human beings are unwi 1 1 inq to keep covenants and

observe the other laws of nature, to a condition in which
they are so willing involves a bit of finesse on the part of

Hobbes.

Indeed, Hobbes's account of this transformation

seems less than compelling for reasons which will be

detailed in the following two chapters. At this point in the
presentation, let it suffice to say that Hobbes does not

believe that the nature of the human organism will undergo

transformation once a COMMONWEALTH is instituted. Indeed,
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a

after the COMMONWEALTH has been established,
the Individuals
Who constitute that COMMONWEALTH will remain
the

predominantly egoistic" creatures which they
had been when
they inhabited*' the state of nature.
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1.

NOTES

2.

Hobbes, Man and Citizen

.

page 106.

When reviewing this chapter, it should be
remembered that
multiperson sovereign units, i.e., commonwealths,
are
composed of human beings, whom Hobbes believed
to possess a
specific and inflexible nature. Verily, Hobbes
claimed that
human beings constitute the "matter" of such
political
example, Hobbes, Man and Citizen pages 98QQ
Thus, before discussing the manner in which
sovereign groups (which are, after all composed ofmultiperson
beings) can be conceived as interacting with, and human
with one another, it will be relevant, instructive,combining
and
worthwhile, to consider how unfettered individuals (who thus
do
not belong to multiperson sovereign organizational
units)
would interact with one another in the Hobbesian
3.
hypothetical condition which I have labeled the state of
4.
nature-1. Indeed, it should be kept in mind that during his
analytical discussions of the origin of, and basis for
allegiance within, commonwealths by acquisition and
commonwealths by preservation, Hobbes chooses to consider
matters from the standpoint of the state of nature-1. (See
Chapter 20 of Leviathan (Hobbes, Leviathan pages 127-132),
Chapters 8 and 9 of De Cive (Hobbes, Man and Citizen page
205-217.), and Chapters 3 and 4 of Part II of The Elements
(Hobbes, Elements of Law pages 127-135.))
,

.

,

,

Hobbes, Leviathan

,

page 130.

Hobbes, Leviathan page 130. In De Cive Hobbes contends
that dominion is acquired "if a man taken prisoner in the
wars, or overcome, or else distrusting his own forces, to
avoid death promises the conqueror or the stronger party his
service, that is, to do all whatsoever he shall command
him." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen page 106.) And finally, in
the Elements of Law Hobbes claims that when a man submits
to an assailant for fear of death "thereby accrueth a right
of dominion." (Hobbes, Elements of Law
page 127.)
,

.

,

,

,

5

Leviathan

.

p.

131.

In De Cive Hobbes claims that it is not
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the obligation of a servant to his
lord, ariseth
not from the simple grant of his life;
hence rather that he keeps him not boundbut from
or
imprisoned. For all obligation derives
from
contract; but where there is no trust,
there
can be no contract.
There is therefore a
confidence and trust which accompanies the
benefit
of pardoned life whereby the lord
affords him his
Man and Citizen pages
.

.

.

,

Hobbes further contends that
when a servant taken in the wars is bound in
natural bonds or chains, and the like or in
prison; there hath passed no covenant from the
servant to the master; for those natural bonds
have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds
of covenant; and they show the servant is not
trusted. (Hobbes, Elements of Law page 128.)
,

Hobbes again forcefully makes this point in The Questions
Concernin g Liberty, Necessity and Chance when he asserts, in
6.
reply to Bishop Bramhall's claim that "the laws of
7.
conquerors who come in by the power of the sword, were made
without our assent
that the "conquered makes no law by
8.
virtue of his power: but by virtue of their assent that
9.
promised obedience for the saving of their lives." (See
Hobbes, English Works Vol V, pages 178-79 and 180,) In the
same section, Hobbes characterizes as "gross" the Bishop’s
claim that conquerors make laws without the assent of the
conquered, and ridicules the position that a man is
"presently obliged without further ado to obey all of [the
conquered’s] laws" simply because the latter is in a
position to kill the former. (See, Hobbes, English Works
Vol
V page 180
.

.

.

.

,

Hobbes, Man and Citizen

,

page 206.

Hobbes, Man and Citizen

,

page 207.

Hobbes, Leviathan

,

page 131.

This would seem to represent a rather significant change
from the doctrine set forward in Hobbes's earlier works The
Elements of Law and De Cive (see this, and the two
immediately subsequent paragraphs in the text of this
chapter
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®*tending this privilege to the
masters of
small commonwealths by acquisition
(L
Hobbesian
"faml
-M
can be seen to conflict with
Hobbes's earlier stated il
(on Le viathan pp
130-131, section [10].
that the mas^'"
enters into a valid contractual
agreLent
with
his subiect
subjects, and is thus bound to perform
the
terms
to which
he had previously agreed, simply
stated, if the maste? Ts
*'*'®
whenever he
believes it°fittino
fitting or advantageous
''d®
to
do
so,
in
what sense
cee hhe u
can
be understood to be bound to honor
thi
terms
of ^1^
previously undertaken contract with his
servant or servanL?
,

.

“

10. Hobbes,

Leviathan

.

page 131.

JiSviaihan, page 131. In this
makes reference to a practice which he context, Hobbes
to exist
during times of war, by which a person believed
(or group of persons)
which has pave) been defeated by an invading
army attempts
to evpe tp "present fury" of his
conqueror by agreeing
yceeing ro
to
submit to the latter's will.
12. Hobbes,

Man and Citizen

,

pages 206-207.

13. See, for example,
gj ements of Law

section 7 of Chapter 3 of Part II of
where Hobbes claims that the "servant
that IS no longer trusted, but committed to his
chains and
custody, IS thereby discharged of his obligation in
foro
interne, and therefore if he can get loose, may
lawfully go
his way
(Hobbes, dements of Law, page 130.) Compare this
with Hobbes s assertion in Section 9 of Chapter 8 of
De
Ci^, that "the servant that is put in bonds, or by any
other means deprived of his corporal liberty is freed from
that other obligation of contract. For there can be no
contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be
which is not given." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen page
209.) In the corresponding passage from Leviathan however,
Hobbes presents a rather different interpretation of the
of the servant s obligation to obey his master when
he writes
,

,

.

The master of the servant, is master also of all
that he hath: and may exact the use thereof: that
is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his
servants, of his children, as often as he shall
think fit. For he holdeth his life of his master,
by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning
and authorizing whatever his master shall do. And
in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or
cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for
his disobedience, he is the author of the same;
and cannot accuse him of injury. (Hobbes,
Leviathan page 131.)
,
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understood to brLund^i'coveLnt t o^ub
therefore may if he can, make his escape ject
by any means
whatsoever
(Hobbes, Leviathan, page 145.) Thus, in
this
latter quotation from Leviathan Hobbes
14.
appears to be
which he had propounded in De Give

15.

frl
16.

tLr ^ork

17. Hobbes,
18. Hobbes,

'

Man and Citizen
Leviathan

.

,

page 213.

page 128.

19. Hobbes,
Man and Citizen

,

page 212.

Hobbes, Leviathan, page 128; Hobbes, Elements of Law
Hobbes, Man and Citizen
page 213.

20.
page 132;
21.
22.

,

.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 128.

Though Hobbes does (perhaps unwittingly) leave open the
possibility that dominion over the child naturally attaches
to the male parent for some other reason.
25.
26.

Hobbes, Man and Citizen

,

page 212.

Hobbes, Man and Citizen

,

page 213.

27.

Hobbes, Leviathan
28.
23. Hobbes,
29.
24. That is,

Leviathan

.

page 129.

,

page 130.

the state of nature-1.

Hobbes, Leviathan

,

page 129.

That is, in the state of nature-3,
of nature-1.

Hobbes, Leviathan
page 213.
Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 130; Cf

,

page 129.

.

rather than the state

Hobbes, Man and Citizen

,

During the course of his discussion of this issue, Hobbes
emphasizes that in the absence of matrimonial laws, dominion
over the child belongs to the mother, even though within
commonwealths (where such laws do exist) "the sentence is
[for the most part] in favor of the father."
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30. Hobbes,

Leviathan

.

page 130.

account
for the^child°s
ror
the child s obligation to obey the
parent
or
preserver
before that child has reached the level
of maturity
requisite for an understanding of the
contractual apparatus
It would seem that during the period
of the child's
preserver exercises authority over
th=f
that child through the application (or
the threat of the
use) of his superior physical force.
Indeed, in such a
dyadic relationship, the preserver can be
understood to
exercise irresistible force over the still weak
and
dependent child. Of course, once the child
attains a state
ae facto equality with his preserver, the
former's
subordinate status to the latter can be conceived as
established artificially through a contract entered being
into by
both parties. Although Hobbes's account of the
contractual
32.
agreement which establishes a "commonwealth by preservation"
IS rather odd, no discussion of this apparent
33.
oddness will
be presently undertaken since including such a
discussion
would take us far afield from the issue currently at hand.
It should be noted that Hobbes discusses the bond
which ties
an individual to his parent or preserver on
128-129
of
pp
r^eviathan pp
132-133 of The Elements 211-214 of De Give,
and p. 180 of Engl ish Works Vol V.
.

,

.

.

.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 110.

Hobbes, Man and Citizen
34. Indeed,

,

page 169.

in the Elements of Law

Hobbes contends that

.

[f]or [a] multitude, though in their persons they
run together, yet they concur not always in their
designs. For even at that time when men are in
tumult, though they agree a number of them to one
mischief, and a number of them to another; yet in
the whole, they are among themselves in a state of
hostility; like the seditious Jews besieged in
Jerusalem, that could join against their enemies,
and yet fight amongst themselves; whensoever
therefore any man saith, that a number of men hath
done any act: it is to be understood, that every
particular man in that number hath consented
thereunto, and not the greatest part only.
(Hobbes, Elements of Law pages 108-109.)
,
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35 Hobbes

Leviathan

pages 107-108

36 .Hobbes

Leviathan

page 107

.

37 .Hobbes

Leviathan

page 109

.

38 Hobbes

Leviathan

page 110.

Hobbes

Leviathan

page 112

40 Hobbes

Leviathan

page 112.

41 Hobbes

Man and Citizen, page 176

.

.

39

.

.

.

.
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CHAPTER V
THE GENERATION OF STATES

Introduction

A.

Given the model of the state of nature which

I

presented in chapter three, and the three types of

commonwealth which

discussed in chapter four, one can

I

conceive of nine possibilities of the manner in which

commonwealth or

a

a

cooperative grouping can arise from the

state of nature. One can, for example, consider how

a

commonwealth by acquisition might arise from the state of
nature-1, how a commonwealth by acquisition might arise from
the state of nature-2, and so on. These various

possibilities can be represented in the following fashion:

HOW A COMMONWEALTH BY

12
45
78

Institution

Acquisition

Preservation

CAN BE UNDERSTOOD TO ARISE FROM OUT OF THE

State of Nature-1
State of Nature-2
State of Nature-3

In this fifth chapter,

institution and how

a

I

3
6

9

will examine how a commonwealth by

commonwealth by acquisition can be

conceived as arising from each of the three conceptions of
the state of nature which we have seen to be contained in

Hobbes's works. Thus, in this
chapter,
six modes of generation
designated
1

,

I

„i

2,

4,

„

insider the

5,

7

and

8

in

the above printed table.

Before beginning this exploration,
a number of remarks
must be made. First, it should
be noted that in this table,
the numerals 1 through 9
function merely as names of the
modes by which various types of
commonwealth
can be

conceived of as "growing out of" the
various types of the
state of nature.
Second, when

I

refer to the establishment of a

commonwealth, it is not necessary that
the type of grouping
I
have in mind is a COMMONWEALTH of
the state of nature-3
variety. Thus, in this chapter a
'commonwealth' will refer
to a fully-fledged COMMONWEALTH of
the state of nature-3

variety, or to a small despotical or
patrinomial group which
I have identified as
being characteristic of the state of
nature-2.^ It should be noted that the latter
type of

grouping can contain as few as two members; indeed,
member grouping represents the limiting case of

a

a

two-

paternal

or a despotical government.

Third, though this chapter could have contained

discussions of all nine of the modes of generation
represented in this table,

I

have decided to refrain from

presenting discussions of modes

3,

6,

and

9.

Even though, in

each of his three principal works of political philosophy,

Hobbes does discuss "preservation" as one of the three
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procedures by which

collective organizational unit can be

a

conceived to arise, I've decided to forego considering
inodes of
inodes

generation

3,

6

and

9

precisely because these three

bear little direct relevance to, and are thus

comparatively unimportant from the standpoint of the
foundation (or "establishment") and maintenance of such
actually existing modern political units as COMMONWEALTHS.
Finally, as

I

the taxonomy which

mentioned earlier in this dissertation,
I

present represents

Hobbes's state of nature which

I

culled from various of his texts.

a

reconstruction of

believe can legitimately be
I

admit that this taxonomy

represents my own reading or interpretation of Hobbes's
texts and that these divisions, as presented by Hobbes, are
far from distinctly drawn.
B.

Mode

1

In his classic description of the manner in which a

commonwealth is instituted, Hobbes asserts that

2

commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a
multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every
one, with every one, that to whosoever man or
assembly of men, shall be given by the major part,
the right to present the person of them all, that
is to say, to be their representative: every one,
as well he that voted for it as he that voted
against it, shall authorize all the actions and
judgments, of that man, or assembly of men, in the
same manner, as if they were his own, to the end,
to live peacefully amongst themselves, and be
protected against other men.
[a]

Thus, we might envision the rational though passionate human

beings who inhabit the state of nature-1 as instituting
159

a

commonwealth in roughly the
following manner: «e might
imagine that persons
p,,

p,

,

confront each

p^,

other in a condition where
there exists neither a common
sovereign mechanism nor
contractually-generated

interpersonal relationships of any
kind (see the description
of the conditions which
characterize the state of nature-1
in chapter 3 of this dissertation).

It must again be

emphasized that the persons who inhabit
the state of nature1 are to be conceived of
as abstract human individuals
who
exist in no particular historical
epoch, and
who are

considered as if inhabiting no specific
geographical area.
In fact, as I attempted to make
clear during my earlier

presentation of the three conceptions of the
state of
nature, the state of nature-1 might properly
be interpreted
as an analytic model which allows one
to understand (or

assists one in understanding) how

a

number of abstract

individuals can be expected to interact with one
another
when they are constrained by no sovereign power,
and are
thus left to their own devices.
It

must be remembered that the individual persons (or

natural human organisms) who inhabit the state of nature-1
are endowed with the faculty of reason and are thus able to

formulate instrumental plans or strategies intended to
secure themselves access to desired material objects, or to
bring into existence desired states of affairs. Further, it

must be remembered that Hobbes describes the behavior of
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human beings as being importantly influenced
or determined
by the presence of such bodily "passions"
as (1) a desire
for the possession of those objects which will
provide

bodily sustenance, (2)

a

fear of violent death, and (3)

a

ho£e to establish and maintain a condition of peace
and

commodious existence. Finally, according to Hobbes, the
faculty of reason can best be understood as providing

a

guiding role for the attainment of the material objects or
states of affairs which are the "particular objects" of the

various human passions. That is to say, for Hobbes, as for
Hume, a judgment of human reason can be understood to

motivate

a

human action only if that judgment is united with

or serves to guide an autonomously (and presumably,

previously) existing passion such

a

desire, an aversion, and

so on
It

should be clear to us, as well as to those who

occupy the state of nature-1, that even though forming

cooperative groups could lead to the realization

of greater

benefits than one could achieve on one's own, keeping to
oneself, that is, attempting to maintain a solitary

existence, constitutes the safer of the two options.

We will recall, moreover, that Hobbes draws

a

distinction between moderate men "who are satisfied with an
equality of nature," and dominators "who take pleasure in

contemplating their own power in acts of conquest."

Since

Hobbes includes individuals of the latter variety among
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those who inhabit the state of nature, we might
reasonably

suggest that as time passes, such dominators will
attempt to
demonstrate their presumed, though spurious, superiority
over other men through "acts of conquest" or instances
of

offensive violence. Moreover, we might reasonably expect
^^^t such acts would, from time to time, be performed in
full view of other individuals so that these acts would be

sensed, noticed, and retained as memories within the

minds/sensory organs of both those who are the direct
victims of such violence and those who are simply interested

observers

.

Thus, by the time the state of nature-1 has, in

essence, "played itself out" through the passage of time,
the resulting interactional situation will have developed

into a rather inhospitable forum. Suspicion of one’s

fellowmen will abound, an initial uncertainty concerning the

motives and probable voluntary behavior of one's fellows
will give way to

a

widespread perception that those around

one are unworthy of trust.

Indeed, each inhabitant will

recognize that engaging in anticipatory activity constitutes
a

necessary means to his continued survival

.

For this

reason, all or most men can be expected to engage in such

activity
Thus, Hobbes's striking description of the remarkably

civilized process by which "a multitude of men do agree and
covenant" to be bound by the decision of the sovereign upon
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whom the members of that multitude have conferred
their
powers, strikes the reader as being entirely out of

keeping

with the description of the state of nature which Hobbes
presents.^ If the individuals who occupy the state of

nature are forced to adopt and maintain an attitude of

vigilance and

a

generally-held willingness to attempt to

dominate others, it appears impossible to envision scenarios
in which offers to establish conditions of peace are not met

with jeers, rebukes or acts of anticipation.
One might suggest that this problem can be eliminated
if we consider the individuals who inhabit the state of

nature to be purely rational actors who are not affected by
such passions as pride and a desire for glory. Indeed, one

might aver that by eliminating such antisocial passions from
this model, human beings can be imagined to relate to one

another in

a

purely rational manner, can recognize the

benefits likely to be bestowed upon them as

a

result of

cooperative activity, and can thus put into practice such
strategies as are designed to institute

a

system of

cooperative group activity.

Although concentrating on

a

model of the state of

nature which construes human beings as rational actors whose

decisions are not affected by such passions as pride and
desire for glory may provide

determining if, and

if so,

a

how

fruitful exercise in
a

group of purely rational

beings can be conceived as coming together to form
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a

a

cooperative union, such

a

strategy would be clearly

inappropriate to deal with the likely
behavior of
individuals construed according to Hobbes’s
anthropology. As
I mentioned in
chapter 2 of this dissertation, Hobbes
takes
as given that a significant,
though never precisely
specified, proportion of human beings can
be characterized
as dominators, and that the behavior
or voluntary activity
of such individuals can be expected
to profoundly

affect the

behavior of those moderate men who dwell in
their vicinity.
Given the previously described character of
the
fully

developed state of nature-1, it would seem virtually
impossible that

a

commonwealth by institution could be

®s^^t*lished among this "state's” inhabitants.
If,

per impossible, such

a

miraculous transformation of

human nature could be effected, the establishment of

a

commonwealth by institution from out of the state of nature1

might be envisioned as occurring in the manner indicated

on pages 142-149 of chapter

4

Mode

2

C.

of this dissertation.

One can easily envision how

a

commonwealth by

acquisition might arise from out of the state of nature-1.
For example, we might propose that such

a

two-person

commonwealth would come into existence as the result of

a

contract in which one man agrees to obey the directives of

another in order to avoid the present stroke of death.
Indeed, dominion "acquired by consent or victory in war,"
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including presumably, the so-called
war of each against all.
is described by Hobbes as^
that which some writers call despotical
and
master over the servant,
and this dominion is then acquired
to the victor
when the vanquished, to avoid the
present stroke
1°"9 as his life
and the liberty of his body are allowed
him, the
victor shall use thereof at his pleasure.
.

.

.

Clearly, however, in the state of nature such
an agreement
would be evanescent and precarious for at least
two reasons.
In the first place,

Hobbes believes that despotical

groupings of this type are held together by the servant's
fear of the master. That is, the servant agrees to
serve the

master ostensibly because the master refrains (or refrained)
from killing him, but additionally because he fears (the

powers of) his master. Admittedly, servant S would have

a

compelling reason to fear, and more significantly, to
promise to render obedience to master M precisely when M has
a

clear advantage over him. However, once the covenant is

instituted, and M allows

S a

partial liberty, S ceases to be

in clear danger of immediate death (in the same sense that

he had been when a blade was situated next to his throat).
In a one-to-one encounter in the state of nature (that is,

one in which the master has no other servants or sons), S

would recognize that M is merely a human being and is thus
subject to

a

quick death (as is any other human being).

Recognition of this fact, coupled with the aforementioned
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overvaluing tendency which afflicts "almost all men,"^
would almost certainly lead

S

to eventually break the

covenant by refusing to obey, or by attempting to subdue or

destroy his putative master.
Secondly, it appears unreasonable to believe that M

would be imprudent enough to trust

S

with

in exchange for a pledge of obedience.

recognize that

S

a

partial liberty

Surely, M would

will retain his cunning and his physical

power even after he has promised to obey M.
little reason to believe that

S

Indeed, M has

will help to defend him when

he [M] commands such obedience, or even that

S

will not

attempt to subdue him "by force or wiles." Hence, we have

strong reason to believe that in the state of nature-1,, it
is more reasonable for M to plunge his dagger into S's

throat than it is to attempt to strike

a

deal for future

defense with his opponent. Clearly, since the fear of M

which

S

feels at that moment will surely diminish when

S

later comes to consider the slender basis of his

relationship of servitude, M would be foolish not to slay
his adversary.

On the other hand, we might contend that if individual
S,

who had previously been conquered by M, and who had

previously agreed to obey M (for as long as the latter
refrains from placing him in chains or other impediments to
corporeal motion), faces the further choice of either

remaining

a

part of the defensive grouping which is headed
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by M, or of attempting to compromise
the integrity of this
group by defecting from, or by attacking
the leader of this

group (and thus forfeiting the advantage
of living within a
viable defensive grouping), S would be
a fool to choose the
latter option. Since life in the state
of nature-1 will, in
all

likelihood, be deemed by S to be inferior
to life as a
subject or a servant within a multi-person
(if only a twoperson) grouping, S can, in all likelihood,
be expected to
adopt the latter option since it represents,
in effect, the
less unpleasant of the two available alternatives.

Furthermore, in this situation,

entered into

a

S

can be understood to have

contractual agreement with M, and as such, to

have bound himself through his own free decision to obey the

commands of M in exchange for M's having spared S's life and
M's continuing to refrain from placing M in fetters, bonds,

chains or other impediments to physical motion.

Therefore, although in this situation

recognize that M is merely
subject to

a

a

S

would certainly

human being and, as such, is

quick and relatively easily executed death, and

that S will inevitably confront M in a situation where the

latter is vulnerable to the aggressive attacks of, and the

physical destruction at the hands of the former, it is

plausible to suppose that

S will

have some reason to forego

the "benefits" of living a free and unencumbered independent

life in order to increase the probability of surviving

through

a

longer (though less unencumbered) existence as
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part of a (somewhat) viable defensive grouping.
Conversely,

although M would surely recognize that

S,

if he is not

killed, will retain his cunning and his physical
powers, and
thus, his capacity to utterly destroy M in an
unguarded

moment, it would not thereby be irrational for M to propose
to enter into the above described covenant with S,

to trust S with a partial

liberty,

and thus

(understood simply as M's

continuing to refrain from restricting the corporeal freedom
of S) For in this situation, M will

likely perceive that

S

will come to recognize that he [S] stands a better chance of

survival within

a

two-person group than he does on his own.

For this reason, M will have some reason to suppose that
will

S

refrain from attacking him [M] after this contract has

been made.
Importantly, the success of such

a

covenant would seem

to depend upon whether S is a dominator or a moderate, and
in fact, M's willingness to enter into such an agreement (or
to propose such conditions of peace) would seem to depend

upon whether M perceives

S

to be a dominator or a moderate.

Since a moderate is envisaged as

a

person who recognizes and

rightly values the benefits of peace and who "is satisfied

with an equality of nature,"

a

moderate would seem to be

less likely than a dominator, to attempt to subvert the

social unit of which he is
(that is,

a

part by attacking its leader

in our example, M)
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Thus, if in this scenario, M were to consider

S to

moderate, he would be more willing to attempt to strike

mutually advantageous bargain with

S

he to consider S to be a dominator.

be

a

a

than he would be were
In fact,

it seems that

if M knows that S is a dominator, he will be completely

unwilling (that is, will flatly refuse) to enter into such
covenant with

S.

a

Crucially, one might reasonably maintain

that if M is uncertain as to whether S is a moderate or

a

dominator, that is, if M does not possess a compelling
reason to believe that

S

is a moderate, M will,

in all

likelihood, refrain from attempting to enter into

contractual agreement with

S.

I

a

believe this to be the case

since in this scenario, M cannot be certain that

S is

sufficiently trustworthy to be relied upon to discharge the
responsibilities to which he will have previously agreed.
Thus,

it seems evident that the success of,

and even the

genesis of the contractual agreement which provides the
basis for

a

two-person commonwealth by acquisition depends

upon whether (1) M perceives

moderate, and whether (2)

moderate

S

dominator or

a

truly is a dominator or

a

S to be a

0

Unfortunately, Hobbes seems committed to a belief in
the impossibility

(or in any case, the extreme difficulty)

of accurately identifying a person in the state of nature as
a

moderate rather than

a

dominator despite the fact that in

at least a small number of cases,
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the information necessary

to make such an identification would be
disclosed to the

identifier

via empirical

suppose that even though

a

observation. Thus, we might

majority of the instances of the

type of encounter represented in the scenario above
(namely,
that in which one person stands above another with

a

sword

drawn) would conclude with the former destroying the latter,
a

s ma

1

number of instances of this scenario would conclude

with M proposing

a deal

to S,

S

accepting M's deal and thus,

S's becoming subjugated to M's will.

Therefore, there does appear to exist some slim basis
^or expecting the generation of viable two-person despotical

defensive units from out of the state of nature-1. This is
true even though Hobbes's comments concerning the

possibility of identifying moderates in the state of nature,
and his expressed belief that even moderates can be expected
to act in an "anticipatory" fashion, serve to render such an

eventuality exceedingly remote.^
D.

As we will recall

believed that

a

Mode

4

from an earlier section, Hobbes

commonwealth is instituted

multitude of men do agree and covenant
all

...

"when a
to authorize

the actions and judgments of whatsoever man or

assembly," is chosen by

a

majority of that multitude.^*'

Further, it has been noted that such

a

COMMONWEALTH^^ was

conceived by Hobbes as being created from out of some

preexistent matter (namely, the natural human beings who
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come to compose that political unit).
Additionally, it has
been noted that Hobbes believed such
units to be voluntarily
instituted by the various contracting parties,
each of whom
enters into a covenant with all other
contracting parties
(and each of whom thus becomes a citizen
of the

COMMONWEALTH), though none of whom enters into

a

covenant

with the natural person or persons who become(s)
the

sovereign of the newly-instituted COMMONWEALTH. In
passage from Leviathan

,

a

famous

Hobbes claims that while the

individuals who enter into

a

COMMONWEALTH by acquisition do

so out of fear of the conquering party, the individuals
who

decide to institute and enter into

a

COMMONWEALTH by

institution do so because they fear their fellow contracting
parties

.

A COMMONWEALTH by institution can be envisioned to

arise from out of the state of nature-2 in no fewer than two
•distinct ways.

First, a COMMONWEALTH can be imagined to be

instituted when the natural persons who function as the
rulers of the various ’’families" that inhabit this condition

enter into contracts with one another; and second,

a

COMMONWEALTH can be imagined to be instituted when all of
the natural persons, both servants and leaders, who live

within the bounds of some number of state of nature-2 type
units, enter into a contract with every other such natural

person. According to this second method of formation, all

contracting parties (who in this case are natural persons)
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agree to transfer their respective
rights of nature to some
newly-instituted sovereign (the latter of whom
enters into
no contractual agreement with any of
the natural persons who
consent to become his subjects).

Though Hobbes is disinclined to believe that
many
historical COMMONWEALTHS have been established
through such
a smoothly executed conventional
process, such a process
does constitute a legitimate procedure in which
a

COMMONWEALTH

c_an

be brought into existence through the

voluntary acts of human beings. The more plausible of
the
two previously-mentioned methods by which

COMMONWEALTH by

a

institution can arise from out of the state of nature-2 is
the first, that is, through a procedure by which the

respective leaders of each of several "families" enter into
a

contractual agreement with each of the other leaders.

Through this procedure, each leader agrees to transfer his

decision-making power over both himself and his servants, to
some person who is not

a

party to that contract.

For example, we might imagine that (natural) person A^

who commands (natural) persons A -Ajg
2

commands persons

Bj-Bjg

and person

Cj

,

,

person

,

who

who commands persons

into a series of contracts with one another to

^2~^10

transfer the decision-making power of all of their

respective group members to some person
this process,

enter into

a

Aj

D.

(According to

will enter into a contract with

contract with

and
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Aj

Bp

will enter into

B^

a

will

contract with

C^)

In such a scenario,

.

not only does

transfer to D decision making power over himself

[A^]

moreover,

Aj-Ajg,

A^

transfers decision making power over

but

,

the

latter of whom had previously transferred their decision

making power to

Aj

through some earlier acts of their own.

Quite simply, in this scenario, natural persons

Aj-A^g

are in no position to transfer their own decision making

power to D (or to any other person), since they have already

transferred such power to natural person
(temporally later) contract,

and

A^,

Cj

A^.

Hence, in this

act as agents or

repositories for the powers which had previously been
tranf erred to them by

A2“A^g

,

B2~B^g

and

C2“Cjg

respectively.^^

This completed contract results in a transferral of

allegiance to
all

so that after the contract has been made,

D,

of the members of the previously existing constituent

families come to be subject to the absolute will of
is true even though A2,

consent to such

a

D.

This

for example, does not directly

transfer of allegiance, and irrespective

of whether A2 prefers to remain under the absolute control

of

Ai.‘<

E.

Mode

5

The most historically plausible manner by which larger

state of nature -2 type "families” can be envisioned as

resulting from the consolidation of smaller ones is through
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conquest.

Leviathan

In a previously quoted passage from
chapter 17 of
,

Hobbes specifies that it is not^^
the joining together of a small number of men,
that gives them
security; because in small
numbers, small additions on the one side or the
other, make the advantage of strength so great as
is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore
gives encouragement to an invasion.
.

.

.

Thus, when the master of a small family comes to notice that
an even smaller family in his group's vicinity stands

vulnerable to

a

successful invasion and conquest by his own

group, he is thereby "encouraged" to launch such an invasion

and attempted conquest. Such

a

manoeuvre might be undertaken

in the hope of making less probable an invasion of his own

family by the leader of

a

slightly (though significantly)

larger family (or defensive group) in his vicinity. Thus,

person M, the master of family

A,

which contains

might launch an offensive attack against family
contains

5

members, in order to prevent

upon family A by the leader of family C,

7

B,

members,

which

suspected attack

a
a

group which

consists of ten members. Thus, over the course of time, the

members of smaller state of nature-2 type groups can be
expected to be conquered by the members of, and to be

"absorbed into" larger state of nature-2 type groups.
Moreover, Hobbes points out that^^
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[t]he multitude sufficient to confide
in our
determined by any certain number,
but by comparison with the enemy
we fear; and is
then sufficient, when the odds of
the enemy is not
ot so visible and conspicuous
moment, to determine
he event of war, as to move him to
attempt.
Thus, after a family reaches a certain
size (determined by a

comparison with the size of the other families
in its
vicinity), it is no longer capable of being
conquered by the
other families in its vicinity in a relatively
effortless
and bloodless manner, and thus, is no longer
vulnerable to
the indiscriminate offensive attacks of the
leaders of such

groups. Purportedly, when a family reaches a
particular

critical size, leaders of other groups are less willing
to
risk the integrity of their respective group by attacking
the first group so that within that first group a certain
level of security is guaranteed. Thus, when a family

achieves some particular size, it ceases to be

nature-2 type group, and becomes

a

a

state of

fully fledged

COMMONWEALTH, though, as had been noted in Chapter
dissertation, Hobbes does not make

a

3

of this

special effort to

inform his readers precisely when this occurs
We might imagine that when person

p,

the leader of a

smaller state of nature-2 type group comes to recognize that
his group is on the verge of being overcome by

a

larger

state of nature-2 type group, he will choose to

contractually transfer his right of nature, as well as his
dominion over his subjects, to the leader of that larger
group. Such a strategy would have the advantage of saving p.
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as uell

as his various subjects,

from falling victim

to>’

the offensive attacks of the
members of that larger group.
This would clearly be a reasonable
strategy to implement if
P does

believe that the likely result of

a

confrontation

between (the members of) bis group
and (tbe members of) the
larger group will be a wholesale
slaughter of the former by
/

if he is a reasonable person wbo
values

his continued existence and safety,
p can be expected to

contractually transfer sovereignty over
bis servants, as
well as his own right of nature, to
the leader of the larger

group
However, if p is

a

dominator, whose reasoning process

IS frequently interfered with or vitiated
by the incidence
of such violent passions as pride and
an unrealistically

high level of self-esteem, we would expect the
probability
of p's refusing to surrender to the leader
of the larger

(aggressive) group to be greater than it would be if
p were
a moderate. Since a moderate can be expected
to maintain an

attitude consistent with the strength of his group vis-a-vis
that of the larger group, while

a

dominator can be expected

to exaggerate his own group's chance of successfully fending

off an attack by the larger and stronger group, a dominator

can be expected to be more willing than
a

a

moderate to mount

struggle in the face of overwhelming odds,

(and in all

likelihood, to procure the slaughter of many or all of his

subjects
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It

is perhaps for reasons of this
type that Hobbes

allows to subjects or servants within
state of nature-2 type
units the option of using "one's own
reason in time of
danger to save his own life, either by
flight or submission
to the enemy as he shall think best
."18
.

Specifically, if q is
by p,

a

.

.

subject within a small group headed

if q recognizes that
p is about to enter their group

into a defensive battle with a larger group
(which in all

likelihood, in q's estimation, will result in the

destruction of the members of that group (including
q)),
then q is permitted to either flee from his group,
or to
submit to the command of the enemy, despite p's directive
that he [q] engage in battle. This is a situation which
will

purportedly not arise (or will arise far less frequently)
within

fully fledged COMMONWEALTH since the latter type of

a

group can be expected to possess adequate means of defense
to render unreasonable q's contention that his group will

certainl

y

be completely destroyed if it engages in battle

with some rival COMMONWEALTH,

(and thus, to render void or

unacceptable g's claim to refuse to obey p's command to
enter into battle based upon the foresight of his own (that
is,

q's own) immanent destruction)^^
Thus,

if within the state of nature-2,

arises in which p, the leader of

a

a

situation

small group S is given

the opportunity to either (1) submit to the leadership of,
or (2)

refuse to submit to the leadership of, and thus to
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zard

group

a

L,

war of his group s against
soma larger and stronger
and if the odds are
overwhelmingly in favor of S's

members being destroyed if
it engages in battle with
L, then
the rational strategy for
p to pursue is to submit to the
will of his adversary.
However, if
refuses

p
to enter into a
contractual agreement with the
leader of group L, then
q, a
subject within S, would be fully
justified in refusing to
honor the terms of the contractual
agreement into which he
had previously entered with
p.

Thus, as

member of a state of nature-2 type
grouping,
q is given greater leeway in determining
whether, in
a

situations where his group is under
attack, he will choose
to remain a member of, or to
defect from his group than he
would be afforded were he a member of
a

fully fledged

COMMONWEALTH
Even though, at the expected locations
in his various
political writings, Hobbes fails to advance an
unambiguous
criterion which serves to distinguish large
"families" from
small COMMONWEALTHS, and at one point in
Leviathan refers to

cities and kingdoms as "but great families,"^® it
is clear
that the means of defense against external attackers
are

much more robust within COMMONWEALTHS than they are within
f ami

lies.

Given the emphasis Hobbes places upon the individual’s
(in principle untransferable)

right to guard against or

obviate his own (violent) death, and to resist the
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directives of even his sovereign in extremis

it can be

plausibly asserted that if the subject has strong
reason to
believe that remaining a part of his present
COMMONWEALTH
will result in his immanent (and seemingly,

immediate)

death, while choosing to defect from his
COMMONWEALTH will

have the effect of preserving his life, he is
permitted to

exercise the second option. This would be true even though
he had previously entered into a contractual agreement
to

obey the directives of his sovereign. However, it can be

equally plausibly asserted that within a COMMONWEALTH,

a

subject would, except in extremely unusual circumstances, be

required to preserve the integrity of his COMMONWEALTH, to
obey the directives of his sovereign, and thus, to refrain

from breaking the contractual agreement into which he had

previously entered.
F.

Mode

7

A COMMONWEALTH can be conceived to be instituted from

out of the state of nature-3 when the sovereigns who

respectively command each of

a

number of COMMONWEALTHS come

to transfer their decision-making power over themselves and

their respective subjects to some other natural person or
set of natural persons. By virtue of this new contract, the

recipient of this transfer of power comes to be sovereign
over all of the natural persons who had formerly comprised
the various constituent COMMONWEALTHS (sovereigns and

citizens alike).

This mode of generation will, in all
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likelihood, approximate that described earlier
as MODE
the primary difference being that by MODE

4,

4,

a

COMMONWEALTH is brought into existence from the
individual
persons or the preexistent matter which compose state
of

nature-2 type families, while by MODE

7,

a

COMMONWEALTH is

established through the consolidation of two or more

previously existing COMMONWEALTHS. Thus, by MODE

4,

a

COMMONWEALTH is formed from two or more families, while by
MODE

7

,

a

COMMONWEALTH is formed from two or more

COMMONWEALTHS. As with MODE

which

a

the most plausible manner by

4,

COMMONWEALTH can be conceived as being instituted

from two or more already existing COMMONWEALTHS is through a

contract in which the sovereigns of two or more already

existing COMMONWEALTHS (rather than all the natural persons
who constitute those COMMONWEALTHS) enter into a contract

with each other. In such an agreement, each contracting
party promises to transfer the decision-making power over
all the members of his COMMONWEALTH (himself included) to

some common newly established sovereign power.
G.

Mode

8

Probably the most historically plausible manner by
which a COMMONWEALTH can be conceived as arising from, or
being formed out of some combination of already existing

COMMONWEALTHS is by conquest in an organized, bona fide war
in which actual fighting occurs.

As mentioned above, wars

waged between the artificial groups known as COMMONWEALTHS
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are likely to be conducted with a
greater degree of

regularity, predictability and routini zation
than are likely
to be those which are conducted between
families. Moreover,
it seems that the sovereign of one
COMMONWEALTH can engage
in war with another COMMONWEALTH while
continuing to

preserve a relatively normal and peaceful state of
affairs
within the boundaries of his own territory. By contrast,
it
is difficult to imagine a significant degree
of "domestic

tranquility" being maintained within the artificial units of
the state of nature-2 variety, especially since such units

are described as having weak if any established safeguards

the encroachments of the members of other groups.

Though COMMONWEALTHS have, throughout history, devoted
a

substantial amount of resources to the fortification and

defense of their territories and borders, it has of course

happened that COMMONWEALTHS have been defeated and conquered
by rival COMMONWEALTHS. Moreover, it confronts us as an

empirical fact, and Hobbes was certainly willing to admit,
that not all COMMONWEALTHS are equally mighty, and that not

every COMMONWEALTH faces every other on strictly equal
terms.

Indeed, Hobbes admits that if a weaker prince makes a

disadvantageous bargain or agreement with

a

stronger one,

due to considerations of fear, he is bound to honor that

agreement.

As such, Hobbes acknowledges a clear

distinction between weaker and stronger COMMONWEALTHS.
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However, despite the fact that some COMMONWEALTHS
are
capable of defeating in battle and conquering other

COMMONWEALTHS, we would expect that the supreme commander
of
the armed forces, that is, the sovereign of the
former
type

of COMMONWEALTH, will normally undertake such offensive

attacks only after he has engaged in

a

sustained

deliberative process in which he carefully weighs the
probable benefits and disadvantages involved in initiating
such an action. This will be true since we can expect the

borders of even relatively small and weak COMMONWEALTHS to
be fortified with some means of defense against external

aggressors, and to be guarded by the members of

a

standing

army
Thus, because even weak and small COMMONWEALTHS can be

expected to stage some defensive resistance when attacked by
an encroaching army, the commander of that encroaching army

will, in all likelihood, think twice before deciding to risk

the lives of his subjects and a loss of some portion of his

COMMONWEALTH'S military resources. Nevertheless, it is
conceivable that new COMMONWEALTHS will, from time to time,
be formed as

a

result of the (bellicose) interaction between

various COMMONWEALTHS in the international forum.
Clearly, the sovereign of

a

larger COMMONWEALTH can be

conceived as extending his/its dominion over

COMMONWEALTH as the result of

a

a

smaller

contract entered into by the

sovereigns of the respective (that is, the larger and the
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smaller) COMMONWEALTHS after the forces of the
larger

COMMONWEALTH have defeated (the forces of) the smaller
COMMONWEALTH in a military battle.
Moreover, one could envision the sovereign of the

smaller COMMONWEALTH choosing to voluntarily enter into

a

contact with the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH even

before any military action has been undertaken. Such
contract, which would effectively entail

a

a

transfer of

sovereignty over the citizens as well as the sovereign of
the smaller COMMONWEALTH to the sovereign of the larger

COMMONWEALTH, would most likely be entered into in the hope
of saving from death and lesser physical damage the citizens

within that smaller COMMONWEALTH.^^
In Chapter 21 of Leviathan

.

Hobbes claims that^^

[t]he liberty
whereof there is so frequent and
honorable mention ... is not the liberty of
particular men; but the liberty of the
commonwealth
which is the same that every man
then should have, if there were no civil laws, nor
commonwealth at all. And the effect of it also be
the same, namely a condition of perpetual war.
,

:

"The Athenians and the Romans," Hobbes goes on to inform his

readers
were free; that is, free commonwealths; not that
any particular man had the liberty to resist their
own representative; but that their representative
had the liberty to resist, or invade other people.
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Until the point in time at which the
sovereign of the
smaller COMMONWEALTH relinquishes, via
contract, to the

sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH the
sovereignty over
his subjects, the former continues to
possess "the

liberty

to resist,

belong to

or invade other people [sc.

Ms

the people who do not

COMMONWEALTH]." However, once he agrees to be

bound by the decisions of the sovereign of the
larger

COMMONWEALTH, he thereby transfers or renounces the liberty

which he had previously possessed to resist the will of the
latter. Even though the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH

might allow the (former) "sovereign" of the smaller

COMMONWEALTH to exercise some limited control over his
former subjects, absolute control over both the former

sovereign and his former subjects belongs to the sovereign
of the larger COMMONWEALTH.
H.

Concluding Remarks

Thus completes my presentation of the most plausible

methods by which the Hobbesian commonwealth by institution
and the Hobbesian commonwealth by acquisition can be

conceived as arising from each of the three varieties of the
state of nature. In the sixth and final chapter of this

dissertation,

I

will further examine the likelihood that

commonwealths of the earlier described varieties, once
established, will remain in existence for any extended

period of time, especially in light of Hobbes's apparent

insistence that dominators will be present within any
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sizable group of human beings.

I

will then explain why

I

take Hobbes’s asseveration that any
sizable group of human
beings will contain the type of natural
persons referred to
as dominators [whose antisocial
tendencies are incorrigible,
and whose disruptive influence upon
the social order is

seemingly ineradi cabl e

,

to effectively render unworkable

the type of governmental apparatus suggested
by this author.
During this portion of my discussion, I will
explain why I

construe Hobbes's model of a viable governmental
apparatus
to be eminently unworkable

,

and why the inevitable presence

of dominators would serve to undermine the
solidarity of

virtually any political grouping which is composed of

Hobbesian men.
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NOTES
1. This same point was made
in endnote
this dissertation.

2.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

#

13 to chapter 3 of

page 110.

3. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.
Hobbes adds in the
corresponding passage from the 1668 Latin edition
^viathan that "there are those who from pride and ofa
desire
tor glory would conquer the whole world."
(Hobbes
Leviathan page 75.)
.

.The retention of such memories would appear
to have the
effect of making the onlooker (or the victim of
such
assaults) even less likely to attempt establishing
cooperative enterprises precisely by providing him with an
assurance that there exist within his milieu persons who
are
unequivocally undeserving of his trust. Thus, the moderate
individual's initial hesitancy to enter into potentially
destructive (though potentially beneficial) ventures with
other persons comes, over time, to be more pronounced and
to
develop into an attitude of suspiciousness and uncertainty.
Further, since within the state of nature-1, persons can be
conceived as being in competition with one another for the
(temporary) control of desired objects, it can be expected
that such competitive struggles will give rise to a
widespread diffidence" of one's fellow men and foster a
widespread "endeavour to destroy or subdue one another."
(Hobbes, Leviathan page 75.)
.

5 The seeming incompatibility of these two descriptions
becomes abundantly clear when one compares, side by side,
Hobbes's description of the state of nature contained in
paragraphs 3 through 9 of Chapter 13 of Leviathan (See
Hobbes, Leviathan pages 75-76.) and Hobbes's description of
the manner by which a commonwealth is instituted in
paragraphs 1 through 3 of Chapter 18 of the same work.
(Hobbes, Leviathan pages 110-111.) Additionally, see my
extended discussion of Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the
state of nature on pages 61-75 of this dissertation, as well
as my discussion of Hobbes's commonwealth by institution on
pages 142-149 of this dissertation.
.

,

,

6. Hobbes, Leviathan
page 103. See my extended discussion of
commonwealth by acquisition on pages 131-135.
,

7

.

See Hobbes, Leviathan

,

page 75.
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The latter factor determining the success
of such an
endeavor, and the former factor determining
whether such a
contractual endeavor is actually undertaken or
initiated
8.

9. Interestingly, while discussing
the conditions which
prevail in the state of nature in Chapter 13
of Leviathan
Hobbes claims that because of the diffidence
with which men
in the state of nature regard each other
.

there is no way for a man to secure himself so
reasonably as anticipation, that is, by force or
wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so
long till he see no other power great enough to
endanger him, and this is no more than his own
conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.
Also because there are some that taking pleasure
in contemplating their own power in acts of
conquest, which they pursue farther than their
security requires, if others (that would otherwise
be glad to be at ease within moderate bounds)
should not by invasion increase their powers, they
would not be able, long time, by standing on their
own defense to subsist. And by consequence, such
augmentation over men being necessary to a man's
conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
(Hobbes, Leviathan page 75.)
.

What can immediately be gleaned from this passage is the
claim that in order to survive in the state of nature, even
moderate men must engage in the augmentation of dominion
over other men, that is, in the extension of servitude over
other men so that effective defensive groupings can be
established. Clearly, in this passage, Hobbes is
interpreting the necessity of the formation of such groups
from the perspective of the person who is "forced" to extend
his dominion over other persons, that is, from the
standpoint of the conqueror or the potential or probable
master
However, one would do well to remember that in order
for a two-person commonwealth by acquisition to be
cont ractua 1 1 y established, one of the two members will have
to agree to obey the orders of, and thus, to become
subservient to, the other. Even though, in this passage,
Hobbes stresses the benefit that will accrue to the master
of a commonwealth by acquisition by virtue of his commanding
one or more potential defenders, one might additionally
point out that those men who are conquered do, in all
likelihood, stand a better chance of survival (or survival
for a longer period of time) than they would had they not
been offered, and had they not accepted the terms proposed
by their conqueror/master.
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as
10.
11.

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 110.

That IS, such a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH
nature-3 variety COMMONWEALTH appears to be since a state
the type of
unit which results from the process
of institution.
13.
of

12 Leviathan

.

page 127.

Given the conditions which characterize mode
of
generation 4, we could maintain the conceit that
citizen of the resulting COMMONWEALTH enters into each
a
contractual agreement with every other citizen in no
fewer
han t_wg ways. First, we could interpret the group
leaders
Aj,
and C, as entering each of their respective
(contractually established) subordinates into a (separate)
contract with each of the other citizens of the resulting
COMMONWEALTH. This could be imagined to take place
precisely
because the respective group leaders (A,, B,
and C,
had
previously been granted the authority to act on behalf of
each of their subordinates (specifically, through the
transfers of right which established the state of nature-2
type groups A, B and C). According to this interpretation,
each of the natural persons {Aj-A^q}, {B.-B,g}, and
{C,-C,n}',
can be understood to enter into a separate contract with
each of the other natural persons who become citizens of the
newly instituted COMMONWEALTH, but can, in every case, be
imagined to do so through the agency of his respective group
leader (viz, A^ Bj
or Cj
As such, A^
Bj
and O would
essentially function as the (respective) contractuallyestablished custodians of the natural decision-making powers
of the subjects within "families" A, B, and C.
Alternatively, in order to buttress the claim that in
the new 1 y- es t ab 1 i shed COMMONWEALTH, each citizen enters into
a contractual agreement with every other citizen, we could
specify that immediately before the members of the three
previously existing "families" A, B, and C coalesce into the
newly established COMMONWEALTH, the group leaders A^ B^
and C^ free their respective subordinates from the contracts
which had previously established the subordinate status of
the latter. (Recall Hobbes's claim of page 86 of Leviathan
that one can be freed from a covenant by being forgiven) If
this were to happen, then each of the (formerly) subordinate
natural persons, upon being forgiven by his group leader,
would thereby recover his right to rule himself, which he
could then immediately transfer to the newly-established
(or, soon-to-be established) sovereign.
,

,

,

,

)

)

.

,

,

,
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however,
musrbe''Loked^upon^L''beinrrrath''''^'''’''®^^*'^°"'
leather perilous one
Since, at least in its lit^K=.i ^
introduces a condition of
momentary 1 awl essnlss^l^d all
'

b^-^

breakd^r

covenant, andihul :no:uraged
° similarly decline to
o^L“"“ir'i""d“V“"®
enter into this covenants
f,
the present
°*
^LfdJ s^^r^atr^n^^^

natura

persons who belongs to the groups
he^derby euUer

person D. I consider this second method
f’
to
plausible
of the two from a Hobbesian
nlrln
clearly be no
Lcessitl''tharan^^l^hh®°^"®®
citizens actually take part in the
commonwealth
COMMONWEALTH establishing
Ltlll° h
covenant.
would be true that since the servantsOn the contrary it
within the three
combine to form the COMMONWEALTH have
..nf
already
contracts with the leaders of their respectivf
families, such subjects are in no
condition
decision-making power over themselves to any to transfer
other person
longer possess their respective'
r^oht^^^f
rights
of nature or powers of self- determination.
textual^ confirmation of the claim that
..omm-iff
committed to a transitivity of covenanting," Hobbes was
see this
author s statement that
hi !w

*1

[s]ince
both the servant himself, and all
that belongs to him are his lord's, and by the
right of nature every man may dispose of his own
in what manner he pleases; the lord may either
^c pledge, or by testament convey the
dominion he hath over his servant, according to
his own will and pleasure.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen page 208.),
.

.

.

,

as well

as his assertion that

seeing the servant and all that is committed to
him is the property of the master, and every man
may dispose of his own, and transfer the same at
his pleasure, the master may therefore alienate
his dominion over them, or give the same by his
last will, to whom he lists.
(Hobbes, Elements of Law page 129.)
,
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Additionally, see Hobbes's remark that
the master of the servant is the master of
all he
holdeth his life of his master,
by the covenant of obedience, that is, of
owning
and authorizing whatsoever the master shall
do.
(Hobbes, Leviathan page 131.)

15.

16.

.

17.

Hobbes, Leviathan

18.

19. Hobbes,
20. And,

Leviathan

in all

21. Hobbes,

.

.

page 107.
page 107.

likelihood, being killed as

Leviathan

.

a

result of.

page 132.

But note what Hobbes has to say about men of a naturally
timorous nature on page 142 in chapter 21 of Leviathan
.

23. Hobbes,

Leviathan

.

page 132.

24. For textual

confirmation of the claim that Hobbes was
committed to a "transitivity of covenanting," see endnote
# 14 of the present chapter of this dissertation.
22. Or in which there is a strong threat of such an actual

war

Hobbes, Leviathan

.

page 86.

An additional relevant factor might be the expectation of
the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH that after he
enters into a contract with the sovereign of the larger
COMMONWEALTH, the latter will permit the former to continue
to exercise some control over his former subjects (that is,
those natural persons who had formerly been subjects within
25.
the smaller COMMONWEALTH). Such a concession would be
granted to the (former) sovereign of the smaller
COMMONWEALTH through an act of grace. That is to say, in
such a scenario the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH
would not forward as a term of the contract into which he
enters with the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH the
demand that the latter grant to the former absolute
sovereignty over his former subjects. Rather, in such a case
the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH would grant to the
sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH limited regulative
powers over his former subjects, while retaining absolute
dominion over all of the subjects within the newly
consolidated SUPERCOMMONWEALTH.

Hobbes, Leviathan

,

pages 139-140.
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26. Hobbes,

Leviathan

.

page 140.

27.1 believe that the view regarding the
nature of
Pa-^enthetioal statement can
be legitimately attributed to Hobbes. For
example. In
Le^iath^, Hobbes claims that because of "the
stubbornness of [their] passions," those men who
"will
strive to retain those things which to [themselves]
are
superfluous and to others necessary.
cannot be
corrected.
[my emphasis] (Hobbes, Leviathan page
95.)
Moreover, Hobbes describes such men as stubborn,
insociable,
f reward and— ntractable
(Hobbes, Leviathan page 96.)
In the corresponding passage from
Give such men
portrayed as "being incorrigible [my emphasis] by reason are
of
the stubbornness of [their] affections."
prx
[ "neque
affectum contumacia corrigi potest.''} (my emphasis)]
(Hobbes,
C itizen
page 141; Hobbes, Opera Latina.
Vol. II, page 187.)
.

.

.

.

^

^

,
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.

,

CHAPTER VI
THE WORKABILITY OF HOBBES’S SYSTEM
The O bjectives of Hobbes's Political Project

A.

Hobbes famously described the faculties of human nature
to consist of bodily strength,

pass i on

.

^

experience, reason and

It is the opinion of the present writer that in

recent years, several commentators on Hobbes have failed to

recognize the significance of the passions, and especially
the passions which Hobbes designates "the perturbations of

the mind which frequently obstruct right reason"^ in

determining the content or character of human behavior.
As we will recall

from an earlier discussion, Hobbes

was of the opinion that nature rendered human beings unfit
for life within collective organizational units, and that

certain of these human beings, whom we have been calling
dominators, are especially unsuited to conform to the norms
of behavior required within such units.

It

is my

contention that the "antisocial passions," which purportedly
affect all human beings, but which are described as being

especially prominent among dominators, constitute the most
significant feature which militates against the
establishment and maintenance of such organizational units
as

(Hobbesian) "families" and bona fide COMMONWEALTHS.
In chapter

5

of this dissertation,

I

presented

a

discussion of why it seems plausible that extremely small,
i.e.

two person defensive groupings (if such groupings could

come to be established) would stand

a

slight chance of

persisting for any extended period of time. During
the
course of the remainder of this chapter, I will
explore how
plausible it is that somewhat larger social groupings
composed of Hobbesian men and women will remain viable and
durable units.

During the course of his writings on political
(1)

phi 1 osophy
(2)

Hobbes attempts to provide answers to the following six
(3)

crucial questions:^
(4)

.

(5)

.

(6)

.

.

.

.

What is the nature of human beings?

Given the nature of human beings, why do men form
commonweal ths?
In what manner are commonwealths formed, or, in what
manner can commonwealths be conceived of as being
formed?

Why do commonwealths remain in existence (rather than
quickly dissolving)?
What strategies and structures must the sovereign of a
commonwealth implement in order to make most probable
the continued existence of the COMMONWEALTHS?
How must citizens behave in order to make most probable
the continued existence of the COMMONWEALTH?
In the next several paragraphs of this chapter,

I

will

review and discuss why Hobbes believed that organized

political units, in this case, specifically of the state of

nature-3 variety, can be expected to remain in existence (or
persist over time).

I

will then present what

I

take to be

Hobbes's answer to the sixth of these questions (6), that
is,

to the question of how citizens must behave in order to
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make most probable the continued
existence of the
COMMONWEALTH to which they belong.^
I

will conclude this dissertation by
discussing these

issues in light of the conception of
human nature which
Hobbes forwarded so that I might determine
whether Hobbes's
answers to the aforementioned descriptive and
prescriptive

questions are consistent with his view of the
human
organism.
B.

Why Hobbes Thought Commonwealths Remain in Existence
Purportedly, Hobbes offered his philosophy of politics

in order to demonstrate why human beings are obliged
to obey

the directives of the sovereign of the COMMONWEALTH to
which

they belong. Specif ical 1 y

,

Hobbes believed that citizens are

bound to obey their sovereign not because they have
(necessarily) entered into an explicit contractual agreement
to do so,

but rather because being a citizen within a

COMMONWEALTH involves the performance of duties which are
tantamount to those which one would incur were one to enter
into such an explicit contractual agreement.® This belief
is perhaps most clearly enunciated in chapter 17 of

Leviathan where Hobbes proclaims that the unity which
combines the numerous men who compose the COMMONWEALTH "is

more than consent or concord," and is rather^
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unity of them all in one and the same
person, made by covenant of every man with every
man, in such manner as if every man should say to
every other man, I authorize and give up my right
of governing myself to this man.
on this
condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and
authorize all his actions in like manner.
a real

.

.

Hence, even though a citizen might not enter into an

explicit contract of the above-specified variety, he does,

nevertheless, by virtue of constituting part of the matter
of the COMMONWEALTH (and of course, by virtue of benefitting

from the advantages which are made possible by the existence
of that COMMONWEALTH)

owe a debt of allegiance to the

sovereign of that COMMONWEALTH. Therefore, Hobbes's theory
of political

obligation can be understood to have

significance not only for those men and women who can be
imagined to have explicitly entered into covenants which

effectively establish very small multi-person defensive
units, but moreover, to those natural persons who have been

born into, or who otherwise find themselves to be part of an

already established or existing COMMONWEALTH.
Of course, Hobbes famously offered the opinion that a

properly regulated COMMONWEALTH, if it is not destroyed by,
or incorporated into some rival COMMONWEALTH,

expected to endure perpetually.^

can be

When considering this

issue in the present chapter, we will be less concerned with
the question of how precisely the COMMONWEALTH under

consideration came to be established, and will instead
concentrate upon whether the COMMONWEALTH can be expected to
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contain sufficiently strong cohesive
forces to prevent the
self-seeking and socially disruptive
tendencies of its
constituent members from rending it
asunder, that is, from
effecting its dissolution.
Surely, when a servant within

a

state of nature-2 type

grouping takes the time to observe and
consider the nature
of the organizational

unit of which he is

a

part, as well as

his own level of physical and intellectual
power vis-a-vis

that of his master (that is, his group's
leader), he will
soon come to recognize the rather thin basis
of the

relationship of servitude in which he finds himself
involved. Even though the servant can be assumed
to have

entered into some type of contractual agreement with
his
master, he will doubtless recognize that he confronts his

master on approximately equal terms qua adult human being,
and that his relationship of servitude to his master is

based entirely upon conventional (i.e., contractual) rather
than natural factors. Moreover, the servant, especially if
he happens to be a member of a two-person group, cannot fail
to be struck by the fact that his master is extremely

vulnerable to physical attacks, and indeed is susceptible to
a

relatively quick and easily accomplished destruction by

any other adult (including the servant himself). Finally, as
I

mentioned in Chapter

a

clear distinction between (1) slaves, who are not trusted

by,

3

of this dissertation, Hobbes draws

and who are thus kept imprisoned or shackled in bonds.
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chains or other impediments to corporeal
motion by their
masters, and (2) servants, who are trusted
by their masters
and, as such, are afforded a degree
of corporeal freedom.

seems clear that

a

It

servant, by virtue of being trusted by

his master, and by virtue of being afforded
a certain level
of corporeal

freedom, is in a favorable position to strike

out against and to attempt to kill his
master.

Indeed, as

I

suggested earlier in this dissertation,

one might plausibly suggest that in many cases,
this

recognition on the part of the servant, especially

if he

happens to be part of a two person grouping, will encourage
him to disobey the orders of his master or to attempt to
kill his master. Surely,

the servant's exercising such

a

strategy, which would involve his failing to discharge the

obligation which he had earlier taken upon himself through
the contractual apparatus, would almost certainly have the

effect of destroying the integrity of his group.
The situation within larger groupings, and especially

within fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS, would be somewhat
different for

a

variety of reasons. In the first place,

since the internal peacekeeping and punitive mechanism

within the COMMONWEALTH will certainly be more organized,
more highly developed and more ominous a presence than will
be the case within smaller groupings, we might reasonably

expect that citizens within COMMONWEALTHS would be less
likely to believe that they can strike out against their
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sovereign (or their master) with impunity than
would be
servants within "f ami 1 ies
.

Secondly, as was mentioned in Chapter

dissertation,
a

a

citizen of

of this

COMMONWEALTH will likely enjoy

a

much more comfortable, creative and predictable mode of

existence than will
a

3

a

natural person who constitutes part of

state of nature-2 type social unit. Since the citizen

within a COMMONWEALTH can be supposed to have the perception
that his physical safety is not in danger, while the subject

within a Hobbesian ’’family” cannot be assumed to be assured
of his own continuing physical

all likelihood,

safety, the former will,

come to recognize the profound value of the

social grouping of which he is
will

part.

a

In turn,

the citizen

likely come to desire that his COMMONWEALTH continues

to exist in the future,
all

in

and will thus be motivated to take

reasonable (or necessary) steps to support the continued

existence of his COMMONWEALTH. By contrast, the subject
within a ’’family” will, in all likelihood, not feel such

a

devoted commitment to preserving or maintaining the
integrity of his social group. Since we might reasonably
contend that the servant within

a

’’family” will

often

(correctly) perceive that his social group is insufficiently
robust and stable to be reckoned upon to adequately preserve
his life, save him from

a

violent death at the hands of an

assailant or provide him with

a

requisitely tranquil social

situation to enable him to procure for himself the means for
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psycnoiogical ly) comfortable existence,
he
will therefore feel a much
weaker stake in seeking to insure
that his present social group
continues to exist.

Additionally, and related to the
latter point, Hobbes
indicates that a servant within a
'’family" will be much more
apt than a subject within a
COMMONWEALTH to encounter

situations where he is justified to
disobey the directive of
his group leader, and thus
ostensibly fail to discharge the
obligation which he had earlier incurred
upon himself. Since
human beings enter into social or
political groups

principally for the sake of assuring their own
physical
safety and saving themselves from the
prospect of suffering
a violent death, and since a
smaller social or
political

grouping can be assumed to provide to its members

a

weaker

or less frequently manifested level of physical
safety (and

protection from suffering
within

a

families

a

violent death) than is available

COMMONWEALTH, natural persons who live within
can be assumed to have a somewhat weaker and less

steadfast commitment to preserving the integrity of their
group than can members of fully fledged COMMONWEALTHS.

Admittedly, an individual's degree of commitment to

preserving the social or political grouping of which he is
part should not be thought of as a bivalent quality

according to which an individual either does or does not
have

a

strong motivation to do all he can to preserve the

integrity of his group. Rather, the degree of commitment to

a

such

a

goal, and in fact, the absence of an individual's

tendency to defect from his group, can be assumed to be very
low within (highly unstable) two person groupings, somewhat

greater within large state of nature-2 type "families," even
greater within comparatively weak COMMONWEALTHS, and the
highest within strong COMMONWEALTHS.^^
Thus, we may assert that a person's degree of

commitment to the active preservation of the group to which
he belongs will gradually vary from

a

very low level within

two person defensive groupings^^ to a very high level

within highly developed, well-regulated state of nature-3
type units,

(which Hobbes believed, at the very least, to be

within the organizational capability of human beings)
Even though Hobbes was somewhat unspecific about what

precisely differentiates
"family" from

a

a

large state of nature-2 type

small fully fledged COMMONWEALTH, he was

nevertheless committed to the position that life within
state of nature-3 type COMMONWEALTH is characteristical

a
1

y

more comfortable, tranquil and creative than is life within
a

state of nature-2 type "family."
C.

Why Should the Citizen Obey?

In A Review and conclusion to Leviathan

Hobbes

expresses the belief that with respect to subjects within

existing governments, there exists

a

reciprocal relation

between protection and obedience. That is to say, according
to Hobbes,

if an individual

finds himself living under
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a

government which is sufficiently powerful to preserve the
and to protect the individual from the

aggressive attacks of either his fellow citizens or the
citizens of some external power, then the individual owes

allegiance to the sovereign of his COMMONWEALTH.^^ Lurking
behind his pronouncement concerning the reciprocal relation

bstween protection and obedience is Hobbes's recognition
that life within any effective COMMONWEALTH is vastly

superior to life in the state of nature,^® or more
relevantly from an historical standpoint, to the type of
life which awaits a man who lives in

a

condition of civil

war similar to that which existed in Britain in the 1640s.

According to Hobbes, given the character which social
relations can be expected to assume in a condition where men
who had previously lived under an effective sovereign

authority find themselves bereft of such

a

sovereign

mechanism, reason dictates that men who currently live under
an effective sovereign authority endeavor,

to the utmost of

their abilities, to prevent the occurrence of

a

condition of

the former (sovereignless and inhospitable) type. One

reasonable means of avoiding such an unappealing eventuality
is to willingly obey and support the efforts of one's

sovereign whenever the latter is able to effectively

maintain

a

Thus,

condition of peace and safety.
if a man finds himself

in a position where he can

either willingly submit to the authority of the present
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sovereign, who is capable of maintaining the public
order,
or else refuse to submit to the authority of
that existing

sovereign (by openly rebelling against, or by otherwise
failing to obey the directives of that power), that man

would be a fool to pursue the second option. Since in this
example, the alternative to submitting to the established

sovereign involves the establishment of, or the reversion to
a

condition in which the danger of violent death is probable

and omnipresent, one would be well advised to pledge one's

allegiance to the existing government. We must now examine
how well this explanation holds up when subjected to further

scrutiny
Hobbes believed that the main factor or the main
feature of the human organism which causes men and women to
enter into, and to remain members of a COMMONWEALTH is fear,

either that of one's group leader, or of the human beings in
one's vicinity, or of the prospect of returning to

a

less

hospitable social condition.^
1

During his discussion of covenants and oaths in chapter
14 of Leviathan

,

Hobbes notes that even though "the force of

words" is "too weak to hold men to the performance of their

covenants," there are, nevertheless, "two imaginable helps
to strengthening it."

And these are
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either a fear of the consequences of
breaking
one's word, or a glory or pride in
appearing not
to need to break it. This latter is
a generosity
too rarely found to be presumed on,
especially in
the pursuers of wealth, command or sensual
pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind.
Rather, opines Hobbes, in most of these instances,
"the

passion to be reckoned upon is fear."^® As Hobbes
further
points out, such fear can be of powers invisible or of
one's
fellow men, and "even though the former be the greater
power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater
fear."^^
In this respect, Hobbes claims that sovereignty by

institution differs from sovereignty by acquisition "only
[sic] in this, that they who choose their sovereign, do it

for fear of one another and not him they institute but" in

the case of sovereignty by acquisition, "they subject

themselves to him they are afraid of
he concludes,

.

"In both cases,"

"they do it for fear."^^

Since Hobbes voiced his agreement with the ancient

maxim Salus populi suprema lex
of the people is the supreme law,

that is, the safety
and thus the primary

responsibility with which the sovereign is charged, and
since most reflective citizens will come to realize that
even a minimally effective sovereign will guard the public
order, maintain a condition of safety for his/its citizens,

and thus deliver each citizen from the strong likelihood of

suffering

a

violent death (the surrmum malum, after all, for
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human beings), many or most of these citizens will come to
realize that each citizen possesses

a

strong reason to

support the efforts of his existing sovereign. A desire to
save oneself from a violent death, coupled with a

recognition of the above mentioned fact can be expected to

motivate many reflective citizens to act in the appropriate
fashion, that is, to indeed support the efforts, and follow
the directives of the existing sovereign.

We must keep in mind, moreover, that each citizen is to
be conceived as having entered into a contractual bargain in

which he has agreed to be bound by the will of the
sovereign; to fail to do so would, after all, be
of the terms of his contract, and thus,

a

violation

constitute an unjust

action. This would surely have some motivational force upon
the citizen's eventual action. Nevertheless, the most

pressing factor which motivates
of,

a

citizen to become

or to remain a part of his COMMONWEALTH,

a

part

is a fear of

his fellow citizens, and specifically, a fear of the effects
of the unpredictable actions of his present fellow citizens.

This being said,

I

will now move on to actually consider the

viability of COMMONWEALTHS which are composed of Hobbesian

men and women.
D.

How Compelling is Hobbes's Advice to C itizens of

Commonwealths?
It

would seem that the maintenance of the internal

order within such a multi-person unit as
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a

modern

COMMONWEALTH depends upon (A) the perception
among
substantial majority of its citizens that the

a

existing

sovereign enjoys

a

sufficient level of support among

a

sufficient proportion of the population to
enable him to
insure that such citizens will not fall victim to
death or
serious injury due to internal strife (or external
aggression), and (B) the actual willingness of

a

substantial

majority of its citizens to actively discharge the
obligations which they have (formerly) incurred by virtue of
having entered into an actual or hypothetical social
contract^^.

Specifically, citizens could be understood to

discharge such obligations by acting in accordance with the
directives issued by the sovereign, and thus, by actively
obeying those pronouncements which can be identified as the
public will” or the will of the sovereign.
We must recall at this point that Hobbes considered one
of the preeminent benefits of

life within an organized

COMMONWEALTH to be the ability to safely observe the laws of
nature (in foro externo) with the assurance that the

behavior of most of one's fellow citizens will conform to
the civil

law (which ideally encompasses the laws of

nature). Hence, with the establishment of the COMMONWEALTH
comes a level of predictability (with respect to the

behavior of the natural persons in one's vicinity), which is
absent, or at the very least, much less able to be counted
upon,

in the state of nature (-2).
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quickly becomes clear to us, however,
that (1) the
sum of the actual (combined) physical
power wielded
It

by the

natural human being (or human beings) who
constitutes (or
constitute) the sovereign^*
the actual combined

^

physical power of the natural human beings whose
function it
is to regulate the public peace within
that COMMONWEALTH

pales in comparison with (2) the actual (combined)
physical

power wielded by the members of the COMMONWEALTH who

constitute neither part of its sovereign mechanism nor
part
of its peace-keeping force.

Thus,

from one standpoint,

each citizen who composes a part of, or dwells within an

existing COMMONWEALTH, has more to fear from his fellow
than he does from either the sovereign or from

those who have been designated by the sovereign to maintain
a

condition of internal peace.

inferred that each citizen has

For this reason, it can be
a

compelling pragmatic or

prudential reason to agree to be bound by the will of the
sovereign, provided that the latter does command a

sufficient level of obedience to maintain the public order.
Unfortunately, however, it appears that in offering his
advice to sovereigns and citizens, Hobbes is essentially

"preaching to the converted

."

(or,

at any rate,

to those

who are capable of being easily convinced and converted) By
this,

I

mean that within his political writings, Hobbes can

be understood to be attempting to convince his readers that

behavior which has the effect of destabilizing one's
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COMMONWEALTH should be avoided or suppressed. Thus, if the
ideas contained in his writings are to be effective, that
IS,

if such ideas are to have practical

value, Hobbes must

appeal to, and attempt to alter the behavior of those men
and women whose actions are frequently of

a

socially

disruptive nature. Indeed, in order for Hobbes’s
recommendations to have

a

beneficial effect upon the

condition of existing COMMONWEALTHS, he must somehow
convince those whom we have been referring to as dominators
that they should recognize that they are fundamentally

(naturally) equal to all of their adult fellow citizens, and
that,

for the sake of fostering

a

harmonious and smoothly-

run COMMONWEALTH, they should resolve to suppress their urge
to demonstrate their supposed natural superiority over other

men and women.

jn

While the arguments contained within Hobbes's writings
can easily be imagined to convince moderate men, that is,

men who are satisfied with an equality of nature (with their
fellow men), these arguments will be reckoned somewhat less

effective in convincing dominators, whose imperialistic,

socially disruptive passions were described by Hobbes as
being ineliminable natural constituent features of such

dominators' corporeal selves. Thus, if they are to

effectively serve the function for which this author
intended them, Hobbes's arguments must have the power to
alter the attitude, or at the very least, the behavior of
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dominators-

However, since the behavior of dominators was

regarded by Hobbes to be incorrigible, unalterable, and not

susceptible to appeals to reasoned principles, Hobbes's
prescriptions would seem to be precluded from having the
desired effect upon the constituent nature, and the level of
overall stability of the COMMONWEALTH.

Unhappily, the presence of dominators within the

COMMONWEALTH would have the additional undesirable effect of
rendering even moderate men unwilling to observe the types
of principles suggested to citizens by Hobbes in Leviathan

and other of his political writings. Specifically, given

Hobbes's commitment to the belief that dominators will be
present within any sizable social grouping, and thus, within
every COMMONWEALTH, and more relevantly, given the eventual

recognition, on the part of the moderate men who populate
that COMMONWEALTH, that dominators are present within their

COMMONWEALTH, even moderate men, fearing that they might be
taken advantage of by such dominators, will in all

likelihood, be deterred from acting in a peaceable, mutually

accommodating fashion.
As mentioned above, the established sovereign

s

ability

to effectively preserve the public order, and thus to

maintain the viability of the COMMONWEALTH, depends upon the
perception on the part of

a

substantial majority of that

COMMONWEALTH'S citizens that their sovereign does indeed
possess the requisite level of public support to preserve
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a

condition of peace.

Moreover, if the sovereign is unabl

to maintain the citizens'

confidence by convincing them that

the civil order is not in danger of breaking down, and if
the citizens

confidence in the sovereign falls below some

critical level, the public order will in fact begin to break
down. One could easily imagine how an atmosphere of

uncertainty, fostered by

a

lack of the sufficient degree of

public confidence in the ability of the sovereign to force
his subjects to honor their contracts and observe the civil
laws, would lead even moderate men who are uncertain that

they can "bank upon" lawful behavior on the part of their

fellow citizens to "err on the side of safety" by failing to

discharge thei

contractual obligations. Consequently, in

this scenario, even moderate men,

(i.e.

those who harbor

a

sincere desire and willingness to foster the continued

existence of the COMMONWEALTH by following the directives of
the sovereign)

,

can be expected to be prompted by the

urgings of fear to behave in such

a

manner as will, in all

likelihood, foster that COMMONWEALTH'S dissolution. Indeed,
in this respect, a kind of "domino theory of the

commonwealth's dissolution" can be imagined to be

manifested
By this,

appear among

I

a

mean that if doubts of this kind initially
small number of (even moderate) citizens of

some COMMONWEALTH, it is plausible that such doubts could,
and in all likelihood, would,

gradually spread to larger
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and larger segments of the population and eventually
cause a

sufficient degree of social instability to destroy the
COMMONWEALTH. These initial doubts can be imagined to spread

throughout the population in no fewer than three ways:
first, by the dissemination of rumour and word of mouth;

second, through an unwillingness on the part of citizens to

observe the civil laws of the COMMONWEALTH; and third,

through an unwillingness on the part of citizens to repose
the degree of trust in one's fellow citizens which is

necessary to maintain

a

strong and viable COMMONWEALTH.

While the first method of transmission can be imagined to be

primarily of

a

verbal nature, the attitude associated with

the second and the third methods of transmission from one

citizen to another will be manifested primarily in behavior,
which will be observed by those natural persons within the

diffident citizen's (or citizens') environment.^^
Of course, we (or Hobbes) could specify that within a

well regulated COMMONWEALTH, the sovereign will provide

effective means to suppress the socially disruptive passionbased behavior of dominators, thus eliminating

a

significant

source of social instability within that grouping. That is,
even though we might concede that the behavior of dominators
is not subject to correction or alteration through rational

persuasion or reasoned argumentation, we might nevertheless

maintain that part of

a

COMMONWEALTH'S effective internal

peace-keeping mechanism consists of provisions for the
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coercive suppression of such
passion-based socially
disruptive behavior. However, at

this juncture, we must

seriously ask ourselves how effective
such provisions can be
expected to be.
Indeed, to contend that the formation
and maintenance
of an internal peace-keeping
mechanism which is capable of

effectively controlling or constraining
the socially
destructive passion-based behavior which
dominators would
otherwise exhibit is a relatively easy or
unproblematic
process, seems to seriously underestimate
the tenacity of
such dominators’ passions. Even though the
effectiveness of
such a mechanism to suppress or control the
behavior of the
citizens of a COMMONWEALTH can be assumed to vary
inversely

with the percentage of dominators who constitute
that
COMMONWEALTH,^^ Hobbes's classic descriptions of the

behavior characterist i c of dominators clearly indicate that
the problem of dominators will significantly affect any

social grouping.

Interestingly, although he is frequently represented as
a

proponent of repressive authoritarian methods of

governing, Hobbes's political philosophy actually reflects

concern with allowing

a

substantial amount of freedom to the

citizens of the COMMONWEALTH.^^ Moreover, it would seem
that even though the

a

exercising of

a

requisite level of

social control to convince the citizens that they are safe
to carry on the conduct of daily life is a necessary
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constituent feature of any effective governmental
organization, it would additionally appear that in many
actually exercising this level of social control

could have effects of

a

seriously counterproductive or

destabilizing nature. Indeed,

a

rather serious problem can

be envisioned to emerge when we consider that, on the one

hand, the sovereign or leader of a COMMONWEALTH can be

expected to need to employ some rather severe authoritarian

methods of governing in order to effectively suppress the
socially disruptive behavior of dominators while, on the
other hand, the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH whose sovereign

routinely employs such methods are likely to resent the

severity of such measures. Citizen resentment can be
expected to arise precisely because such severe

authoritarian measures are likely to be perceived by both
the dominators and the moderates within the COMMONWEALTH as

constituting overly harsh restrictions on personal liberty.
That is to say, by inadvertently creating the perception
that he and his agents are exercising unjustifiably harsh

methods of social control (methods of social control which,
in all

likelihood, will be necessary to keep the socially

disruptive behavior of dominators in check), the sovereign
is likely to undercut the freely given support of his

citizens, the latter of which is, after all, required to

insure the COMMONWEALTH'S continued existence.

Hence, the

problem related to the suppression of the behavior
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of

dominators within COMMONWEALTHS can be understood to be twopronged: In the first place, it is doubtful that methods of
social control which are adequate to suppress the antisocial

behavior of dominators can be formulated and implemented,
and in the second place, even if such methods could be

developed and successfully implemented, it seems likely that
the utilization of such methods would result in an

unintended diminution of public support for the program of
the sovereign- Simply, the employment of the severe

authoritarian methods which are necessary to accomplish this
task is likely to be resented by much of the citizenry. In
turn, the employment of these techniques would, in all

likelihood, have the effect of eroding the citizens' support
for their sovereign. Finally, such an erosion of citizen

support would likely bring disastrous effects upon the

COMMONWEALTH precisely because (1) the persistence of such
citizen support is necessary to foster the continued

existence of the established COMMONWEALTH and because (2)
such citizen support cannot be extorted from those citizens
but rather, must be freely given.
E.

Is Hobbes's Justificatory Project Successful?

Needless to say, there is something artificial or

unrealistic about Hobbes's account of the generation of

COMMONWEALTH by institution. As was noted in chapter

5

a

of

this dissertation, Hobbes provides a detailed description of
the remarkably civil process by which a multitude of
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Hobbesian natural persons who inhabit the same geographical
region come to peacefully agree to obey and be bound by the
will of some designated sovereign authority.

In this

respect, an obvious criticism of Hobbes's position is that
one can hardly expect the predominantly self interested,

death aversive individuals who inhabit the state of nature-1
to willingly attempt to forge a peace-keeping agreement with

those who live in their vicinity, especially in light of the
fact that such individuals lack a guarantee that their

overtures to peace will not be met with violence. Quite
simply, in the state of nature-1, one cannot expect

Hobbesian individuals to assume the enormous personal risks
that are involved in taking upon oneself the role of

peacemaker
A fairly likely response to this objection on the part
of a supporter of Hobbes is that although we should not

expect a COMMONWEALTH by institution to arise from out of
the state of nature-1 in the manner indicated by this

author, Hobbes's account of the institution of such an

"artificial" COMMONWEALTH is not intended to chronicle an
actually instantiated historical event, but is meant rather
to demonstrate why men and women who find themselves living

within actually existing COMMONWEALTHS have an obligation to
obey their sovereign. In light of this, we might claim that

Hobbes's account is intended not to describe the genesis of,
but rather to justify the continued existence of an
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established COMMONWEALTH and to shed light on the nature of
the social bonds which unite or tie a number of disparate

individuals into one coherent social unit. Thus, political

philosophers as well as men and women who dwell within

COMMONWEALTHS are to regard the obligation of the citizens
to the sovereign of their COMMONWEALTH as being identical to

that which would be explicitly acknowledged were a disparate

group of solitary individuals to form

a

society "by

institution" in the manner indicated by Hobbes.
true,

If

this is

then Hobbes’s main objective in discussing

COMMONWEALTH by institution is not to describe to the
citizen the actual process by which his COMMONWEALTH was set
up,

but rather, to show the citizen how he must behave in

order to make most probable his own long and relatively

fulfilling life (and importantly, to show the citizen how he
must conceive of his relationship to his sovereign).

Although such

a

defense of Hobbes's position does

possess a certain degree of plausibility,

I

contend that

this account is still flawed since it fails to take adequate
37
account of the human behavioral tendencies which would,

in all probability,

effectively prevent the COMMONWEALTH by

institution being formed in the manner indicated by Hobbes.
That is to say, even if we (correctly) conceive of Hobbes's

project not as one of explaining the actual historical
process by which COMMONWEALTHS are instituted, but rather as
one of explaining the basis of the citizen's obligation to
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obey his sovereign (and of convincing the citizen that he

should behave in

a

particular fashion), Hobbes in his

account nevertheless fails to acknowledge that human
antisocial tendencies and an abiding uncertainty among the

citizens of

a

COMMONWEALTH that their fellow citizens will

act in the required manner, will very likely^® prevent

citizens from confidently complying with the directives of
their sovereign. Moreover, given man's self-seeking

tendencies, man's apparent willingness to violate contracts

when he believes that he may do so without being detected,
and the very evident constraints which limit the natural

power of even the mightiest of sovereign "persons," we may

conclude that the prospect of any COMMONWEALTH existing for
a

substantial period of time is rather bleak.
Granted, even though the project of justifying

allegiance to an already existing social institution stands
a greater chance of success than that of demonstrating that

such an institution arose from

a

general convention attended

by a multitude of human beings who do not enjoy the benefit
of any social

ties, even the former task will strike the

reader as a formidable one given Hobbes's rather extreme and

inflexible conception of human nature. Indeed, given the

divisive behavioral tendencies which Hobbes attributes to
human beings, and given the fact that Hobbes believed such

tendencies will remain a constituent part of the human

organism even after they have "entered into"
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a

COMMONWEALTH

instituting social agreeinent, one would have little reason
to simultaneously accept Hobbes's conception of human nature

(and behavior) and the proposition that socially established

COMMONWEALTHS will endure for any sustained period of time.
Upon recognizing this truth, however,

a

significant problem

with Hobbes's philosophy of politics glaringly emerges.

Specifically, we must acknowledge as an empirically

verifiable truth that COMMONWEALTHS do persist, in some
cases for hundreds of years. We might better understand the

nature of this difficulty by considering the following
argument

(1)

If

Hobbes's conception of human nature is correct, then
COMMONWEALTHS should not be expected to persist for
substantial periods of time

(2)

COMMONWEALTHS do (as

a

matter of fact) persist for

substantial periods of time
(3)

Therefore, Hobbes's conception of human nature is
incorrect

Hobbes's harsh conception of human nature and his dismal
assessment of human associative potential, if accurate,
would appear to render unworkable any long-lasting

collective social unit such as

a

COMMONWEALTH.

Though Hobbes had little praise for the manner in which
theretofore existing COMMONWEALTHS had been designed or
introduced
organized, he nevertheless believed that he had
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monumental innovations into the science of
governing.
Indeed, Hobbes famously insisted that civil
philosophy is
"no older than my own book De Cive .”^^ and
rather

immodestly observed that^®
[t]ime, and industry, produce every day new
knowledge. And as the art of well building is
derived from principles of reason, observed by
industrious men, that had long studied the nature
of the materials, and the divers effects of
figure, and proportion, long after mankind began,
though poorly, to build: so, long time after men
have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect,
and apt to relapse into disorder, there may
principles of reason be found out, by industrious
meditation, to make their constitution, excepting
by external violence, everlasting. And such are
those which I have in this discourse set forth.

Thus, Hobbes believed that the principles of justice and

sovereignty which he propounded in Leviathan and De Give

,

could be employed by an interested ruler or sovereign to

prevent his (i.e., the latter's) COMMONWEALTH from

dissolving or being torn asunder by internal destabilizing
influences

Though Hobbes clearly maintained that

a

COMMONWEALTH

organized in accordance with his own prescriptive principles
could, barring a successful external invasion, be expected
to endure perpetually, he was much less sanguine about the

possibility of COMMONWEALTHS not organized in accordance
with his principles enjoying such success. Additionally,

Hobbes believed that no society which existed either in his
own time or in earlier stages of history was or had been
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organized in accordance with his principles,
and in
Leviathan he expressed his fervent hope that

his "short"

,

book would someday find its way^^
into the hands of a sovereign who will
consider it
himself.
without the help of any interested or
envious interpreter: and by the exercise of entire
sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of
it, convert this truth of speculation, into
the
utility of practice.
.

,

Notwithstanding his rather sel f -vaunting pronouncements
on this issue, Hobbes could hardly have denied
that many of

the COMMONWEALTHS which have been established over the

course of history have, for whatever reason, managed to
endure, in some cases for hundreds of years, despite not

having been organized in accordance with his own propounded
political principles. However, given Hobbes’s generally

pessimistic estimate of human associative potential

,

his

contention that human beings are born naturally i^fit for
life within societies, and his stark view of the influence
of the socially disruptive human passions upon individual

persons (as well as upon social groups that are composed of
such persons), such

a

result should not have obtained.

Indeed, the fact that COMMONWEALTHS have, as a matter of
fact, been chronicled to have endured for substantial

periods of times seems strikingly inconsistent with Hobbes’s

presuppositions, especially in light of his claim that his

principles of political organization have never been put
into effect by

a

sovereign or civil ruler. Thus, we are left
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with the conclusion that Hobbes's philosophical anthropology
or theory of human nature portrays human beings in

unjustifiably harsh colours; for if

a

significant proportion

of human beings were as naturally self-interested and

rapacious as Hobbes contends, virtually any human social

enterprise would be doomed from the start.
F.

Concluding Remarks

A careful reading of his philosophical writings reveals

that Hobbes forwards no fewer than three distinct

conceptions of the pre-political situation which he labels
"the natural condition of humankind," or "the state of

nature." By examining the relevant passages from The
Elements of Law

,

De Give and Leviathan

Hobbes's three

,

principal works of political philosophy,

I

have shown that

Hobbes's state of nature should not be interpreted as
single invariant concept but rather as

a

a

series of three

distinct heuristic or expository models. It is my contention
that Hobbes's complex model of the state of nature gradually

took shape during the course of his political writings as

Hobbes successively attempted to imagine how human beings,

whom he believed to be endowed with

a

specific invariant

human nature, would behave when subjected to differing
levels of social control and individual freedom. It is

important to realize that even though the representative
units involved in the various conceptions of the state of

nature do differ from conception to conception,
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the

natural qualities attributed to individual persons remain

constant across the three conceptions. It is precisely the
fact that human nature remains constant irrespective of

whether the individual under consideration (1) lives in or

constitutes part of

a

COMMONWEALTH,

constitutes part of

a

"family,” or (3) is considered to

(2)

lives in or

inhabit the state of nature-1 which militates against the

successful formation and maintenance of any collective
social enterprise,

(even one as putatively stable as a fully

fledged COMMONWEALTH)
In the final analysis,

the internal consistency of

Hobbes's system is undermined by this author's forwarding an

unjustifiably severe doctrine of human nature and behavior.
I

characterize Hobbes's doctrine of human nature as

"unjustifiably severe" precisely because it appears highly
improbable that human associative groupings composed of such
biological organisms could (1) be instituted or established
in accordance with any of the techniques indicated by Hobbes

throughout the course of his writings or (2) remain viable
units even if such units were brought into existence either
in the manner indicated by Hobbes,

or through some other

method. This first point of inconsis tency (1) would

seriously impugn Hobbes’s project of demonstrating that
viable social or political units can be conceived as arising
in accordance with the processes indicated in his writings,

while the second point of inconsistency (2) would cast
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serious doubt upon Hobbes's justificatory
project of
convincing the interested reader that he

[the latter] has a

compelling reason, and is indeed obligated,
to support the
efforts of the established sovereign
mechanism in the area
where he dwells, by scrupulously complying
with the

directives of that sovereign.
Though Hobbes might be reckoned by some to
have offered
sage advice to those men and women who are
confronted with
the choice of either (A) complying with the
directives
of

their existing sovereign or of (B) refusing to comply
with

such directives and thus helping to foster the degeneration
of the COMMONWEALTH to which they belong,

we must conclude

that the philosophical basis of Hobbes's propounded

prescription is seriously undercut by his refusal to embrace
and urge as accurate a conception of human nature which will

allow for the formation and maintenance of viable,
*Tiu 1

1i

pe rson units.

In the absence of his offering such a

conception, we must conclude that Hobbes's philosophical

project of convincing men and women that they have

a

compelling reason to obey the directives of their sovereign,
stands a dim chance of success.

Because Hobbes endorses a model of the human organism

which renders extremely unlikely the possibility of viable
and sustained human associative groups, Hobbes's

recommendation that citizens of existing COMMONWEALTHS
should take all the steps necessary to preserve the given
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regime by obeying the laws and supporting
the cause of their
sovereign, strikes this reader as a wel 1
-conceived strategy
for guaranteeing one's own demise and
destruction. For if

Hobbes's severe model of the human organism
were accurate,
acting in such a "prosocial" manner would
almost inevitably
lead to being taken advantage of, and perhaps
being

destroyed by the hostile (or perhaps merely preemptive
or
anticipatory) acts of other men.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this

dissertation is that in presenting his philosophy of
politics, Hobbes forwards an unrealistically or

unjustifiably harsh conception of the nature of human
beings, a conception which, if taken seriously, would

prevent this author from insisting that stable and secure
political units such as COMMONWEALTHS could be consistently

established or maintained.
The most obvious solution to this predicament is to

revise one's conception of human nature and human

associative potential to

a

model which is more in keeping

with what has been shown to be the case throughout the

course of human history, and which is more amenable to the

formation and maintenance of stable social groupings. To do
so would not require the theorist to forward

a

conception of

the human organism which construes such beings as naturally

sociable, or as capable of forming (much less spontaneously
forming) stable multi-person groups in which each individual
223

member lives in perfect harmony with every
other.
Unfortunately, the limited scope of this
research project
prevents the present writer from offering
specific concrete
answers to the question of how the theorist’s
conception of
human nature can be changed so as to more
faithfully

reflect

the truths which we see manifested before us,
and to salvage

Hobbes's descriptive and prescriptive projects from
the
charges of irrelevance and unworkability
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NOTES
l.See, for example, Hobbes, Man and Citizen

,

page 109.

Or "perturbationes animi " See Chapter 12 of De Homine in
Hobbes, Man and Citizen pages 55-62.
2.

.

,

3. For textual confirmation of the first claim made in this
sentence, namely, that Hobbes was of the opinion that nature
rendered human beings unfit for life within collective
organizational units, see Hobbes's contention that "man is
made fit for society, not by nature but by education."
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen page 110.) For textual
confirmation of the second claim, specifically, that certain
human beings, whom we have been calling dominators, are
especially unsuited to conform to the norms of behavior
required within collective organizational units, see my
extended discussion of the behavior of dominators in Chapter
2 of this dissertation. In order to see that Hobbes did not
consider human beings to be naturally sociable creatures,
one need only read "The Author's Preface to the Reader" and
section 2 of chapter 1 of De Cive (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
pages 95-106; 110-113) Additionally, see Hobbes, Leviathan
pages 108-109; Hobbes, De Cive pages 167-169, and Hobbes,
5.
Elements of Law pages 102-103.
,

,

.

,

,

,

,

4.1 attempted to present Hobbes's answer to the first of
these questions (1) in the first chapter of this
dissertation,
Hobbes's answer to the second of these
6.
questions (2) in the second chapter of this dissertation,
and Hobbes's answer to the third of these questions (3) in
7.
the third, fourth and fifth, chapters of this dissertation.
At various points throughout this dissertation, I have
endeavored to show why Hobbes believed that citizens of
organized political units can be expected to actually remain
parts of such units; thus, at various places throughout this
dissertation, I have presented what I take to be Hobbes's
answer to the fourth of these questions.

Though considerations of brevity prevent me from
presenting a full-scale discussion of Hobbes's answer to
question (5), above, it should be noted that Hobbes's advice
to sovereigns of political units can be found primarily in
chapters 22-30 of Leviathan (Hobbes, Leviathan pages 146.

233.

,

)

And, of course, since the laws of nature require that one
actively perform in a manner consistent with this 'as if'

consideration
Hobbes, Leviathan

,

page 109.
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8.

See Hobbes, Leviathan

.

pages

220-221.

9 See my explanation of why this might
plausibly be supposed
to occur in the paragraph which begins with the
words "In
the first place," on pages 165-166 of this dissertation.
.

10. I judge this to be a reasonable expectation since
a
stable state of nature-3 type COMMONWEALTH will almost(1)
*^®*^tainly contain a more sophisticated and more reliable
punitive and peace-keeping apparatus than will a relatively
unstable state of nature-2 type "family," and since (2) the
citizens or the subjects within the respective type of
11.
grouping will, in all likelihood, form accurate beliefs
regarding the effectiveness and reliability of the peace
keeping apparatus of their own group via empirical
observation

Even though a state of nature-2 type "family" can be
expected to provide its members with some degree of
protection against the predatory attacks of external
aggressors,
because such groups are described by Hobbes as
12.
being unstable and factious units, and because human beings
living within such units are described as being deprived of
the bases or prerequisite conditions for a commodious
existence, a subject within such a unit can be supposed to
believe that he has much less to lose if his present social
group were to dissolve that he would be were he a citizen
13.
within
a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH.

"Strong COMMONWEALTHS" can be characterized as those
COMMONWEALTHS in which the citizens possess the greatest
degree of confidence in the state's ability to insure their
own physical safety, are able to most fully enjoy the fruits
of science, industry and the trappings of a "commodious"
society, and most fully understand that their relatively
comfortable, stable, and anxiety-free lifestyle is directly
attributable to living within such a political unit.

Which were conceived by Hobbes as theoretically possible,
though seldom actually existing historical units. Recall
Hobbes's discussions of Adam's relationship to Cain in The
Questions concerning Liberty. Necessity and Chance on pages
183-184 of Vol V of Engl ish Works and on page 344 of Vol
VII of English Works
,

.

.

See also Hobbes, Leviathan page 144:
Hobbes, Engl ish Works Vol. IV, pages 420-25; Hobbes,
English Works Vol. V, pages 178-80; and Hobbes, Eng 1 i sh
Works Vol. VII, page 344.
14 Leviathan

p.

,

490.

,

,

,

,
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15 According to Hobbes, this includes the obligation to
"protect in war the authority, by which he is himself
protected in time of peace." (Hobbes, Leviathan page 490.)
Hobbes explains that a citizen incurs such an obligation
because "he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve
his
16. own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy
him, by whose strength he is preserved." (Hobbes, Leviathan
page 490 )
.

.

.

That is in a conception of the state of nature other than
the state of nature-3.
17 Admi ttedl y
asserting that Hobbes believed fear to be the
main or preeminent factor which motivates men and women to
enter into, and "persuades" them to remain members of the
COMMONWEALTH, does not do f ul 1 justice to Hobbes's thoughts
on this topic. For example, in a famous passage from the
final paragraph of chapter 13 of Leviathan Hobbes claims
that "(t)he passions that incline men to peace are fear of
death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious
living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them."
(Hobbes, Leviathan page 78.) Thus, Hobbes mentions a desire
for the means necessary for a commodious life and a hope to
obtain the material trappings which characterize such a
lifestyle as among the passions which incline men to seek
peace through the establishment of a COMMONWEALTH.
Significantly, however, in this oft-quoted passage Hobbes
lists the "fear of death" as the first passion which
inclines men toward peace.
,

,

,

18 Hobbes

Leviathan

,

page 87

19 Hobbes

Leviathan

,

pages 87-88

20 Hobbes

Leviathan

,

page 88.

21 Hobbes

Leviathan

,

page 88.

22 Hobbes

Leviathan

,

page 127

23 Hobbes

Leviathan

,

page 127

page 179; Hobbes, Leviathan,
24. See Hobbes, Elements of Law
V, page 178.
Vol
Works
page 219, and Hobbes, English
,

,

.

25. With one’s fellow citizens in the case of sovereignty by
institution, and with one's sovereign in the case of

sovereignty by acquisition.
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make this claim in full knowledge of the fact
that
Hobbes’s system, the human being who singly composes,
or fthe human beings who collectively compose
the
COMMONWEALTH'S sovereign constitutes, in its political
capacity, an artificial (as opposed to a natural)
person
Nevertheless, it should be noted that within this sentence
am referring to the natural (as opposed to the
artificial
or contractually established) power which is
possessed by
the natural human beings who comprise the sovereign,
the
sovereign's peace-keeping agents, etc.
26

I

i""

2 7 Admi t t ed 1 y
this statement would be patently false were
we considering an authentic democracy of the variety
described by Hobbes on pp 109-110 of The Elements of Law
Nevertheless, it must be recalled that Hobbes consistently
maintains that, with respect to governmental effectiveness,
monarchies are superior to aristocracies and aristocracies'
are superior to democracies. Thus, we must conclude that
Hobbes's preferred type of government is one in which the
above recounted statement is true, that is, a government in
which the combined physical power of the natural persons who
constitute the citizenry surpasses the combined physical
power of the natural persons who constitute the sovereign
and the sovereign's peace keeping forces. Note well,
however, Hobbes's somewhat inflated claim in The Author's
Preface to De Give that although he has endeavored "to gain
a belief in men that monarchy is the most commodious
government," it is the "one thing alone I confess in this
whole book not to be demonstrated, but only probably
stated." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen page 104.)
.

,

.

.

,

28. Of course, this fact makes it imperative that the
sovereign somehow manages to "win over the hearts," or
maintain the support of those men and women whom he governs;
for if the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH take the time to
consider that the total physical power of the governed
exceeds (perhaps far exceeds) that of the sovereign and
his/its minions, such citizens will come to recognize that
the sovereign's ability to maintain the public order will
depend directly upon the citizens' willingness to behave as
if the sovereign does indeed possesses the actual physical
power to compel them to observe the civil laws, (and thus,
to discharge their contractual obligation) Hence, the
citizens' fear of their sovereign's power can be recognized
to rest on a rather shaky or uncertain basis, specifically
upon the widely-held belief that the sovereign can maintain
the requisite level of support among the populace [or the
citizenry]. In this sense, we can understand that the
sovereign's power to control the actions of his/its citizens
is not a natural quality, but rather something which is
artificially generated (and sustained) through the
contractual apparatus.
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29. It should be noted that Hobbes did not believe that a
direct reading of his political writings would provide the
most likely mode of transmission of his ideas to the
majority of the citizens of the commonwealth. Rather, Hobbes
registered the belief that his ideas regarding sovereignty
and obedience should be proclaimed to the common people in
sermons delivered by clergymen who are to learn the tenets
of Hobbes's political philosophy while at university. Such a
conviction
30.
lies at the basis of Hobbes’s contention that
Leviathan should be adopted by, and taught to students by
the members of the faculty of English universities. (See
Hobbes, Leviathan page 496.)
.

As John Robison has pointed out to me, such arguments can
also be used to persuade moderates to keep dominators in
31.
check.
Of course, one would expect that moderate citizens
would actively take steps to control the behavior, or to
restrict the corporeal motion of their social 1 y-disruptive
dominator fellow citizens, only when they are called upon to
do so by their sovereign, (or by his authorized
representative)

Recall Hobbes's pronouncement that the "[r]eputation of
power is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of
those that need protection." (Hobbes, Leviathan page 51.)
,

32. See endnotes # 37 and # 38,

below.

33. If for the sake of argument, we were to conceive of a
COMMONWEALTH composed solely of moderate men who "are
satisfied with an equality of nature," who recognize the
profound benefits of living in a condition of peace, and who
are able and willing to consistently act in accordance with
the directives of the sovereign (as encapsulated in his
COMMONWEALTH'S civil laws), we would have some reason to
believe that this COMMONWEALTH is an effective and stable
unit. We would expect this to be the case since the
citizens' level of suspicion that the sovereign is unable to
effectively maintain public order will, in all likelihood,
be rather low. This characteristic, i.e. the low level of
suspicion among the populace, would be attributable to the
fact that most or all of the citizens within this
COMMONWEALTH are motivated, and are generally recognized to
be motivated, to support the efforts of their sovereign by,
among other things, refraining from attempting to disobey
the sovereign's directives.
However, for Hobbes, such a harmonious social condition
would constitute an unattainable ideal state since, as has
been mentioned a number of times already in this
dissertation, this author was committed to the position that
any sizable grouping of human beings will contain some
(never precisely specified) percentage of dominators.
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34. So that COMMONWEALTHS which contain smaller percentages
of dominators can be expected, all other things being equal,
to contain more effective means of internal peace keeping

(and behavioral control !) than COMMONWEALTHS which contain
smaller percentages of dominators.
35. See, for example, Hobbes, Leviathan
page 229, especially
the sections entitled "Good Laws, What?” and "Such as are
,

Necessary

.

36. Given the aforementioned differential

in the level of

combined physical power between (1) the sovereign and the
members of the sovereign's peace keeping forces, and (2) the
members of the citizenry, and the likely recognition of such
a differential on the part of a large number of those who
comprise the latter category (2), we must conclude that such
support cannot be physically extorted from the members of
the citizenry but must, rather, be freely offered.
37. It should be noted that the word 'would' in this sentence
is being used conditionally. To wit, in this sentence, I am
claiming (among other things), that if Hobbes's doctrine of
the human organism were accurate, then it would be the case
that a COMMONWEALTH by institution could not be formed in
the manner indicated by Hobbes, (barring the occurrence of
exceptionally preternatural conditions--see endnote # 38,
bel ow)

38. It should be noted that I am employing the phrase 'will
very likely' and not simply the term 'will' in this sentence
since the latter usage would, in this context, indicate
demonstrative certainty. That a collection of Hobbesian
human beings could spontaneously come together, and
subsequently live with each other in perfect harmony for the
remainder of all their natural lives is, strictly speaking,
possible despite Hobbes's frequently trumpeted
pronouncements concerning man's antisocial nature and man s
natural unfitness to form, to follow the laws of, and to
remain members of collective organizational units.
Strictly speaking, it is not impossible that upon
entering into the social contract, the sovereign and the
citizens of the newly-instituted COMMONWEALTH will, despite
their f requently-remarked-upon antisocial nature, live
together in perfect accord.
^
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On the other hand, given Hobbes's straightforward
pronouncements concerning man's antisocial nature (which
were discussed at great length earlier in this
dissertation), it seems overwhelmingly more likely (1) that
the human antisocial tendencies would prevent a collection
of Hobbesian men from forming societies in the manner
indicated by this author, and (2) that a recognition of the
human antisocial tendencies on the part of most or all of
the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH, accompanied by an abiding
uncertainty regarding the future behavior of one's fellow
citizens and a fear of losing one's life in a violent
encounter, would discourage many if not most citizens of the
COMMONWEALTH from confidently complying with the directives
of
39. their sovereign.
Obviously, because one cannot draw conclusions in this
40.
matter
with demonstrative certainty, one must be satisfied
to
make
claims concerning what is plausible or probable
41.
given Hobbes's repeatedly stated proclamations concerning
human nature and human behavior.

Hobbes, Engl ish Works

,

Vol

.

I,

page ix.

Leviathan

,

pages 220-221.

Hobbes, Leviathan

,

pages 243-244.

43. Hobbes,

42. So that the representative unit in the state of nature-1
is the individual natural person, the representative unit in
the state of nature-2 is the small unstable social group

which Hobbes designates the "family," and the representative
unit in the state of nature-3 is the COMMONWEALTH.
Providing such an alternative model of human nature might
prove difficult within the parameters of Hobbes's overall
system, since in his writings, this philosopher did expend a
good deal of effort in order to demonstrate that his model
of human behavior follows directly from that of his
mechanical view of human perception and conation (or
motivation). (See chapters 1-2 of this dissertation)
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